


A.G. JAVADEKAR

AXIONOETICS



VALUATIONAL
THEORY OF
KNOWLEDGE

EVER since the inception of epistemological enquiry in the history of philosophy, the theory of knowledge has suffered an undue abstractionism of one sort or another from the multiform and concrete human experience. In contemporary times this parochial tendency has been further intensified by physicalism of the Philosophy of Science, positivisation of Logic and the restricting of Philosophy to mere Linguistic Analysis. However important may be the contribution of these outlooks in epistemology and methodology, they do not constitute a solution of the real problem of knowledge understood in all its comprehensiveness.

In this book, Dr. A. G. Javadekar makes a plea for a re-orientation of epistemic enquiry. The basic point of view from which the human institution of knowledge is approached is axiological. This is in direct and challenging opposition to the positivist method of outlook. Since the various philosophical positions differ in their starting points, there is no reason, says the author, why one

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AXIONOETICS

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APPROACH TO REALITY

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Research Series—1

AXIONOETICS

Valuational Theory of Knowledge

A. G. JAVADEKAR, M. A., Ph. D.

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To

My Most Revered Teacher

PRINCIPAL S. V. DANDEKAR, M.A.
who initiated me into Philosophy

What ought to be being the Key to what is the whole conscious being is concerned: there is not merely the cognition of what is, there is also an appreciation of what it is worth.

—JAMES WARD
in *The Realm of Ends*

PREFACE

PHILOSOPHICAL systems differ from one another mainly because of the specific differences in their starting points. And though each such system may try to justify its own standpoint as possibly the best one, there rarely is any conviction about its claims. In general, the opposite initial standpoints come to cancel each other. It only remains a question of temperamental differences as to which of the positions should be taken and maintained. If this is all that philosophising requires, one wonders why one should not begin and end one's philosophy with the concept of value which is so fundamental and universal in human experience.

In the recent history of philosophical thought there was a time when Empiricism, Positivism, Scientism, Existentialism, Phenomenology, Linguistic Analysis held their sway on the minds of the philosophers. But each of these movements have undergone tremendous changes, so much so that it is very difficult to recognise them in terms of their initial positions. The movements, which, for a while appeared to be discrediting all ontological metaphysics, noumenal or transcendental enquiries, ratiocinative and speculative methods, essentialist and valuational viewpoints as meaningless, have gradually come to see the self-contradictions, parochialism and undue dogmatism which their own positions involve.

Originally it appeared that facts alone count in the acquisition of knowledge. Our madness for facts had gone to such an extreme in the contemporary thought, that we had even become suspicious about the meaningfulness of those propositions which could not be, in some way or the other, verified by making an appeal to facts. Thus a host of propositions which couched in them a reference to values were turned down as nonsensical, being no more than emotive expressions. Hence repeated warn-

ings had been issued to get our language analysed to enable us to purify it of all such extra-factual references to mere wishfulness. The so called values were looked down upon as nothing more than our affective attitudes of approvals and disapprovals, likes and dislikes, commendations and condemnations, hopes and fears, praises and blames. They had nothing to do with facts as they actually are. In the field of scientific knowledge we could not tolerate such extra-territorial loyalties to values. The only certified knowledge was scientific, and it was scientific in proportion as it followed a methodology by which verification in terms of facts alone could be made.

But is not our experience of values as fundamental as that of facts? Then why should facts rather than values be considered as more obligatory in our thinking consideration of things? Why at all should we be partial to facts as if values have no claim on us? If we could begin and end with facts, we can as well begin and end with values. Our enquiries and investigations can very well entirely be oriented in terms of values.

In contemporary philosophy more emphasis has rightly come to be put on the valuative aspect that is involved in all our judgements, including those which appear to be factual.

Again, there cannot be exclusive objectivism in our knowledge. We can hardly eliminate subjective elements in the knowledge situation. But in order to avoid degeneration into mere subjectivism, and to save universality in knowledge, it is well to begin with the concept of values, which, though experienced subjectively, have an objective meaning and an universal appeal.

Thus, improvement in the study of knowledge is from objectivity to subjectivity, and from subjectivity to valuation. Or in other words, it consists in going from facts to ideas and from ideas to ideals or values. In this way, ontology gives way to epistemology, and epistemology to axiology.

All abstract tendencies in epistemology could be overcome if we look upon knowledge as a concrete human institution which takes on the forms of science, philosophy, literature, religion, art, morals and so on, and judge them in terms of the basic values which human life naturally expresses and yearns for. Such a discipline helps to organise all human knowledge in terms of the human values.

This monograph on Axionoetics is an attempt in that direction. It proposes to study knowledge as a concrete human institution in terms of the concept of value which is the most fundamental of human experiences. It first shows a correlation between value, knowledge and reality and makes an introduction to the subject in hand. Next it considers the paradoxes which result from an abstract study of knowledge in the traditional epistemology. Thereafter the five-fold value attitudes to knowledge are critically expounded and the theory of self-validity of knowledge is suggested to avoid scepticism, and its limitations and valuational implications are made clear. Further, it discusses the comparatively concrete study of knowledge undertaken by the Sociology of Knowledge and Philosophy of History and shows their limitations. Then it makes a plea for an Ethics of Knowledge, and undertakes a consideration of the nature and worth of moral knowledge and the reality of freedom of the will as a value. Thus having applied the axiological view to Ethics, it goes on to apply it to Epistemology. It shows the various ways in which value is pertinently related to knowledge and makes an analysis of the epistemic values in the various epistemologies. The theories of truth and error are discussed and an axionoetic point of view is suggested. Then there is an attempt at applying the logical-value concept to Metaphysics as represented by the Vedānta and Buddhism. Here only the problem of the description of the Highest Reality which is central to Metaphysics is undertaken, and an estimation of the four-fold logical-value-attitude of Buddhism in

comparison with its double-edged application in the Vedānta is made. Then is taken up the application of the axiological view to the philosophies of Science and Religion (*dharma*). Thereafter is a suggestion of the criterion of harmony, as the one criterion that fits uniformly in the spheres of knowledge, art and morals. The values of truth, beauty and goodness are tested by the criterion of the internal and mutual harmony. Finally, there is an analysis of the concept of creativity which is so germane to human intellectual activities of knowledge in all its forms.

Thus a valuational viewpoint for the organisation of all knowledge—ethics, epistemology, sociology, history, metaphysics, science, religion and art has been worked out in this monograph. It is an initiation of a distinctive discipline. All new points of view cannot be systematically finalised in one stroke. Yet it is an humble attempt to break a new field.

Much of the contents of this book had previously appeared in the form of papers in the *Journal of the Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda*, *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Journal of the Philosophical Association*, and *Darshanik* (Hindi). I am thankful to the Editors of these for allowing me to use the material for this book.

My thanks are also due to my departmental colleagues Miss S. H. Divatia, M.A. (Cambridge) for intelligent and suggestive discussions, and Shri H. Prapanna, M.A. (Benares) for preparing the press copy. I am also grateful to Shri. S. L. Bhyrappa, M.A. (Mysore) of the Post-Graduate Department of Philosophy in the Vallabhbhai Patel Vidyapeeth, Anand, for preparing the Index.

A. G. JAVADEKAR

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AXIONOETICS

1.

FUNDAMENTALS OF AXIONOETICS

I. Axionoetics Defined

AXIONOETICS* is a valuational study of human experiences in general and intellectual acquisitions in particular. It is an axiological approach to the human institution of knowledge in all its forms such as science, philosophy, religion, literature, history and art. Though epistemology constitutes the core of axionoetic study, yet axionoetics is an attempt at a more comprehensive and a more concrete fulfilment of the traditional theory of knowledge with a specific emphasis upon the concept of value. There are certain limitations in the traditional epistemology, recognizing which axionoetic theory attempts to overcome them.

II. Intellect essentially Creative and Valuational

Human mind, intellect and knowledge have been studied in the various sciences. It is possible to trace the origin of human intellect in such a way that its nature could be described in physico-chemical, biological, psychological or sociological terms. Though all such studies reveal very important aspects of human intellect, they cannot be regarded either singly or collectively as exhaustive of the nature and function of intellect.

The popular belief that the dividing line between the brutes and the human beings is the possession of intelligence by the latter has been progressively proved to be wrong by the studies in comparative psychology. Intelligence, as psychology broadly understands it, consists in an ability to learn through trial and error or through insight, and profit by experience. But such intelligence is found in all animals in different degrees. Dogs,

* Greek, *Axiam*—to deem worth; *nous*—mind.

monkeys and elephants are certainly some of the most intelligent among the beasts.

It is the contention of Axionoetics that proper understanding of the nature of human intelligence is not possible through such descriptive sciences as Psychology and Anthropology. The experts in this field do admit the mysterious nature of the intelligence. But their insistence on a naturalistic explanation is very inadequate. We must make an axiological approach. The clue for human intelligence is found in its highest functions of creativity and appreciation of values. The naturalistic explanation based on causal determination, though useful in other fields, including animal psychology and an extensive portion of human psychology, is not applicable with reference to these highest modes of human intelligence. There may be a physico-chemical explanation in terms of bodily build and blood chemistry and endocrine glands in the cases of the abnormals, of the dull and of the average human beings, but such explanation cannot be final and complete at least in the case of geniuses in the fields of science, philosophy, art and morals. And even in the case of normal men, an experience of values and a conscious recognition of values is not explicable in wholly naturalistic way. Human intelligence is largely mechanical, but there is an innate potentiality in it of transcending this insentient mechanism, of going beyond the chain of causal determinations. The intelligence is at its real best when it enjoys the freedom of creation. Neither an appreciation of necessity nor a recognition of valuational discrimination (*viveka*) is either mechanically determined or naturalistically explicable. Whatever other abilities the beasts may have in common with the human beings, the sense of values appears to be a differentiating characteristic of the human beings. While the beasts are devoid of such a sense, the function of valuational discrimination is definitive of human intelligence.

In Indian philosophy the *buddhi* is looked upon as insentient or *jaḍa*. But it has been also emphasized especially in the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta that intellect, being the finest and subtlest element in human nature, is the only principle that has the capacity of reflecting the spirit. Intellect is thus Janus-faced, participating in both matter and spirit (*prakṛti* and *puruṣa*) and performs the schematic function of uniting them. It is thus the most valuable principle in human nature. It is therefore a half truth to reduce it to, or to explain it wholly in terms of, material being. Its freedom from and transcendence to matter is derived from the intimations that the intellect has from spirit. It is at its worst when materialized and best when spiritualized. Its creativity and valuational appreciation are owing to this ingredient spirituality.

The most remarkable function of human intellect is revealed in a valuational discrimination which it makes between the eternal and the transient, the absolute and the relative the *pāramārthika* and the *vyāvahārika*, the ultimate and the provisional, the real and the apparent, the essential and the accidental, the foundational and the superficial, the primary and the derivative, the perfect and the imperfect, the infinite and the finite, the ideal and the actual, the categorical and the conditional, the universal and the particular, the intrinsic and the instrumental, the genuinely good (*śreyas*) and the merely pleasant (*preyas*). The human understanding or wisdom consists in the possession of a proper sense of values and the capacity to reach a valuational systematization of all human experiences. This is the goal of Axionoetics.

In the variety of experiences which a human being is capable of, those experiences which are predominantly active rather than passive, free rather than determined, creative rather than representative, appreciative rather than receptive and valuational rather than factual, reveal pre-eminently the human nature.

It is in the light of this understanding of the nature of human intelligence that we can have a proper appreciation of human intellectual achievements in the fields of science and literature, morals and religion, philosophy and art. These are the diverse forms of human knowledge. Axionoetics undertakes to apply the concept of value, which is so original to intelligence, for a critical evaluation of human knowledge in this most comprehensive sense.

III. Valuing Contiguous with Knowing

The roots of valuation are in the very cognitive function of consciousness. As we know, it is possible to distinguish cognition, affection and conation, but it is not possible to separate these aspects of consciousness. And though the degree of the hedonic tone of cognition may be dependent upon the nature of the object of knowledge, which may be comparatively a dull object or an interesting one, it is difficult to have a cognition which has a null affective tone. The roots of appreciation, appraisal, or valuation lie in this affectivity of all knowledge. It may be even said that so long as the tonic effect is not felt to have arisen from any knowledge, that knowledge has not taken place at all. Intellectual cognition is very often looked upon as a prosaic process, but it is never so. Even in that kind of knowledge where intellectual operations are predominant, the hedonic undertone is always present. The intellect does take delight in intellectual operations. It does enter into love with its object. But besides unity of cognition and affection, of knowing and loving, understanding and appreciating, there is a third element of conation or activity which is also contiguous with the experience of knowing—feeling. The pleasant object of knowledge is pursued, the unpleasant avoided. The known object is so felt and valued as to have taken possession of the knower and issues in a will to deal with that object in a serviceable way. To the extent that cognition remains aloof from affection and conation, cognition worth the

name has not taken place. There are individual differences regarding the predominance of intellect, feeling or will, but the unity of these is not affected thereby. The cognition may originate in intellect or it may originate in feeling or even will, and this origin may affect the nature of cognition; but unless there is a sort of union in all these aspects the cognition has not reached its pitch. Hence knowledge and valuation, a judgement of fact and a judgement upon fact go hand in hand. Description dovetails with prescription, and understanding with estimation.

Knowledge is itself felt and willed. All human activities have a purpose sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious. The cognitive activity also has a purpose. Thus knowledge has an immanent teleology. This teleology renders knowledge appreciative of its object. The fulfilment of knowledge is in valuation. Or to put it in other words, valuation is symptomatic of knowledge.

IV. Reality Has a Value Structure

It is necessary to study knowledge as it originates in human experience in dealing with reality side by side with the efforts it involves in realizing values. If valuation of knowledge is the central problem of a theory of knowledge it could not be successfully attempted in terms of truth abstracted from the conception of value. Reorientation of a theory of knowledge in terms of value is necessitated by a complete understanding of the nature of fact, being or reality. Scientific philosophers like Eddington, Whitehead and Lloyd Morgan think of things and events not as colourless facts, but in terms of values. Our cognitive estimations are essentially axiological evaluations. We cannot look upon the universe simply passively as something that happens to be what it is, we are compelled by our constitution, as well as that of the universe, to view it as having a reference to a norm or an ideal. There is no choice before us whether to think or not to think of the worth of things, for worth is embedded in them. The posi-

tive outlook of the sciences including epistemology, is a deliberate abstraction of fact from value and as such a distortion of truth. The value is not a subjective addendum to reality, nor is it an indefinable quality attached to reality, nor again is it a form of utility that satisfies practice; but value is the very condition or essence of existence and knowledge. It is an error to abstract the actual from the ideal, the reality from the worth, the being from the meaning, and the fact from the value. Such abstract apprehension of a thing is a misapprehension, an error. To recognize the value that is a thing's essence is to comprehend fully the truth of it.

Identity of knowledge and existence, in some form, is usually recognized, but their identity with value is not. Out of the five universal characteristics of reality given by Vedānta, namely, being (*asti*), knowledge (*bhāti*), value (*priya, ānanda*), name (*nāma*) and form (*rūpa*) the first three are eternal and fundamental, and the last two transitory and superficial. Any theory of being or of knowledge that does not take into account the value aspect of existence and knowledge, is bound to be deficient. The Ṛgvedic conception of *Ṛta* and *Satya*, and the comprehensive doctrine of *Karma* in Indian Philosophy are a recognition of the basic value constitution of the universe. Value pervades everything. "It determines the meaning of the world as a whole as well as the meaning of every person, every event and every action".¹

V. Valuational Orientation of Epistemology

Such a contiguity of knowing and valuing will not be possible if it were not in the nature of things that they did possess value. It would not be sufficient to say that to know is to value and to be is to be capable of being known, the next complementary position also has to be accepted that to be is to possess value or to be valued. Value is the very dimension of being. The

¹ Lossky and Marshall: *Value and Existence*, p. 27.

aspect of value pervades knowledge on the one hand and the reality on the other. The ultimate stuff of which either our knowledge is made or reality is constituted is a triune of being-knowledge-value (*sat-cit-ānand*). If a metaphysical approach to epistemology could be made or an epistemological approach to metaphysics could be made, it should also be possible to make an axiological or valuational approach to both knowledge and reality. An orientation of both epistemology and metaphysics from an axiological point of view is conceived in Axionoetics.

There is one possible advantage in such an orientation. While metaphysical and epistemological differences of opinion are difficult to surmount, our intuitive recognition of value has a more or less unique universality about it. Value has a compelling interest for human consciousness. Value is axiomatic in its nature, self-evident in consciousness, objective in its being, social in its significance and universal in its appeal. We are not in Axionoetics so much concerned with axiological theories of the nature of value as with the simple recognition of values as values, and their application to the concrete human institution of the multiform acquisition of knowledge.

It is better to start with the intuitive foundation of values and evaluate our knowledge in all its forms of science, philosophy, literature, history and art in terms of those values. The essential function of philosophy is to arrive at a hierarchy of values, and by employing the criterion of the supremely valuable in human experience and knowledge, to determine the nature of reality. Such a determination of reality in terms of value may be called Axionoetic Idealism.

VI. Axionoetic Idealism

Axionoetics emphasizes the inevitable priority of knowledge over reality. Its interest in showing this is that we are concerned directly with knowledge and nothing else, that a proper object for our valuation is knowledge only as we do have it.

Tattvajñāna, which is the word used in Sanskrit for philosophy, literally means knowledge of reality. The expectation is that there should be knowledge of reality as it is (*yathārtha*), and hence the appropriateness or validity of knowledge is ultimately determinable in terms of reality. But inspite of this very common and natural expectation, the fact remains that the only way to reality is through knowledge. We have only to postulate or to hope that knowledge does conform to reality. There is no means of comparing knowledge with reality to ensure that knowledge faithfully represents reality, nor do we know that knowledge does not conform to reality. Therefore, we naturally think that knowledge is of reality, and also that it ought to conform to reality. A man does not have first an access to reality and then judge whether knowledge has made an access to it. There is no passage from reality to knowledge, but only from knowledge to reality. The proper function of philosophy is not to attempt knowledge of what is originally given to be real. That is impossible. Its real function is contained in what Jñāneśvara, the great Maharashtrian saint, has called *Anubhavāmṛta* (This is the title of his philosophical work in Marathi language). Philosophy consists in a search of the immortal reality possessing the maximum value, by a critical evaluation of one's own experience. We are directly aware of our own experience which constitutes the foundation of our knowledge. By a gradational valuation of that knowledge, we reach the most valuable in that knowledge. It is to that knowledge which constitutes the *summum bonum* for us that we give the name of reality. Therefore, even though the word *tattva* comes first and the word *jñāna* comes afterwards in the composite term *tattvajñāna* it is the latter through which alone the former could at all be approached. Reality is called the object of knowledge only because there is no other method of approaching it except through knowledge.

VII. Distinction from Epistemological Idealism

The above is a brief statement of what I have called Axionoetic Idealism. The absolute priority of knowledge must not be understood to be a stale statement of hackneyed idealism. For, the statement does not refer to what Axionoetics believes to be a secondary problem in epistemology, e. g., the relation between knowledge and reality, which the traditional idealism solves by saying that reality is dependent on knowledge and realism solves by saying that reality is independent of knowledge. Even if we grant that neither of these positions is verifiable in the logical — empiricist sense, both of them must be looked upon as genuine cognitive pieces of knowledge, in terms of which alone the status of reality is attempted to be determined. Both idealism and realism are aspects of a more fundamental and more comprehensive idealism, according to which the determination of the independence or dependence of reality in relation to knowledge is itself a form of knowledge through which alone we approach reality. Even if the realist proves his case, he has only shown that it is *his knowledge* ultimately that decides that reality is independent of knowledge.

Had it been the case that between reality and knowledge it is the right of reality to determine knowledge, that reality is the original source from which alone knowledge springs, that in order that knowledge may become possible at all there must be a prior being of reality, that the most natural procedure is from reality to knowledge, it is really very difficult to see why, inspite of the unity of reality from which automatically a unity of knowledge ought to follow, there is only a prevalence of a diversity of knowledge supposed to be of the same reality. The unity of reality is irreconcilable with the variety of its knowledge. Our expectation of a unitary knowledge is thus frustrated. Why are there differences in the philosophical positions like materialism and spiritualism, monism and pluralism and so on? Reality is

one but the sages describe it variously.² The reason is that it is not a fact that reality determines as to how the sages should describe it. The fact rather is that it is the sages or philosophers who are trying to determine that reality through their conjectures and imaginations.³ There is no royal road from the palace of reality to knowledge, but only circuitous lanes and bylanes of opinions from the huts of humble sages to the palace of reality. If the term knowledge is to be reserved for unitary, universal, absolute, ultimate and final knowledge, then I am afraid, we have no knowledge but only opinions, without there being an apparent prospect of elevating the status of opinions to that of knowledge.

In spite of the scathing criticism made by such philosophers as Śaṅkarācārya and Bergson of the hypothetical nature of intellectual knowledge and the recommendation of intuition, the philosophical formulations of these original intuitions do not seem to validate themselves. The question is not whether we have a rational or an intuitive knowledge. Whatever form the knowledge may take, it is through that only that the gateway to reality is opened to us. Reality does not intuit itself, nor does it offer a rational explanation of itself; it is for the knower either to reason or to intuit, and thus take a step towards reality.

The question of existential priority between reality and knowledge is similar to that of their relation of dependence. Whichever way we may settle it, the priority of knowledge is unquestionable. The existential priority of reality may be a sounder proposition, yet that has to be first established in knowledge. The two famous orders of *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi* are the two forms of fundamental cognition. The prior existence of reality is not first asserted by reality and only

² *Ekaṁ sat viprā bahudhā vadanti, Ṛgveda.*

³ *Ekaṁ santaṁ bahudhā kalpayanti, Ṛgveda.*

acknowledged by knowledge later on ; but it is first revealed by knowledge, and in so revealing knowledge recognizes its own secondary position too. It is in this most fundamental sense that knowledge is absolutely prior.

VIII. Distinction from Metaphysical Idealism

This position of Axionoetic idealism must also be distinguished from Metaphysical idealism. Idealism in Metaphysics asserts that the qualitative nature of reality is spiritual. It is antagonistic to materialism as a theory of the nature of reality. But Axionoetics declares that both spiritualism and materialism are forms of knowledge, through which alone the question of the nature of reality is approached and attempted to be solved. Their metaphysical validity is of no immediate importance for Axionoetics. Both of them cannot escape being theories of reality, and even if materialism is justified, Axionoetic idealism is not defeated thereby. For, whether reality is spiritual or material in character is an open question before human knowledge, and the decision that it is material is taken within human knowledge. It is this inevitability of the priority of human knowledge in relation to any question regarding reality that fundamentally favours the position of Axionoetic idealism. Reality does not assert its material character, it is for human knowledge to fathom it in order that its nature may be known.

The only approach to reality, therefore, is through our knowledge. Hence the question of validation of knowledge becomes supremely important.

IX. Principle of Unity and Continuity of All Human Knowledge

Here we come to a point of great importance. We are confronted with the various systems of knowledge in science and philosophy, religion and art through which we are making an approach to reality. We must believe in the internal unity and

continuity of all human knowledge in which these varieties of theories are maintained. The question is of finding out a method of organizing this knowledge in a unitary system. There appears to be no better way than to fall back upon the basic experience which we have of value, in terms of which we sit in judgment upon all forms of human knowledge. Recognition of human values has an advantage of being immediate and universal, and therefore, it offers a point of departure, a foundation that is beyond controversy, a criterion that supports itself. The differences among the axiological theories, including the positivist emotive theory of values, do not affect the assertion that there are such values.

How do all human intellectual achievements stand in relation to these values and how, in terms of these values, those achievements could be evaluated is one of the central problems of Axionoetics.

At present human knowledge appears to be a big buzzing chaotic mass without there being any principle of organization. Each science goes its own way, little bothering how it affects other sciences, much less other human interests. The physical sciences and the social sciences are not progressing on a par, sometimes they appear to be going at tangents. Scientists and artists, politicians and moral reformers, men of literature and of religion, appear to be occupied so much with their own pursuits that they little appreciate the possibilities of other valuable approaches and viewpoints. They have their own systems of values which constitute their different "ethoses" within which alone they move. But how does the ethos of the physical sciences compare with the ethos of the social sciences, where does the ethos of literature and art agree with that of science and where does it differ, in fact, what is the possibility of a coordination of all these different ethoses and on what basis is it to be achieved, is a very important problem for Axionoetics.

Nobody feels the necessity and responsibility of building a unity of all knowledge which the unity of human life and existence makes it desirable to achieve. Such an integral view is made possible by a belief in the sanctity of all human values. To attempt this is the supreme task of Axionoetics. In this discipline the problem of validation is approached through a valuational organization of knowledge.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL PARADOXES AND POSTULATES

I. Paradox of the Ignorant Knower

IN the *Śārīraka-Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara in his introduction of superimposition (*adhyāsa*) discusses, in brief, the question who is a *pramātā* or the knower? The self cannot be the knower according to him, as it has nothing to do with the not-self to which the intellect, the mind and the senses belong; while the not-self being *jada* or insentient cannot by itself be the knower. The answer is that, it is the self under the influence of *adhyāsa* wrongly identifying itself with the not-self that becomes the knower. All human activities including his knowledge whether practical, scientific, philosophical or religious are rooted in the fundamental ignorance (*avidyā*). Śaṅkara says: "In this respect man is not very different from the beasts."¹

The whole situation could be analyzed thus: *Pramā* is right cognition. It is obtained in the relation between the *pramātā* and the *prameya*, subject and object; when the *pramātā* by the use of the *pramāṇas* or the means of knowledge acquaints himself with the *prameya*. Who discovers these means and instruments and makes them definite? Who judges their efficiency? Who guarantees their serviceableness? The only answer seems to be that the *pramātā* is the substratum or the source of *pramāṇa*s. But it has been decided already that *pramātā* is an ignorant being under the spell of illusory

¹ Cf. *adhyāsaṁ puraskṛtya sarve pramāṇaprameyavyavahārā lokaika vaidikāścā pravṛttāḥ sarvāni ca śāstrāṇi vidhi pratiṣedhamokṣaparāṇi tasmādauidyāvadviṣayānyeva pramāṇāni. Paśvādibhiścāviśeṣāt. Śārīraka-Bhāṣya* I-I.

superimposition or *māyā*. How can such an ignorant knower have the knowledge of the instruments of knowledge which are capable of leading to valid knowledge of the object? The knower is imperfect, his intellect is also imperfect, so are his senses. The instruments of knowledge or *pramāṇās* function only when these imperfect equipments are made use of, and they have originated from the imperfect intellect of the knower, with the result that these instruments themselves must be defective and their functioning too defective. Yet the claim is that they lead the ignorant knower to the right knowledge of the object. So that, it is a strange happening where the root of knowledge is in ignorance. But how can ignorance be the ground of knowledge or imperfection of perfection? This may be called the Paradox of the Ignorant knower.

One of the points of criticism made by Rāmānuja against Śaṅkara's doctrine of *māyā* or *ajñāna* is known as *Āśrayānuṣaṅgī* or inconceivability of the substratum of ignorance. *Ajñāna* can neither be in *Brahman* whose nature is knowledge, nor in *jīva* who is the very product of ignorance. But besides these difficulties, in the problem that we are discussing, there is quite an opposite type of difficulty. Just as the omniscient transcendental self cannot consistently be the substratum of nescience, the empirical self, who is essentially ignorant, cannot be the substratum of knowledge.

The difficulty is not peculiar to Śaṅkara's system, but it is common to all systems of Indian philosophy in so far as the individual self is regarded as in bondage or *bandha* due to ignorance which is variously termed as *ajñāna*, *aviveka* or *mithyā jñāna*. This ignorance is metaphysically regarded as *anādi* or beginningless. How can such an individual self in bondage liberate himself? The question needs more thought than is given to it. The question essentially is: How can the ignorant liberate himself of his fundamental ignorance which characterizes his finite nature? For whatever he does or knows is conditioned

by his ignorance, finitude or bondage. The means of knowledge that he finds, the methods that he discovers and adopts, the attitude that he takes, the concepts that he uses, all these have their origin in ignorance and imperfection, and must have the same imprint on them. Therefore, one who is in bondage cannot have any means that would lead to his liberation. The one who is really ignorant cannot develop instruments of knowledge that would make him know. Bondage can beget bondage, ignorance can beget only ignorance. There must be strictly a similarity in essence between the seed and its fruit, between the cause and the effect. It may even be said that, instead of there being a superimposition of ignorance upon the omniscient self, that an empirical self gets any knowledge at all is a superimposition on the ignorant self. That there is a possibility of knowledge is itself a claim made under *adhyāsa*.

Though such a conception of bondage and liberation with its peculiar Indian colouring is not to be found in Western philosophical thought, though, of course, there are similar ideas in the religious literature of the West, the problem is of a universal nature. For, in no case can a philosopher start with the assumption that the individual knower is omniscient. He must be regarded as he is, and there could be no two opinions about this fact that, the knower is ignorant but aspires to attain knowledge. The question is: can the ignorant being be the basis of knowledge? The answer is very difficult to give.

II. Paradox of Divine Grace and Human Effort

Are we to fall back upon the doctrine of divine grace as found in the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad*? The *ātman* (which stands for ultimate omniscient reality), it is said, cannot be obtained by discourse, intellect, penance or wide learning, nor by one who is impotent and errant, the *ātman* could be obtained by one who is chosen by the *ātman* himself that discloses himself to

such a chosen one.² The philosopher who realizes the truth is only a chosen person. Rāmānuja, however, says that God's choice cannot fall on anybody without rhyme or reason. The divine grace is conditioned by human efforts, though in such a conception the grace has partly lost its charm.

Śaṅkara interprets the line differently.³ Whosoever chooses to know the reality as it is, he would know the reality, the real would reveal itself to him who has a will to know it. No sheer grace. Initial human will and effort are necessary. The *Muṇḍaka* itself stands for human effort.⁴

The philosopher's is an ever-widening and perhaps unending effort of reaching perfection in all directions including that of knowledge. Ignorant and imperfect though he is, it is an assumption worth starting with, that he aspires towards perfect knowledge and that he is capable of attaining that. It is the first postulate of knowledge that knowledge is possible through human efforts. Man's achievements would justify the assumption that we have made.

III. Paradox of the Cognitive Relation

Theoretical epistemology usually discusses the problem of the relation between knowledge and reality, in order to decide whether human knowledge is a true knowledge of reality. The discussion, however, appears to be meaningless, because it assumes that we have a definite knowledge of truth as it stands in relation to reality. If we regard human knowledge as false or doubtful, we can do so only on the strength of the possibility of our knowing that reality is different from what we know of it. But this position is certainly absurd. Again, if our knowledge is regarded as true, it is true only because we believe that reality

² Yamevaiṣa vṛṇute ten labhyastasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanum svām, III-2-3.

³ See the note above.

⁴ Etairupāyairyatate yastu vidvānstasyaiṣa ātmā viśate brahmadhāma.

is revealed in our knowledge. It means that knowledge of truth that it is truth cannot be different from knowledge of reality. For if there is a difference between truth and reality, truth is no truth, and if there is no difference between them, there is nothing external to truth in terms of which truth could be measured. It means that we have to start with the further assumption that human knowledge is naturally a true revelation of reality.

Again, the whole process assumes that we have brought a standard of truthfulness with us and we can apply that standard to the knowledge that we acquire. But to possess the standard of truth is to know the definition of truth, to know already, *a priori*, as to what constitutes truth. And the task of evaluation of knowledge consists in applying that criterion or standard to the knowledge obtained.

The difficulty, however, in such a position is that, if all knowledge has to be evaluated, as it must be, then, the knowledge as to what constitutes truth also has to be evaluated in like manner. Otherwise, the whole procedure of evaluation of knowledge is only dogmatic. For we must know what value there is for the standard of truthfulness which we possess.

IV. Paradoxes of the Criteria of Truth and Error

There are various systems of philosophy, both of metaphysics and epistemology. The profoundest of all questions is : By what test can we judge the validity of any philosophical system? Each philosophical system will claim that it alone correctly represents reality : if it does not so claim, there is no justification for its existence. But there is evidently no criterion by means of which we can finally and decisively justify the truth of any philosophy.

Regarding the epistemological theories of truth themselves we may ask the same question. By what criterion can we decide once for all the truth of the theories of truth? It may even be

asked: By what kind of correspondence can the knowledge that correspondence theory is true be proved to be true? And, by what pragmatic test the knowledge of pragmatic theory of truth could be rendered true? The question, it should be remembered, is not of applying these criteria of truth to any concrete experience or knowledge, and if found so applicable they are to be accepted as true: the real question is of applying these criteria singly to the corresponding knowledge that these criteria are true. But this appears to be impossible. If these criteria could not be proved to be true on their own basis, they cannot be made the standard of evaluation of knowledge. Besides these difficulties, the usual difficulties about these criteria also persist. It appears, therefore, that we do not need any criterion of truth to evaluate knowledge in terms of truth, only because all knowledge must be regarded as true. For, if knowledge is not inherently regarded as true, there is no procedure by means of which knowledge could be validated.

The various criteria of error, regarded as the obverse statements of the criteria of truth, could be shown to be themselves erroneous. If, for instance, error consists in an absence of correspondence between knowledge and reality, there being no reality to correspond with this knowledge of the criterion, the criterion itself becomes erroneous according to its own standard.

If, again, error consists in the absence of workability of knowledge, wherein consists the workability of the knowledge of this criterion? For, possibly an idea about an object may be made to work with reference to that object, but one does not know where to find the workability of an idea of workability itself. Hence, in the absence of the workability, the idea of the criterion of workability is, according to its own admission, erroneous.

If error consists in the absence of consistency of knowledge with itself, on the supposition that it is fictitious to speak of

consistency or otherwise of knowledge with a transcendent reality, then the criterion fails to establish any contact with reality, and not only does it render all knowledge fictitious but becomes itself a fiction. Besides, in which special sense, the idea of the criterion of self-consistency is self-consistent, in order to be true?

If self-consistency of knowledge means consistency of a piece of knowledge with another piece or pieces of knowledge, no one piece of knowledge, taken by itself, can ever be self-consistent or true. Truth, therefore, does not attach itself to any judgement singly, but to a system of judgements. But the judgement that truth consists in self-consistency, being the standard of truth, lies apart from the system of judgements. The principle of systematization can never be an element within the system. Therefore, the judgement formulating the criterion of truth, remains unsystematized, and therefore, untrue.

Besides, inspite of the emphasis on the principle of truth that is immanent in knowledge, there is a double transcendence in this theory. In the first place, the truth of a piece of knowledge, say A, is determined by another extraneous piece, say B, which is consistent with A. Truth, therefore, of A is not immanent in it, but is determined by B that transcends A. In the second place, the principle of truth is a judgement that is not one amongst many judgements, but is one that transcends a system of judgements.

If it is objected that a principle of truth is not to be equated with a judgement, it must be shown how it differs from it and also from other principles of truth like correspondence, or workability.

It is possible to show that these principles are quite consistent with one another, and being so, according to the criterion of consistency, they mutually support the truth of one another. This means that the criterion of consistency does not contradict the other two criteria. And hence, the criterion of self-con-

sistency is not in any special sense preferable to the other two criteria.

Thus the criterion of correspondence is true because it is self-consistent and could be worked. The criterion of consistency is true because it corresponds with the real structure of knowledge, and hence, it also works. The criterion of workability is also true because it is self-consistent, and shows how correspondence is a matter of fact. A criterion of truth supported by another criterion at once proves its own limitation and justifies the other. It is like the blind leading the blind.

The logical empiricist criterion of verifiability of a proposition by sensuous experience, not being itself verifiable, either directly or indirectly, not only becomes false but meaningless according to its own conception. Similarly according to this criterion, all the above criteria also become meaningless. Certainly an error has a more privileged place than nonsense in the field of knowledge. But according to this criterion of verifiability, all the criteria of truth become nonsensical.

The sceptical conclusion of the traditional epistemology is inevitable because of its essentially abstract, hypothetical and speculative character.⁵ If we take human knowledge in its concrete, actual and practical sense, we will find with Engels that "human action had solved the difficulty long before human ingenuity invented it."⁶

V. Postulates of Knowledge

To sum up, the following are the postulates which must be taken for granted, if any theory of knowledge is to be possible. The first postulate is that knowledge is possible through human efforts. In other words, the will to know constitutes the *raison d'être* of knowledge. The second postulate is that human

⁵ Cf. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, article on Epistemology.

⁶ Engels, *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*, Introduction.

knowledge, from whatever sources it originates, whatever conditions it involves, whichever standard it applies, certifies its own truth. The third postulate is that human knowledge is invariably directed upon an independent object with which it corresponds. These three I call postulates, because there is no direct proof for any of these. The "this or nothing" principle suggested by Bosanquet would constitute an indirect proof of these postulates. Acceptance of these postulates assures the possibility of true knowledge of reality for an ignorant and imperfect human being. Denial of these postulates not only renders truth fictitious but knowledge itself impossible. The traditional epistemology, which critically considers the difficulties involved in knowledge, may be regarded as constituting an elaborate but indirect justification of these postulates.

But we cannot leave the problem of knowledge just here. For, inspite of the postulation of a possibility of knowledge that certifies its own truth about an objective reality, the sense of the distinction between truth and error persists, and we must account for it. The traditional epistemology recognizes the distinction but it cannot satisfactorily explain it. The more emphatic it is in marking out that distinction, the more sceptical are its conclusions, inspite of its protestations.

3.

LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF SELF- VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

I. Five-fold Valuational Attitudes to Knowledge

The following attitudes could be taken with regard to knowledge: (1) All knowledge is originally false. (2) All knowledge is originally doubtful. (3) All knowledge is originally neutral regarding truth or falsity. (4) All knowledge is originally probable. (5) All knowledge is originally intrinsically true. Each of these positions could be defended to a certain extent. There is an increasing value in the positions from scepticism to probabilism and then to certainty in knowledge. Of all the positions regarding knowledge the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta doctrine of self-validity of all knowledge is very much accredited for its comprehensiveness and its capability of refutation of other positions. It is my object here to show the limitations of that doctrine and to indicate the sense in which it has to be understood.

II. The Alleged Superiority of the Doctrine of Self-Validity

The doctrine of self-validity is particularly directed against the rival Naiyāyika doctrine of external validity of knowledge. The latter, it is well known, involves the impossible position of infinite regress, in so far as every piece of knowledge needs validation by another piece of knowledge. Hence the obvious superiority of the Vedāntic position. The doctrine of self-validity means that any knowledge whatsoever, as and when it arises carries its validity within itself. It is immediately true.

That is, it does not require the mediation of any other knowledge besides itself to testify its truth. If, however, any subsequent knowledge is found to contradict the original knowledge, then the falsity of that original knowledge is said to be established extrinsically. Thus the falsity of any knowledge is only externally shown. No knowledge could be false in itself but only with reference to certain truth. Thus the first of the abovementioned propositions viz., all knowledge is originally false, comes to be discredited. Hence the correct position is that while the validity of knowledge is intrinsic (*prāmāṇyam svataḥ*) its invalidity is extrinsic (*aprāmāṇyam parataḥ*). The whole history of the advancement of knowledge is actually a continuous demonstration of this doctrine. Ptolemy's geocentric theory of the universe, for instance, was originally regarded as valid for centuries. It was only a subsequent realization of the truth of heliocentric conception formulated by Copernicus that falsified the original belief.

III. Hypothetical Nature of Intrinsic Validity

The implication of the doctrine of self-validity, then, is that only so long as a certain piece of knowledge is not shown to be false with reference to a certain another piece of valid knowledge, we should not question the validity of the knowledge we already possess. But does this position not mean that the nature of the doctrine is not categorical, but hypothetical? We must read *prāmāṇyam svataḥ* and *aprāmāṇyam parataḥ* together. The whole doctrine is thus that unless extrinsically a knowledge is shown actually to be false it ought to be regarded as intrinsically true.

This condition has to be noted and it refers to the possibility in principle, though hypothetical, of another piece of falsifying knowledge. Therefore the guaranty of the validity of knowledge is not entirely internal, but it is allowed to be considered

as valid only in the actual absence for the time being of another invalidating knowledge. The doctrine does not guaranty the absoluteness of validity to any piece of knowledge since in principle there remains a possibility of its being falsified. A piece of knowledge is only relatively true. Similarly, no knowledge is finally true, it is only provisionally true.

IV. The Complementary Nature of Extrinsic Validity

The validity of knowledge it should now be realized, is at once intrinsic and extrinsic. We can significantly say: *jñānasya prāmāṇyam parataḥ api*. The externality here referred to is not that of the presence of another validating knowledge, as the Nyāya position stands, but that of the absence of another invalidating knowledge. The external condition that is expected to be fulfilled by any knowledge is not of the nature of a positive support but of the nature of a negative support. The confidence, as it were, in the truth of a knowledge grows in proportion as it is not externally prohibited from being true. But is this not a probabilistic doctrine? That is the position taken in the fourth proposition stated in the beginning, viz., All knowledge is originally probable.

At the best, therefore, it appears that we cannot say anything more than this regarding any knowledge when it originally arises that it is relatively true, provisionally true, probably true. If the doctrine of self-validity means anything more than this, if it insists upon absolute and final certainty of any knowledge as it arises, then it is sheer dogmatism. It is obstinate turning of one's eyes away from the actual evidence of the history of the growth of knowledge consisting in transition from less of truth to more of truth.

But it is said that we never can significantly declare that knowledge has arisen at all so long as a doubt is sustained about it. It arises when the knower is satisfied that all his

doubts are removed. To say that a certain piece of knowledge is relatively true, or provisionally true, or probably true is to cast a doubt upon that knowledge. Truth qualified and conditioned is no truth at all. But as we have seen above the doctrine of self-validity is a conditional doctrine, and since that conditionality can neither be neglected nor overcome, all knowledge virtually remains doubtful. That in fact, is the position described in the second proposition, viz., All knowledge is originally doubtful. In attempting to make the significance of the self-validity clear we have come to a curious position of doubt as a characteristic of all knowledge. This position makes theory of knowledge as a search for the nature of truth impossible.

V. Does Intrinsic Validity Make Epistemology Superfluous ?

But even if we grant that self-validity means that all knowledge as it arises and when it arises is valid, it leaves no scope for any epistemological enquiry. If all knowledge is valid, does not enquiry into theory of knowledge become superfluous? For, the doctrine does not make it clear as to what conditions are necessary for the origin of any knowledge. It is silent regarding the sources of knowledge, the methods of knowledge, the means of knowledge, the criterion of truth and the limitations of knowledge. As a matter of fact the enquiry into and examination of the factors involved in knowledge appear to be out of place once it is granted that all knowledge as it arises and when it arises is valid in itself. It has no use for an evaluation of the conditions of knowledge or for even a general consideration of the same. The doctrine only states that whatever conditions lead to the origin of knowledge the same conditions are by themselves sufficient to determine the validity of that knowledge.

But as knowing agents we are not so much interested in this comparatively simple and a somewhat redundant statement

that knowledge arises when it arises. That there is no such distinction as true knowledge and false knowledge, because false knowledge is no knowledge at all. That phrase involves a self-contradiction. Hence all knowledge to be truly called knowledge is a true knowledge.

VI. Does Intrinsic Validity Deny the Distinction between Truth and Falsity?

But we cannot help making that distinction between truth and falsity in spite of the above truism. There is a truth as distinguished from a falsehood. And as genuine knowing agents we are interested in knowing what is the way towards the truth and what obstructions may lead to falsehood so that we can overcome them or avoid them. The real question is when and how does knowledge arise. This is a difficult question to answer in a simple way. The whole theory of knowledge attempts to answer this question. But we hardly get a unanimous answer to this question. It appears that because of the variety of views held by the theorists of knowledge one may get a kind of satisfaction in the simple solution of the problem by resorting to the doctrine of self-validity. The doctrine, therefore, appears to be more psychological than logical, and perhaps we cannot get any absolutely logical solution to the problem, which would also be acceptable to all, and hence the need for a psychologically satisfactory answer that concerns everybody. When one is satisfied that knowledge has arisen, whatever conditions it may have involved, the knowledge is said to have arisen.

VII. Self-validity and Subjective Satisfaction

The doctrine of self-validity, therefore, appears to afford a psychological solution of the problem of knowledge. Whenever the knower feels that whatever knowledge he has is "clear and

distinct",—as Descartes would put it,—that it is free from all doubts so far as he is concerned, that knowledge is true. The doctrine of self-validity in fact appears to mean that knowledge is valid not in itself but for the self for whom that knowledge has taken place with all his limited concrete situation. Such a psychological interpretation of the doctrine is inevitable. But this means subjectivism and relativism.

The concrete knowledge-situation involves the subject with all his qualifications—physical, mental, intellectual, moral and spiritual. It also involves his place in the social-historical situation of the progress of knowledge. The situation concretely determines the nature of conditions that are regarded as sufficient for the origin of knowledge. The Nyāya system calls these conditions *sāmagrī*, and it is interested in determination of these conditions. It may be said that the doctrine of self-validity could be extended to the valuation of these concrete conditions of knowledge. Then with reference to those conditions the doctrine of self-validity means that every condition of knowledge has an intrinsic value so far as it does concretely make the realization of knowledge possible. The *prāmānya* of the various *pramāṇas* is intrinsically determined. Ultimately a valuation of the knowledge with respect to the value of the conditions of knowledge is dependent upon the actual qualifications (*yogyatā* or *adhikāra*) of the knowing agent.

But what are the qualifications of the knowing agent? Is he really qualified to know the truth in its absoluteness? It is the finite, imperfect, ignorant knowing agent that attempts to build the system of knowledge. His conception of the right sources of knowledge, the correct means and the exact criteria of the realization of validity, in fact his whole conception of the right methodology of knowledge is finally conditioned by his original limited and imperfect nature as the finite self. His finitude finally vitiates all knowledge. So far as he is imperfect

as a knower his knowledge cannot be true. All human knowledge is essentially false.

I have shown above the Vedāntic difficulty concerning the knower. It cannot explain satisfactorily as to how the supposedly omniscient self comes to be bound in ignorance. How does the fall of the Absolute self to the empirical self take place at all? That of course is only a theoretical difficulty. The more genuine difficulty for us is the opposite. It is both a theoretical and a practical difficulty. We are all familiar with the direct and actual experience of our ignorant and finite nature. It may logically imply the absolute and infinite knowledge. But the abstract logical implication of perfection does not make anybody actually and concretely perfect. Therefore the genuine difficulty boils down to this: how can the ignorant knower become the foundation of knowledge at all? Ignorance only begets ignorance. All human knowledge is bound to be false. That is the first position of absolute scepticism as stated above.

VIII. Postulational Character of Self-validity

The doctrine of self-validity of knowledge, as it appears to me, is of the nature of a postulate of knowledge which has only a moral significance of encouraging the ignorant knower to believe in the possibility of knowledge if he makes that effort. This doctrine is believed to be true only because the alternative is scepticism. Accept self-validity or no knowledge is possible. To render the cognitive activity significant in spite of the difficulties involved in the attainment of success in knowledge, one has to put faith in the possibility of knowledge. This is the implication of self-validity of knowledge.

IX. Valuational Gradation of the Attitudes

The position that all knowledge is originally false is absolute scepticism. The second position that all knowledge is originally

doubtful is comparatively a mild form of scepticism. Though this position does not believe in the validity of knowledge it at least does not believe in the invalidity of knowledge. Hence it is a superior position in relation to the first. There is at least a hope that what is doubtful today may become certain tomorrow. These two positions are modified forms of Buddhism. The third position of the neutrality of knowledge is still superior in the sense that we need not have a suspicious attitude towards knowledge as the second position implies. Let us regard that knowledge remains unqualified either with truth or falsehood so long as it is not proved or disproved. This Nyāya position suggests an openness of mind towards knowledge. It awaits for the proof or disproof which enables us to label knowledge as true or false. Neutrality is a better psychological attitude towards knowledge than suspiciousness. But the fourth position generally maintained by Jainism is a still better one. We cannot work successfully if we take only a neutral attitude. In order to get at truth, we must at least believe in the probability of the truth in hand. Whenever we have any knowledge we are not neutral to it but rather believe in the probability of it, if not certainty. The last position of self-validity, maintained by *Mīmāṃsā*, goes still further in this faith and asserts that the very fact that a certain knowledge has taken place in us brings with it the conviction of its truth, or the knowledge in the case does not arise at all. Whatever may be its future prospects of being strengthened or weakened by the subsequent knowledge, retrospectively speaking we believe in the truth of knowledge because there has been sufficient evidence for it. Knowledge cannot grow otherwise. So far as our knowledge for the time being goes it is up-to-date, whatever its future. We are sitting tight over what has been acquired and hoping for the best. Even if it is provisionally true it does not matter, for it has the capacity of being finally true.

X. Self-Validity Intrinsically Applicable to Self-knowledge

But is it really the case that the doctrine means that all knowledge is only provisionally and relatively true? Is there not any knowledge which is absolutely and intrinsically true? There appears to be at least one piece of knowledge which fulfils the condition of absolutely intrinsic validity, without requiring a reference to the presence or absence of an actual or possible extrinsic knowledge of its justification or falsification. That is self-knowledge according to Vedānta. Self-knowledge is the only knowledge which is absolutely intrinsically valid. It does not require to be proved nor is it capable of ever being falsified externally.

The doctrine of self-validity of knowledge refers absolutely to the knowledge of self, and all knowledge that the self may get of the not-self is only relatively and provisionally valid in itself. Self-knowledge alone is primarily self-valid. All other knowledge is only secondarily self-valid. The maximum truth value of the knowledge of the not-self is reached by one who has realized his absolute self by a process of an integration and idealization of the initially given imperfect self. It is through self-realization that everything gets realized in its fullness and completeness. That is the most important implication of the doctrine of self-validity of knowledge.

A VALUATIONAL CRITIQUE OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

I. Epistemological Pluralism

There are various theories of knowledge which attempt to explain human knowledge more or less exclusively in terms of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology or sociology.

Thus knowledge could be shown to be originating and developing in the material conditions both inside and outside human body. The human brain, the nervous system and the sense organs have essentially a material constitution. As part and parcel of the material universe these are governed by the mechanical laws of matter in motion. The human modes of knowledge are determined by the external circumstances in which men are born and brought up. The human intellect is thus a mechanical product. Man is a machine that 'thinks'. A physical shock to the brain, or a removal of a portion thereof, results in the change of the agent's experiences and his knowledge. This is a factual verification of what may be called 'the physics of knowledge.'

'The chemistry of knowledge' consists in the study of the chemical processes that take place in the human organism, especially in the various glands and their secretions. By administering certain drugs either orally or through injections a magical and a mysterious change is produced in human experiences. The wonders of the modern system of medicine are owing to the essentially chemical nature of the human consciousness. The Upaniṣads have declared that food is the stuff of which mind is made.¹

¹*Annamayam somya manaḥ, Chāndogya, VI -5-4.*

'The biology of knowledge' looks upon human intelligence as a product of a long process of biological evolution. Life is an adjustment of the internal to the external environment.

In the struggle for the preservation of life the organism produces movements that enable it to adapt to the changed circumstances. In which process not only the different sense organs have been successively put forth but the very mind had been engendered. It is as good as the sixth organ. Mind has its origin in life and is meant to serve life. The pragmatic conception of knowledge with all its multifarious developments is ultimately rooted in this biological explanation of the origin and growth of human knowledge.

The psychological study of human knowledge has valuable contributions to make regarding the general nature of knowledge. The empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume had followed mainly the psychological or the genetic method of knowledge. But with the progress of the science of psychology, more and more light could be thrown on the nature of human knowledge. Especially experimental psychology, psycho-analysis and psychotherapy have unravelled the unknown spheres regarding the human knowledge. The findings of psychology regarding the nature of attention, interest, memory, learning, measurement of intelligence, instincts, emotions, the unconscious and the subconscious have a good deal to say regarding the proper understanding of human knowledge. The Freudian explanation that the contents of consciousness are determined, in the ultimate analysis, by libido, is well known. Sex-energy is supposed to condition even the highest religious and mystical experiences. According to the psychological science of knowledge, a man's knowledge, at any stage of his development, is a culmination of his complete psychological history.

These various theories of knowledge may be said to be constituting 'epistemological pluralism,' which means that the subject-matter of knowledge could be studied from diverse

points of view. Each such point of view is valid within certain limits and thus has epistemological value. But here the 'fallacy of exclusive particularity' consists in making one of these the exclusive explanation of knowledge.

Here I intend to consider one more such important theory of knowledge known as the 'sociology of knowledge.' The social studies have taken the field in the recent times, and hence the need of our critical attention to these studies, particularly with reference to the explanation of human knowledge.

II. Existential Determination of Knowledge

The theory that thought or knowledge is determined by extra-mental factors is known as "existential determination of thought." Various attempts at deciding these extra-mental factors have been made. Usually the factors so recognized are race, climate, geography, society and so on. Human thought has actually been interpreted and explained in these terms. There has been, however, very little attempt at a serious theoretical justification of such modes of explanation. The tenability of such explanation appears to be on the whole doubtful. The most plausible attempt has been an interpretation of thought in terms of society, and the most popular phase of such interpretation has been that of economic determination of thought.

The general problems involved in existential determination of thought are: the nature of the existential determinant, the means by which determination takes place, the forms of mind; the origin, the content and the validity of thought. Here I am concerned with social determination of thought, alleged to be the most successful theory, and its solution of the problem of validity.

III. The Concept of the Sociology of Knowledge

The general theory of social determination of thought, we find developed variously in the writings of George Lucacs, Max

Scheler, Ernst Grunwald, Karl Mannheim and Arthur Child.² This theory is known as Sociology of Knowledge, the postulate of which is that all thought or knowledge is determined by social existence, and that thought is a variable of social historical situations. As applied to Logic, the theory maintains that Logic is not purely a formal matter, but a cultural matter. As to what sorts of conclusions will be drawn by a person from a given set of facts will depend upon the culturally determined system of "conclusion drawing" to which he belongs. Piere and Farnsworth have expressed this idea in the following words: "Philosophers have long held that there is one valid procedure to be used in arriving at a sound symbolic solution to a problem. This process is termed Logic, and the Aristotelian version has been believed to be the basis for the development of modern science. Perhaps it is, but there is certainly nothing universal about the principles agreed upon as sound. For what is sound reasoning seems to depend entirely upon the society that sets the values that are used in determining whether a given solution is a success or a failure. . . . Only when there is agreement on objectives, can there be agreement on the validity of thought procedures."³ Thus the "collective representations" of different societies being different, their ideas regarding truth and falsehood too are different. The mode of reasoning changes from society to society, and historically from situation to situation. Again, persons belonging to different strata of society, for instance, the farmers and the landlords, the labourers and the mill-owners will think differently. They always exhibit a mentality appropriate to the social class, to the economic, political and religious groups to which they originally belong, or with which they have come to identify themselves.

² For a fuller critical treatment see the author's book *Approach to Reality*, Part IV.

³ *Social Psychology*, p. 132.

IV. Confusion between Social Interpretation and Social Determination

It must be remembered that there is a distinction between social interpretation of thought and social determination of thought, though both these phrases have been alternately used. The term "interpretation," is connotative of a methodological procedure. The term "determination," again, is connotative of causal relationship between the society and thought. It is one thing to say that human knowledge could be best interpreted in social terms, and quite another to say that it is caused by the socio-historical situation. It is the latter proposition that is postulated by the sociologists of knowledge.

It must be conceded that ordinarily the person who employs logical reasoning is a part and parcel of the society in which he is born, brought up and trained. What a person should know, how he should feel, and what he should or should not do, is as it were *a priori* determined for him by the society. But to make a capital of this fact and build a whole sociology of knowledge over it overshoots the mark. In any theory of knowledge the problem of the origin and validity of knowledge is most fundamental. In my opinion Sociology of Knowledge is correct in so far as it asserts the extra-logical origin of knowledge, but it can neither furnish a criterion of truth nor explain how truth originates. Again in so far as it does this, it does not remain merely a sociology of knowledge, but takes on the normative role of what may be termed as Ethics or Axiology of Knowledge. This is inevitable because a sociological study of knowledge is bound to be descriptive, while the problem of truth is essentially evaluational. For if the values which are set by a society determine the nature of thinking of its members, for the solution of the problem of truth, these values themselves must be evaluated. And this is evidently beyond the scope of Sociology of Knowledge.

V. Truth as Consensus of Opinion

The establishment of an equation between society and knowledge must necessarily end in social-subjectivism or social-relativism which makes the very concept of truth meaningless. For if reactions to reality go on differing from society to society and from situation to situation, if truth takes on different garbs in the various social strata, it is very difficult to assess or even recognize the real truth. If there are various cognitions of the one reality, the problem before any sound epistemology is to evaluate as to which of the cognitions represents reality as it is. The social factors make it very difficult to decide as to where exactly lies the truth. Truth evidently cannot belong to any individual, or any class or to any one particular society. It cannot belong even to a particular historical period.

We cannot say that truth is that which the majority of people regard as truth.⁴ There may be improper reasons for a "consensus of opinion." Here the social factors instead of being restricted only to a small group of people, are spread out to a larger group. Even perfect unanimity has an important social significance in that it is productive of certain moral values making for the maintenance and solidarity of society. But social progress does not depend merely upon such unanimity. It depends upon the possibility of conceiving higher values. Such a knowledge originates in persons who can transcend the limitations of the historical, the economical, the social and the cultural background in which they are born and reared. They are distinguished from the common run of the people in their having a far-sight, a foresight and an insight, which they can develop along with their own moral and spiritual integration.

⁴ See Arthur Child's article, "The Problem of Truth in Sociology of Knowledge" in *Ethics*, October, 1947.

VI. The Important Role of the Individual Seers

Truth, so far as it has a social reference, therefore, could be measured in terms of the values it promotes for the welfare of society. In this, the nature of truth is determined by the narrow or wide conception of moral life. Insight into these comprehensive and higher values is possible in rare personalities who can transcend the narrow circle of their socio-historical situation.

With reference to the above, it may be said that an individual owes his limitations to society, and the possibility of transcending those limitations lies in his own personal effort, intellectual as well as moral. As the individual imbibes the culture and knowledge of the society of which he is a member, he is a receptacle both of the truth and the falsehood which characterize the given society. Whatever progress any individual can make depends upon his capacity to retain the original truth and overcome falsehood. This is possible only if he consciously develops a detached and a broad outlook.

We must make a distinction between truth as it is actually determined at a given period in history and truth as an ideal to be attained. The important question is not what society regards as true, but what it ought to regard as true. Anything does not become truth simply because of its historical actuality. Truth may require transcendence of the actual. This is the core of the ethical or valuational conception of knowledge. We find such ideal transcendence in a few gifted individuals who make the progress of society possible. They are the persons of real worth, they are heads and shoulders above their own society. They have a better personal equipment of genius and virtue, which helps them see what others do not see. What gives these people success is their moral and spiritual integrity. They are the persons who refuse to be determined by the prevalent social prejudices.

Society is essentially conservative, and its activities are primarily determined by impulses, passions and deep-rooted prejudices. These gather strength from generation to generation, and people would continue to remain buried in the mire of falsehood, prejudices and superstitions, if they were not awakened from their dogmatic slumber by an individual who was superior to them in all respects and who, in truth, was a spectator of all times and all existence. Such is a man who loves independent thinking and refuses to think with the society. Society owes all its progress to such "seers" of truth.

VII. Interrelation between the Individual and the Society

In the interrelation between the individual and society, when society is emphasized and made all in all, it leads to social deterministic theories of various sorts in which the individual is merged in the society. The result of such deification of society is absolutism, fascism, socialism and communism. When the individual is put against society, the result is extreme individualism, subjectivism and solipsism.

From the interrelationship of society and the individual follow two facts which are generally ignored. One is that society, being a peculiar configuration or a cultural pattern is something more than the individual. This configuration is a sort of a *gestalt* irreducible to the individuals. In fact, the individual is to a large extent determined by this pattern. The postulate of social determination in the sociology of knowledge is derived from this fact. But there is another side to this interrelation. The individuals themselves contribute towards the building of this social configuration, and they have an individuality of their own which is not altogether exhausted in their being members of a society. As M. Ginsberg says, "Though individuals are nothing apart from society, or rather the development of individuals is at the same time a development of sociality, yet society is nothing but individuals in relation, and in individuals there is a

core of being which is unique and incommunicable.”⁵ This is an important truth neglected by the social deterministic theories. An individual can rise above society and its milieu. To a certain, though limited, extent the individuals can choose to remain independent of society. The life of the recluses, yogis and the mystics, many a time living far removed from society, provides an example of the possibility of such an independent life. An individual may even find that for his mental and spiritual evolution the society and the so-called social life may constitute an actual hindrance.

Again all kinds of value, including the value of truth, are constituted for and attained by the individual. The origin, recognition and enjoyment of these values, whether cognitive, ethical, aesthetical or spiritual are only in the individual consciousness.

Moreover, to whatever extent social determination there may be, it could not be regarded as an existential determination. For it is wrong to conceive society as extra-mental determinant. The society is not so much a physical as it is a mental organization. How can society be wholly external to individuals' minds? If it is nothing but an interrelation of individual minds, there is a point in saying that it is ultimately the individuals that determine the formation and nature of society.

VIII. Teleological Determination

The social deterministic theory could be understood in a way in which it appears plausible. Social determination of thought may mean that the individual's thought directly refers to society, that is, it does not conceive anything which has nothing to do with social being, and social values. In brief, the social determination may mean that the individual mind is tied down to the field of social environment. His ideas, feelings and conduct are

⁵ *Psychology of Society*, p. 47.

directed upon and are with reference to the social being. The scientific knowledge that he achieves, the artistic works that he creates, the moral and religious aspirations that he entertains, the metaphysical systems that he builds, in brief, all his concrete and abstract achievements are socially determined, not in the sense that society is the efficient cause of these, but in the sense that all these either serve (or hinder) directly or indirectly the objects of society.

Apart from the truth or otherwise of this description it is questionable how far it could be called as social determination as the sociologists of knowledge understand the phrase. Such a determination in so far as it is directed towards the social ends must be regarded as essentially teleological and hence ethical or axiological in the widest sense. Here the final purpose truly becomes the efficient cause.

It is, of course, quite possible that an individual may not have direct social purposes consciously taken as ends, he may think and act independently with non-social motives (not necessarily anti-social) as he does in his strictly individual spiritual efforts, such as meditation, prayer and worship, nevertheless such originally non-social activities may have a good deal of social repercussions, which may from that point of view be regarded as by-products of the individual's spiritual progress.

The entire conception of the social determination and the other sorts of existential determinations get their sanction from a historical study of individual societies. History or historicity becomes the supreme category in terms of which everything, whether in the physical sciences or the social sciences, is studied. The concept of history is intrinsically connected with the concept of time. History, or Time, as the ultimate source and determinant of everything is a doctrine analogous to the Indian doctrine of *Kāla* (Time) as the ultimate reality.⁶

⁶ Cf. *Kim kārṇam—Kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatiryadyecchā Svetāśvatara*, I-2.

IX. Philosophy of History

This leads to the consideration of the Philosophy of History. Philosophy of history presupposes the denial of general scepticism about all knowledge, the denial of the positivist contention against the specific form of knowledge called philosophical and the denial of the impossibility of knowledge of the form of history. Further it involves the presupposition that combination of philosophy and history, different from a mere history of philosophy, is also possible. Croce identifies history of philosophy with a philosophy of history.

There are three modes of human knowledge: facts, laws and fiction. These three peculiarly combine in history. History, to begin with, deals with the narration of facts or events of the past, out of which the historian attempts to build a science of history, which formulates laws of the occurrences of events. The chaos of diverse events, therefore, gets reduced to a system. But it remains, more or less blind, until a meaning is found or put into the historical occurrences. A historian at his best is a philosopher of history. A philosopher of history is not necessarily a different man from the historian. It is the logical role of the historian to philosophise upon his findings. He interprets them, colligates them and throws a flood of light on them, bringing them under a certain idea or ideas. That is the role of fiction in history, which leads to the inevitable "pathetic fallacy." Every fact is an instance of a law signifying a certain purpose as man sees it. In this sense all interpretation of history is idealistic. Facts do not explain themselves, they do not express their own meaning and purpose. It is the intelligent interpretation by a human mind of things before it. Even the materialist interpretation, in this broad sense, is idealistic. It is inevitably anthropomorphic and even anthropocentric in so far as it is man who constitutes the chief object of interest.

Broadly, all theoretical discussion about the nature of history, its meaning and practical utility, constitutes a philosophy of history. In what sense is history a science? Are predictability and objectivity of the physical sciences possible in history? If so, to what extent? Or, is history a science in the sense of a systematic body of knowledge? How far could history be regarded as an art, since a historian needs to have a vision of the historical purpose and must skilfully express the same in his writing? A historian is required to construct history. All construction requires a prevision and a skill. To the extent that these are found in history it is an art. Nietzsche wrote on the "Uses and Abuses of History." In the *Ideal of Human Unity* that "History teaches us nothing," at least regarding the great problems of existence has been remarked by Sri Aurobindo. Bacon said, "History makes man wise." Such remarks are philosophical in their import. What is the educational value of history? There is an opinion that history should not be taught at all, since it contains a good deal of distortion to suit the national ego which is a menace to world peace. There are also general questions regarding the methodology of history. Though all this generally comes under a philosophy of history, there is the more fundamental question regarding the interpretation of the course of history and the understanding of the mode of its development.

X. The Materialistic and the Idealistic Interpretations

In the history of the philosophy of history we find a geographic, an economic, a racial, a cultural, a materialist and an idealist interpretation of history. Among them, Hegel's idealistic interpretation and Marx's materialist interpretation are most opposed and most popular. For Hegel the rational and the real are identical. It is the spirit that unfolds dialectically through thesis, antithesis and synthesis, from 'being' to 'idea'. Marx thought that it is matter at the base that dialectically makes the evolution of the universe possible. It takes the form of economic determination in

the history of human progress. Marxists say that Hegel was revolving on his head (spirit) and that Marx set him upright on his feet (matter). Chronologically, matter is prior, and therefore Marx was right. But logically, spirit or reason is prior, and hence, Hegel is also right. Whether we stand upright on our feet or upside down on our heads it is the head that controls the posture. That is the inevitable logical priority of the spirit.

The various interpretations of history suffer from the fallacy of exclusive particularity. The same phenomenon could be variously studied. For instance, the motion of hand could be explained in terms of physics, physiology, psychology and ethics. None of these explanations is exclusively true, though all are legitimate. Different philosophical interpretations are legitimate, but none of them exclusively true. There is also a genuine historical pluralism, which does not lend itself to a stereotyped explanation. To attempt to bend historical phenomena to a favourite idea of our own involves both an ignorance on the part of the theorizer and also a distortion of facts. The philosophers of history have a tendency to commit this error.

The interpretation of history is further liable to what Toynbee calls the "apathetic fallacy" of treating living creatures as though they were inanimate. A philosopher of history must guard himself against it.

Though all social deterministic theories are more or less guilty of committing this fallacy, the historical materialists are the most guilty of it, in so far as they regard matter as the ultimate reality and economic determination as the only mode of its dialectic development. So far as the past alone is regarded as the determinant of the present, an historical explanation essentially becomes a mechanistic explanation.

XI. Valuational Study of History

But the element of free human will refuses to be

determined by the past alone. The future is as much the part of the present as the past is. In this sense all history is a "contemporaneous history." But when we bring in the notion of future as becoming a part and parcel of the present, history does not remain merely a record of facts but also becomes meaningful through the concept of value. Prof. Boodin says, "Values enter into the texture of history; they are objective causes."⁷ When it comes to the interpretation of history in terms of values, the whole conception becomes axiological. We may differ in our conception of values, which we read in history, but the conception of value is indispensable.

If the idea that man brings to bear upon history makes a philosophy of history, the best of the philosophy of history would be an interpretation of history in terms of the eternal values for which man stands. In such an interpretation, it is the future, which is embedded in the present ideals of man, that is more significant than the past. The past is significant, only as it concentrates its wisdom in the formulation of the ideals of the present to be realized in the future.

Mahatma Gandhi asked: "Is history a record of the course of human nature, or is it a record of its interruption?" The popular political history is a record of the interruption of nature. The real history records and helps to create a history of man with reference to the highest human values. That is the axionoetic philosophy of history. Such a history which is the only universal history, far from being a burden on the memory of man, makes for the illumination of his soul.

The historical approach to reality when made consistent with itself thus leads to an ethical evaluation of the historical process, as it leads to a similar evaluation of oneself. As a part and parcel of his historical process one not only evaluates others

⁷ See his article, "Philosophy of History" in the *Twentieth Century Philosophy*.

but also one's own self and considers it almost one's duty, as Schweitzer postulated in *The Philosophy of Civilization*, to give it the right direction. But evidently all cannot succeed in such an insight into their duty towards the future. It is the privilege of highly enlightened individuals.

If, therefore, behind society there is a history, behind history there is an individuality. In proportion as an individual rises above the limitations of his times, in proportion as he is able to regard in one moment the whole drama of existence, in proportion as he has a vision of the eternal values worthy to be realized, he fulfils the mission of carrying forward the message of history to the mankind.

Is man a product of the times or a maker of the times? In proportion as he voluntarily and effectively frees himself of his times he is the maker of himself and of the times to come. If he makes no such efforts he is led away by his times as a mere product of their forces. The capacity to see the truth lies in those men who conquer themselves morally and spiritually and transcend their own times.⁸ But such a position is fatal to all social deterministic theories of knowledge. Sri Aurobindo says, "The communal mind holds things subconsciously or in a confused chaotic manner: It is only through the individual mind that the mass can arrive at a clear knowledge. . . . Thinkers, historians, sociologists who belittle the individual and would like to lose him in the mass or think of him chiefly as a cell, an atom, have got hold of the obscurer side of the truth of Nature's workings in humanity. . . . Individuality is absolutely important and indispensable."⁹

⁸ "Kālo vā kāraṇaṁ Mājñah rājā vā kālakāraṇaṁ iti te saṁśayo mā bhūt, rājā kālasya kāraṇam." *Śānti Parva, Mahābhārata*.

The reference to king here may be understood as a reference to the moral and spiritual leader of the people, who is a maker of the times for the sake of social progress.

⁹ *The Human Cycle*, p. 274.

5.

ETHICS OF KNOWLEDGE

I. The Possibility of the Formulation of the Ethics of Knowledge

If there could be a physics and a chemistry of knowledge, a biology, a psychology and a sociology of knowledge, there is no reason why there could not be legitimate enquiries which could be characterized as an ethics, or more broadly, an axiology of knowledge. But the philosophers have not as yet formulated any systematic enquiries which go by these names. It is true that we do get in the philosophical and other literature casual thoughts considering the relation of knowledge and the moral or other values. These thoughts are scattered over here and there in a disorderly manner. Hence there is a need of systematizing these thoughts in an independent and comprehensive discipline of a profound importance in a manner which will command attention and assent of the scholars. Here is an humble attempt made in that direction which only claims to be suggestive and tentative rather than final in its form.

The possibility of formulating such a significant ethical system of knowledge could be shown in a still another way. The various social sciences and the social institutions could be subjected to a normative evaluation in terms of the ethically desirable ends of human life. This will result into what is known as a social philosophy. The sciences of education, economics, politics, jurisprudence, constitutional law and international relationship could be studied from the standpoint of the basic concepts of ethics with an emphasis on human values. It is the ethical foundation of these sciences which gives a perennial value to the knowledge that these sciences make available for

progressive organization of human life. Just as the factually descriptive sciences like physics, biology, psychology and sociology as well as a comprehensive system of metaphysics provide materials, in consistency with which a concrete ethical philosophy could be established, so too on the firm foundations of the ends and values which ethics has prescribed, the structure of all the sciences of the individual and social significance ought to be raised. It is only in consistency with the ethical and spiritual ends of human existence that these studies command our allegiance. In the books dedicated to these studies we do find notes which deal with the relation of the particular study to ethics, but its noteworthiness is more apparent than real. It is a sort of a lip service done to ethics, which rather slips off from the attention of the student than make him aware of the foundational value of that relation. The real need is to expand those notes in such a manner as to bring that relation into a bold relief. And while these relations between ethics and the specific social sciences remain scattered in the different books dealing with those sciences, a coordination of all these in one place and in an extensive manner which the subject of the ethics of knowledge as such deserves, is an imminent necessity.

II. The Ethical Criticism of the Institutions of Knowledge and Art

The various social institutions which have been mainly formed for the maintenance and preservation of society have to be evaluated in terms of the ethical function that they are meant to serve. The institutions of marriage, family, property, church, workshop, theatre, playground and the like have often been subjected to moral criticism, the aim of which is to show what in them is obsolete and superficial and what is living and essential. Such a criticism results into new directions of reformation. In the same manner the constructions of science, philosophy, art and literature collectively give rise to an institution of

knowledge which also is in an organic relationship to society. To study the institution of knowledge in terms of the foundational values of human life and existence is to formulate an ethics and an axiology of knowledge.

If the institution of knowledge must be studied in all its aspects, then the valuational aspect of knowledge also must be made an object of study in a manner that this aspect deserves. But it is a matter worth taking note that there has not been made any serious attempt to formulate such an ethical science of knowledge. People have been, on the other hand, found to be very slow even in the recognition of an ethico-axiological aspect that knowledge does have. If we take into account the amount of discussion that has been usually carried on regarding the interrelationship between art and morals we are simply surprised to find that comparatively very little or no attention has been paid proportionately to the significant relation which prevails between knowledge and morals. Art does have a cognitive or an epistemic aspect along with its mainly affective function of aesthetic enjoyment, and hence a discussion regarding art and morals is also to a certain extent an indirect discussion regarding knowledge and morals, yet this does not bring into prominence the multifariously intimate relationship between knowledge as such and morals. Particularly is this discussion pertinent when it is realized that knowledge is much more powerful than art in its far-reaching consequences. Art enters into man's life mainly as a recreation, while knowledge in its practical applications enters into the very modes of life and existence. Art is only a pastime, knowledge is a serious business. Art is a sport and a play, knowledge is work. Art is merely a diversion, knowledge is a principal occupation. Art fills leisure, but knowledge fills life. It is knowledge that has made leisure possible. While art appeals to emotion and imagination, knowledge has a compelling conviction for reason. This distinction is not intended to condemn art and commend knowledge, but to show their relative values in

the making and moulding of life as a whole. Both knowledge and art have this function to serve and they do it complementarily in their own way, but the effects of knowledge take deeper roots in human life and consequently they are far-reaching as well as long-lasting. Hence, if the discussion regarding the interrelation of art and moral values occupies so much of our time and space, much more must be given to the consideration of the interrelation of knowledge and moral values. This is what the ethical theory of knowledge purports to do.

III. The Problems before the Ethics of Knowledge

The ethical theory of knowledge, broadly speaking, deals with the problems that lie on the borders of ethics and epistemology. Epistemology should concern itself with all that is relevantly connected with knowledge. Besides the usual questions that are discussed in epistemology, the following questions appear to be not only relevant but also very important: What subjective conditions qualify a person to get knowledge? What different kinds of preparations are necessary for different kinds of knowledge? What is the correlation between the character of a person and the knowledge which he acquires? What part does knowledge play in the promotion of ethical values in the individual and society? What is the place of knowledge as a value in the system of values? Does knowledge possess an instrumental value or an intrinsic value? How is the value of knowledge correlated with other values?

What is the effect of knowledge on the knower? Can the knower remain indifferent to the knowledge he obtains? If knowledge does, in some sense, influence the knower, is this influence always good? If knowledge has an intrinsic worth can there be an evil influence of knowledge on the knower? Can there be a distinction between a good knowledge and a bad knowledge? Is there a hierarchy of various knowledges on the

basis of some fundamental principle of valuation? How do we decide that principle? Should knowledge be imparted equally to all? Has every person a right to all kinds of knowledge? Should we make a discrimination between the fit and the unfit to receive knowledge? On what basis can such a distinction be made in the knower? Should any knowledge be kept secret? Does all knowledge have a public claim? How is knowledge related to peace, power and progress?

What is the utility of knowledge? What are the specific uses of specific studies? How do different studies affect their respective students? What truth is there in Bacon's observation that history makes man wise, natural philosophy deep, moral philosophy grave and so on?

Knowledge is directed upon a certain object. What is the highest object to which knowledge should be directed? Again, what is the highest purpose which knowledge serves? In other words what is the *summum bonum* for cognitive activity? Is there anything about which it is better to remain ignorant? Is it true that knowledge purifies us, saves us?

Following the general ethical theories regarding ideal we may study as to what would be the hedonistic, formalistic and eudaemonistic conceptions of knowledge.

If the three-fold knowledge situation, there are ethical problems connected with each of the elements of the knower, the means and the object of knowledge. Thus the recognition and the acquisition of certain qualifications by the knower adequate to the object of knowledge, a moral faith in the adequate methodology commensurable with the nature of the object of knowledge, a moral discrimination in the choice of the experimental methods in the process of the acquisition of knowledge, determination of the adequate relationship regarding knowledge of intrinsic worth and knowledge of instrumental worth in the moral life of the individual and the society, a comparison and a

correlation among the scientific, the philosophical, the artistic and the moral attitudes, a consideration of the moral responsibilities of the persons in all these fields—such are the significant ethical questions which the ethical theory of knowledge can have before it for a detailed consideration.

It is not possible to deal with all these questions here, they are indicated here more to stimulate enquiry than to give ready-made solutions. Some of the questions are very suggestive about the general lines on which the answers will be expected. Nevertheless here I propose to deal with a few of them in a manner that will be sufficient to give an outline of the ethics of knowledge.

IV. The Concept of the Ethics of Knowledge

We have always stressed the psychological, the logical and the sociological conditions of knowledge. But we have altogether neglected the ethical and the spiritual conditions of knowledge. There is such a thing as ethics of knowledge studying the ethical foundation and significance of knowledge, defining truth in terms of the ethical and spiritual discipline of the knower or the subject, and above all suggesting a methodology of conquering the regions which ordinarily lie beyond the sphere of human capabilities.

Just as "Social determination of knowledge" is the postulate of sociological epistemology, "Ethical determination of knowledge" is the postulate of ethical epistemology. But while the sociological theories of knowledge are deterministic and relativistic the ethical theory of knowledge gives free scope for independent, progressive acquisition of a completer truth. Again, while the sociological epistemology is historically descriptive in its results, the ethical epistemology is both autobiographically descriptive and ideally normative in its suggestions, in so far as its object is

to search for an ideal method of the acquisition of knowledge as well as a method of idealizing the knower.

While the psychological epistemology studies the origin and development of knowledge in the individual knower by following a plain historical or genetic method, the sociological epistemology too studies in the same manner the origin and development of the individual knowledge as determined by the socio-historical forces. Logical epistemology, again, studies the conditions of the validity of knowledge, and attempts to define truth and error. Its function lies in evaluating knowledge rather than describing the origin of knowledge. Ethical epistemology, on the other hand, concerns itself with the problem of the ethically right method of getting at truth. It defines the qualifications of one who can know the truth, and lays down a process as to how he can acquire those qualifications and how he can know the truth. It is interested in the knowing agent and the method of his idealization. In this, unlike the previous epistemologies, it is dynamic in its conception; for it is not content with showing the limits of human knowledge, but suggests a method of overcoming them.

V. The Basic Role of the Knower in the Knowledge Situation

The old epistemologies were concerned with the sources and the means of knowledge. Their attention was shifted from the object to be known to the ways and means of knowledge in the cognitive situation, and its interpretation of the status of the object known, whether it is dependent on knowledge or independent of it. So too they speculated about the criterion of truth, whether it consists in correspondence, coherence or successful activity, etc. But they did not take into consideration the most significant part played by the knower himself. The moral and the spiritual character of the subject influenced the capacity of his acquisition of truth. What in most cases we have is opinion

which cannot be ultimately and absolutely regarded as true, because the knower is incapable morally and spiritually to know the absolute truth. The history of philosophy brings out the medley of opinions held by the various philosophers on various different topics of philosophy. Where is the truth? Is it in all of them or none of them? In any case, it points to subjectivism and relativism and scepticism. The history of philosophy is a history of illusions, which points to the "Poverty of Philosophy" as Marx has expressed it. I do not want to say that it is all an illusion and a dire poverty of philosophy; there are elements of rich truth in the philosophy of the past; yet the diversity of philosophical interpretations, the diversity of methods used, and the diversity of conclusions reached is so very flabbergasting that it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that each one of the philosophers has his own absolute philosophy, as if there are many absolute truths. It behoves us, therefore, to see whether instead of studying the measures or *pramānas* of knowledge, we should not measure the measurer of knowledge. The establishment of truth (*prameyasiddhi*) is said to be dependent upon the means of knowledge (*pramānas*), but it is much more dependent upon the knower (*pramātā*). The problem of interest for the epistemologist now is this *pramātā* or the philosopher himself. Once our attention was shifted from the object of knowledge to the means of knowledge. Now we must again shift our attention from the means of knowledge to the knower himself.

Instead of losing ourselves in the meshes of diverse philosophies, we should concentrate upon the philosopher, and study why he fails and how he can make himself equal to the task of knowing the indubitable absolute truth. If Descartes has laid down the subjective trend of modern philosophy, the task is not yet complete. It is no use indubitably establishing the existence of the self as the knower; if we are to make the right use of

this firm foundation of knowledge, we must further ask how we can make this self or subject of knowledge perfect, so that he can know everything else in the same indubitable fashion. Self-certainty must pave the way for self-realization which, in fact, consists in the idealization of the lower into the higher. Such an ideally perfect philosopher alone can give us an indubitable truth. All others can give us nothing more than mere opinions, and therefore, only doubtful knowledge. Shaftesbury says, "To philosophise in a just signification is but to carry good breeding a step higher." This evidently means that moral and spiritual idealization of the philosopher is a condition of his justly philosophising about the Ultimate Reality.

The postulate of ethical determination of knowledge signifies that the "ethos" of the society in which the individual is born and brought up, and the formation of a unique character by the free agency of the individual himself, are the chief ethically determinant factors of his opinions. Whatever beliefs the individual holds are the product of the two factors of the social and cultural backgrounds, which have no meaning apart from the ethical ideology of the social group and the moral character of the individual himself, who determines himself from within as much as he is determined by society from without. The social and other environment has an influence upon the formation of the individual character as well as his opinions and beliefs. The Marxian and other social theories are deterministic in their conception. But there is something in the individual which is irreducible to the influence of external circumstances; in fact, nothing is a circumstance to the individual which he does not recognize as such. His independent activity of selection and rejection, his allowing the circumstances to influence him or not, in short, his free creative freedom is an important condition of the formation of his unique moral character. This individual character too determines his philosophy, his opinions and beliefs, his knowledge in general.

The beliefs of society as of the individuals are merely opinions and not knowledge or truth, though subjectively they may be regarded as true; for they vary not only from individual to individual, or from moment to moment in the same individual but also from society to society in the same time. We cannot legitimately say that all these beliefs and opinions are true; possibly all these are false.

VI. True Knowledge is a Way of Self-purification

The most important question is how is true knowledge determined and acquired. Whatever other conditions of truth there may be, the most decisive condition seems to be the moral and spiritual qualifications of the person who is intent upon the knowledge of the truth. He alone has the capacity to know what is real as distinguished from what is illusory who has built in himself an ideal character. All that is conditioned by passions, sentiments, prejudices, interests and such other falsifying and distracting elements in human personality cannot be true. The soundness of the sense organs, the keenness of intelligence, the various weapons of knowledge and of methodology do play their part in the acquisition of knowledge; but at the root of all these is the knower, who can make a good use or a bad use of them, and thus attain either truth or falsity. The weapons of knowledge in the hands of an immoral and imperfect knower would lead only to false knowledge. The same weapons would yield correct knowledge in the hands of the knower with moral and spiritual integrity. Purity of the self is the arch-stone which supports all other factors involved in knowledge. A morally and spiritually imperfect knower is a great falsifier, and therefore most unreliable in the field of knowledge as he is in the field of practice. The height of his audacity is that he should claim to have known the truth in spite of his living under an illusion. The whole history of philosophy bears this out.

The knower, to begin with, is full of imperfections, limitations and ignorance. Whatever he knows and does would have this imprint of imperfection. The problem is : can such an imperfect knower be the cause of perfect knowledge? The process of knowledge is fundamentally a process of idealization of the knower. In this sense, true knowledge is essentially a process of becoming or being. The process of realization of reality is, in essence, the realization of the best in the self. For, to realize is to make something real. The ignorant, the imperfect, the limited, and so far unreal self undertakes, in the process of knowledge, the activity of making himself more and more real. In the long and incessant physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual effort, there is a process of the realization of the true being of the knower. There is in fact a transformation and purification of the whole original being. This seems to be the meaning of the terms *Satvasaṁsuddhi* and *Viśuddhātmā* in the *Gītā* ; *Dhātuprasāda*, *Jñānaprasāda* and *Viśuddhasattva* in *Kaṭha* and *Muṇḍaka*; *Vaiśāradya*, *Adhyātmāprasāda* and *Aśuddhikṣaya* in *Yoga*. The purport of all these terms is that knowledge, in the ultimate analysis, is a way of the purification of being by a gradual elimination of the elemental impurities of the knower and an acquisition of transparency or illumination.

VII. Ethical Discipline in the Fields of Perceptual Knowledge and the Physical Sciences

Now the question is: Is all knowledge ethically conditioned? Or there are only some fields of knowledge which require ethical qualifications in the knower? There is ordinary empirical knowledge which is the basis of our ordinary conduct of life. Take for example the proposition 'this is a paper.' It does not seem to need any moral training to assert the truth of this proposition. There is, again, the field of scientific knowledge about physical reality such as the propositions, 'heat is a form of

energy', 'oxygen is essential for life', etc. Here, too, it seems that moral preparation on the part of the scientist is not necessary. The keenness of senses and the intellectual alertness are here the aspects of the moral qualification. But it must be said in this connection that though in the context of social behaviour a morally and spiritually imperfect scientist may discover a truth, it cannot be said that a research worker in the scientific field does not require some sort of moral discipline. Hard labour, sincerity, impartiality, even a sort of moral asceticism are essential on the part of the scientist, at least in his own field, though his conduct otherwise may be objectionable. Biographies of the great scientists will bear out the truth of their integrity of character as great researchers. A sort of disciplined life is indispensable for the discovery of an unknown truth or for the conception of a great idea.

VIII. Ethical Discipline in the Fields of Social Enquiry

What, again, about the knowledge of social phenomena studied in the social sciences? What about the judgements of an economist, a politician, a lawyer, a judge in the court of law, a sociologist and the like? In many cases, here, the judgments may be true inspite of the moral imperfections of the persons who pass these judgments. Yet the differences in the judgments in the social field are mostly due to moral imperfections of the workers in that field. In this connection a passage from an article entitled "Towards a Theory of Social Knowledge" by Mr. W. Stark of the University of Edinburgh would be very illuminating.

"It proposes, first of all, a clear consciousness of the fact itself in the spirit in which boethe calls self-knowledge the beginning of all improvement. It demands, next, a much higher degree of care and attention in the handling of the materials of knowledge than naive, philosophically untutored approach will ever

deem requisite. And it also calls for an unrelenting self-criticism which constantly keeps an eye, not only on the object of study, but on the student himself, to prevent his accustomed modes of thought from surreptitiously slipping into the mental image he endeavours to build up. For one who is aware of the necessity of a social theory of knowledge, and of a philosophical critique of social perfection, a historical, anthropological, or even merely sociological investigation can never be anything but a very painful understanding. In other words, all social study requires a moral as well as an intellectual effort, and to that extent it is decidedly more difficult than purely scientific research. It necessitates—if it is to be successful—a large measure of genuine good will towards the outsider, and his strange, apparently so often irrational and even uncivilised world, which is more difficult to provide than many will realize. It is possible only through continual self-conquest and self-denial."

The whole passage is very eloquent from the point of view of moral and spiritual equipment indispensable for the student of social sciences, who is interested in the true knowledge of societies and social phenomena. Similarly Prof. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, President of the Royal Anthropological Institute, writing on "Social Anthropology: Past and Present" has criticised all functional determinist theories of society which reduce knowledge of truth to a mere function of the social organism, expressible in terms of natural law. He says, "In its extreme form functional determinism leads to absolute relativism and makes nonsense not only of the theory itself but of all thought." Then he makes a plea for "the thesis that social anthropology is a kind of historiography, and therefore ultimately a philosophy of art," which "implies that it studies societies as moral systems and not as natural systems, that it is interested in design rather than in process, and that it therefore seeks patterns and not scientific laws, and interprets rather than explains. These are conceptual and not merely verbal differ-

ences." It is clear from this conception of society as essentially a moral pattern that its phenomena have a moral significance. Social knowledge, therefore, in its last analysis is morally conditioned.

IX. Ethical Discipline in the Fields of Philosophical Enquiry

What about the highly philosophical knowledge? Whatever speculative and interpretative elements are involved in it, it could hardly be doubted that high moral and spiritual integrity is necessary on the part of the philosopher. He is a spectator of all times and all existence, and has an ambition of grasping ultimate and absolute reality. If he lacks in these qualifications, he cannot overcome his prejudices, partial interest, selfishness, egotism, passions, fickleness and many such deficiencies which are bound to vitiate his knowledge of the real. Hence the Indian philosophers have stressed the need of the acquisition of the four-fold discipline (*Sādhana Catuṣṭaya*¹) before one launches upon the most difficult of all tasks. A strict moral and spiritual discipline, as is laid down in Yoga, alone would qualify anyone to become a philosopher. One well-versed in the eight-fold yoga (*Aṣṭāṅgayoga*) attains elimination of impurities (*Aśuddhikṣaya*) which results in enlightenment of knowledge *Jñānadipti* as the 28th Sūtra of *Sādhana-pāda* of the Yogasutras says. By the gaining of the three-fold self-victory (*Samyama*) consisting of concentration (*Dhāraṇā*) meditation (*Dhyāna*) and absorption (*Samādhi*), one attains intuition (*Prajñā*) which is the instrument of indubitable knowledge of ultimate reality.

But have we left any sphere of knowledge beyond the ken of moral qualification? We have made reference to judgments

¹ (1) *viveka* (discrimination), (2) *vairāgya* (renunciation), (3) *śama* (mental tranquillity), *dama* (sensual control), *uparati* (distaste for pleasures), *titikṣā* (spirit of durance), *śraddhā* (faith), *saṁādhāna* (contentment), and (4) *Mumukṣutva* (keen desire for freedom).

of ordinary empirical knowledge and of scientific knowledge in the physical sphere, judgments in the social sphere and in the philosophical sphere. We have seen that more and more moral qualifications are necessary for the knower as he goes from a comparatively simple field of knowledge to more and more complex. And finally we have concluded that philosophical knowledge worth the name must absolutely be conditioned by perfect moral and spiritual integrity of the philosopher. But it could be pointed out that all knowledge without exception is in its ultimate analysis philosophical. Whatever statement made in whatever sphere, if it claims absolute truth for itself, is philosophical in its significance; and hence must be ethically conditioned. If the statement is only relative, made from a definite point of view, its truth is relative to that point of view alone. The statement, 'for instance, this is a paper,' is a simple case of perception and true as a matter of fact from the practical point of view. But if it claims absolute truth, it becomes a philosophical judgment, and therefore questionable. For the problem of perception is itself philosophical, and it involves many interpretations. What happens in perception? There may be physiological and psychological and logical explanations of it, and many diverse views may be held. The judgment itself may be pulled to pieces, and various theories about its import, about the relation of the subject to the predicate and of both to reality are there. There is an idealist logic, a realist logic, a positivist logic, a symbolic logic, a pragmatic logic and so on. In the end, it is the most difficult of all tasks to decide as to what ultimately is true about the fact of perception. If this is the case about the simplest of perceptions, how much more variety of philosophical views there would be about all the rest of the judgments whether made in the physical, the social or the philosophical sciences? Which is the most rational view? Is it not true that to be rational is to be moral? The basis of rationality is in morality.

X. A Philosophical View is an Expansion of a Philosopher's Ethics

The case of ethical knowledge is most convincing in connection with the ethical determination of knowledge. Only a man of dutiful character like Kant can advocate a theory of duty for the sake of duty. Only a *Cārvāka* given to life of pleasure can advocate a hedonist theory of morals. They cannot exchange their theories and still retain their character. There is a consistency between the life and theory of a moralist.

It follows, therefore, that at least in the ethical sphere of knowledge there is an ethical determination of that knowledge.

But to admit this is to admit ethical determination of knowledge in all spheres. For, it is a historical fact borne out by all the self-consistent philosophies of the various philosophers, that there is a certain internal harmony in the views regarding various allied spheres of knowledge. The hedonist in ethics, broadly speaking, will necessarily be a materialist in philosophy, and an empiricist and a realist in epistemology. The idealist in ethics will also be usually an idealist in metaphysics, logic and epistemology. If its not so in some cases, there is a likelihood of inconsistency in their doctrines. If the ethical life of a person determines his ethical theory, and if all other philosophical knowledge is in harmony with the ethical knowledge, all knowledge must be regarded as determined by the ethical personality of the philosopher.

It may be asked, what ethics ultimately determines the possibility of the acquisition of absolute truth? The objection may be answered on the following lines. Firstly, the moral theorists are not perfectly moral, and hence the variety in their theories. There is a moral progress in the theories of the moral ideal from Hedonism, through Formalism to Eudaemonism or self-realization, and also in the theories of the moral standard

from Heteronom , through Theonomy and Cosmonomy to Autonomy. This progress shows that the moral theorist himself goes through these ideals and standards, and thus reaches both a supreme moral life and a supreme moral theory. The variety of theories are only stages in the development; they all are not absolutely valid. Secondly, the moralist is not always strictly moral even according to his own theory; and being immoral, he does not see the defects in his own moral theory. If he tries to live up to his theory, he would see the contradictions involved in it; and if sincere, he would remove those by developing a new moral theory in consistency with his own experience as a moral agent. Thirdly, there is a consensus of opinion regarding concrete moral virtues, though theories' might be divergent. Truth, Temperance, Justice, Courage, Non-violence, Wisdom, Faithfulness, Chastity and such other most important virtues are universally accepted by people of more or less enlightened consciousness. Perfection of moral and spiritual life consists in the sincere practice of these virtues which would enable a man to enlarge his vision of truth.

THE NATURE AND WORTH OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE

I. Universal Postulation of Moral Knowledge

We will determine, to begin with, the place of ethical knowledge in the scheme of human knowledge. Ethics holds a central position in human life. It may be said to be holding the highest rank in comparison with many other knowledges which a man may have. Even if there is an abundance of all kinds of knowledge, an individual can afford to remain indifferent to most of that knowledge at least up to a certain degree. But owing to the practical imminency of life a man cannot afford to be indifferent to the ethical knowledge. It is not difficult to deal with men who are ignorant of the principles of Physics or Chemistry, Astronomy or Mathematics, Psychology, History or Sociology. The common run of people are usually ignorant of a scientific knowledge in many fields. But even those men who are recognised as experts and geniuses in some special fields of knowledge are found to be as ignorant as any person could be regarding many other things. But nobody would be inclined to take a serious objection to such ignorance. It is only because a man cannot be expected to know all the things owing to the natural limitations which are put upon anybody's abilities and capacities. One can afford to be indifferent to such ignorance, not because the specific knowledge that various sciences have to offer is useless, but because it does not so closely enter into a man's daily activities. Moreover owing to the specialised knowledge of so many mechanical appliances which I may be actually using, I can shelve my responsibility of knowing their technique. I may amuse myself by means of a radio or a television set, or work on the typewriter or drive a car, yet when these machines go

wrong I may have to seek the help of the expert mechanic. I don't think that he can find fault with my ignorance. But while every man is allowed ignorance of many things, no man could be ever allowed to betray ignorance regarding moral behaviour. Nobody can make a plea that he behaves in the manner that he does because he is ignorant of the behaviour that makes anyone a gentleman. A man who lacks in common moral sense, a man who has no pinch of conscience is most difficult to deal with. All ignorance could be pardoned but moral ignorance is unpardonable. If ignorance of law is no excuse much more is moral ignorance inexcusable. Our actual social practice is an evidence to this fact. The criminals, for instance, are punished even if they may plead innocence. The sinners or persons of despicable conduct, though could not always be so punished in the court of law, they have to suffer punishment in terms of public censure. Everybody knows—though whatever be the mode of that knowledge—that he is expected to be honest, just, truthful, faithful, harmless, temperate, and so on. He also expects others to behave accordingly. The maxim "Do unto others as you would be done by" may be given as an example of the quintessence of moral knowledge.

A note of caution must be given here to avoid confusion. This ethical knowledge is not acquired by reading the treatises on Ethics or Moral Philosophy. No common man has the required ability, nor is it obligatory on him to understand the intricate and abstruse discussions with which these works are replete. He may well be ignorant of these theoretical hair-splitting discussions and yet he is expected to know what is good and what is bad, what is right and what is wrong. A man who lacks this knowledge is intolerable in society.

Of all the knowledges moral knowledge is at once most simple and most difficult. Had it not been simple, somehow natural and universal, we could not have punished children and

the illiterate and the ignorant for their misconduct, though the mode of responsibility and punishment would be adequate to the situation. It appears that a man knows what it is to be good as spontaneously as he knows how to breathe and live. The moral ethos of the society is naturally imbibed by the individual. Our mutual social dealings are based upon the postulation that we know how ought we to behave towards one another. We never ask whether one has learnt the distinction between good and bad before we praise or condemn a person for his particular mode of behaviour. Moral knowledge unlike other knowledge is taken for granted. This is its uniquely distinctive characteristic which probably no other kind of knowledge has.

II. The Unity of Theory and Practice

But moral knowledge has its unique difficulties. These are apparent as soon as we enter into theoretical discussions. These are the difficulties regarding the determination of the highest good, the criterion of right and wrong, the explicit formulation of the principles on which a man ought to act, the fixation of the hierarchy in these principles and the solution of casuistry. We do not find the same extent of such theoretical difficulties in the natural and the social sciences. The contemporary tendencies are sceptical regarding ethical knowledge. The trends are in the lines of the linguistic analysis, the emotive-attitude theories based on logical empiricism and the denial of values in the physicalist outlook of the scientific philosophy. But just as Hume was an honest sceptic who made a distinction between his theoretical doubt and exigencies of practical life, in spite of the anarchy that may prevail in the ethical theory we have to be conscientious regarding the pressing demands of man's existence. The existentialist emphasis on the priority of existence to essence has a lesson of importance to give. Experience of life is deeper than theoretical reason. And when the latter develops in a way that may prove dangerous to the

foundational human existence itself, the theoretical reason constitutes a devalue. The value of human existence is self-evident.

But howsoever we may separate the fields of theoretical research and human practice particularly when a theory ends in scepticism proving dangerous to human existence and practical living, we need not and cannot, as integral human beings, separate the two fields. Happily the contemporary trends in the ethical theory are not the last words on the matter and they are only some of the ways amongst many others of the approaches made to moral philosophy. There have been and there still are the teleological and axiological approaches to ethics.

There has been a more or less general agreement regarding the influence of theory on practice in all spheres of knowledge. The theoretical research or as it is called the 'pure research' could be done without avowedly practical ends in view, but the work of the disinterested research-worker—may be of interest from the point of view of practical consequences of far-reaching importance, and when once the results of theoretical investigation become public, the practical applications soon find their way.

But if this be the case of pure research not meant for practice how much more would be the influence of a theory that is not only meant for practice, but also is of practice? Ethics is essentially a theory of the actual and the ideal human practice and thus must inevitably influence practice. There is a view that the interrelation of theory and practice particularly in the social sciences is really so intimate that a theory contains so much as practice allows, that it is commensurable with practice, that its truth is determined by its practicality, that it is an intellectual summation of the volitional activity. In fact, there is an essential unity between theory and practice. The *Gītā* proclaims that those who distinguish between the two—*sāṅkhya* and *yoga*—are

fools. Those alone are said to be wise who look upon these as one.¹

The nature of the influence that a theory may have on practice is dependent upon the kind of theory that is advocated in Ethics. The intuitionist theory, and the utilitarian theory, the hedonist theory and the rationalist theory, the naturalist theory and the axiological theory, the absolutist theory and the evolutionary theory, the secular theory and the theological theory—all these will necessarily have different practical consequences. But it may be said immediately that any of these theories is preferable in value to any form of scepticism in ethics. Because a sceptical theory necessarily ends in moral anarchy and frustration. If it is a fact of experience that life does not wait for a theoretical basis, and if inspite of the sceptical protestations of theoretical scepticism practical exigencies of living force themselves upon us, what more refutation does scepticism need? If a theory is verified in practice then where can we find a verification of scepticism? If, therefore, there is a discrepancy between theory and practice, theory must be given up in preference to practice, and a suitable theory that sums up the practice must be reformulated. To make practice bend to the cherished theory is to commit the fallacy of putting the cart before the horse. And particularly in this case of moral scepticism putting it into practice is to invoke annihilation.²

III. The Axiological View of Ethics

If theory does influence practice, then our attitudinal preference of any constructive theory to a sceptical theory is determined by the recognition of the intrinsic value of the theory that contributes positively to the preservation of life, in whatever manner it deems fit. No ethical theory can justify itself unless

¹ Cf. *Gītā*, V—4, 5.

² Cf. *Gītā*, IV—40.

it intuits fundamental values of human existence. Therefore all ethical theories are at once axiological and intuitionist, though their attitudes and views regarding these values may differ. Thus the hedonist and the utilitarian theories find value in pleasure or agreeable feeling and the universal welfare. While the rationalist intuitionist theories find value in the intrinsic goodness of the will, the empirical utilitarian theories find it in the actually realizable desirable consequences. While the absolutist theory sees value in the realization of perfection which the self already implicitly has, the evolutionist theory sees it in progressive mutual adjustment of the new ideals and the novel circumstances. While the secular and the humanist ethics recognizes the ultimacy of the empirical world and the value of humanity, the theological ethics finds supreme value in God as an abode and source of all values. The axiological point of view in ethics has a dynamic faith in the intuitions of absolute values of human life and existence. Its understanding of the universe, where moral life is to be enacted, is that it has a value-constitution where the law of the Conservation of Values is postulated. Such a faith and understanding lead the moral agent to a moral activity for the sake of its intrinsic worth. But such intrinsically worthy activity done continuously results in the increase of good will in himself, and, as a reaction, in others. The by-product of the intrinsically moral activity essentially consisting in the pursuit of values is the increase of total happiness necessitated by the value-frame of the universe itself. The prudential utilitarian ethics will not produce as much happiness as the intuitionist absolutist ethics would do. Hence the axiological ethics is consequentially more utilitarian than the avowedly utilitarian ethics.

IV. The Obligatory Nature of Moral Knowledge

Both theory and practice proceed from the unity of human life and hence they are bound to affect each other. Therefore, if theory does affect practice, then a man who studies ethics seri-

ously is likely to be a better man than one who does not have that theoretical knowledge. Just as the study of mathematics and logic helps sharpening of the intellect, a study of moral philosophy is likely to offer a new zest to the good will. The moral agent will be able to see the subtleties of the virtuous life, his vision will expand, his insight would be deepened, and he will have a foresight ever longer than before. In short, the originally given moral sensitivity will be on the increase with a progressive theoretical understanding. Thus moral knowledge is indispensable, as the social life has a compelling demand on the individual.

Thus if a proper sense of moral values is expected of the persons then it is obligatory on them that they study the ethical theory as best as their capacities allow. Of all the knowledges that man may possess there is no knowledge comparable to the moral knowledge which pervades human life, and hence it occupies the highest position in the general framework of human knowledge. We do not measure the worth of the learning of an educated person in terms of the big load of information that he carries in his head, but rather we weigh the culture that education has imparted him. We are inclined to value the cultivation and development of character as a result of his learning. We are interested in his forming such attitudes as are always susceptible to the increasing sense of values. Moral education however is not one of the subjects amongst a host of other subjects which one must study, but it is continuous with every instruction that a student must receive.

V. A Conflict of Choice and a Conflict of Involuntary Sinfulness

One of the distinctive difficulties of the moral life is not so much a want of knowledge of the distinction between good and evil, the real difficulty is of the will to be good. Duryodhana, the

Chief of the Kauravas and the greatest rival of the Pāṇdavas in the *Mahābhārata*, may be regarded as representing the common man regarding the moral conflict he experiences. He says, "I know what is good, but I am not inclined to do it, I know also what is evil but I am not inclined to abstain from doing it."³ In the *Gītā* Arjuna poses his difficulty in the following words: "What is it that incites and forces a man into committing a sin even against his will?"⁴ This is a different kind of conflict that a man goes through than the common experience of a conflict of choice. It is not a case of conscience of the nature "to be or not to be." In the case of conscience there is a will to do good but there is no determined knowledge of the good. In the present conflict, on the other hand, there is a knowledge of the good but an inhibition of the will. It is a case of separating the theoretical conviction from the practical implementation. This is a peculiar difficulty with moral knowledge. In other kinds of knowledge there is not such a comparatively wide gap between the theory and the practice.

VI. The Theory that Virtue and Vice are Innate

The answer provided by Śrīkrṣṇa is that the knowledge is covered by ignorance and the man is under a delusion. It is his own passions that devour the agent. The gulf between knowledge and action is created by the conservative and the prohibitive elements of the psychological-ontological qualities of *rajas* and *tamas*.⁵

Here I propose to discuss at some length an interesting question. Does a man sin because he is morally evil in nature, or because he is ignorant, or because he is insane? What is the

³ *Jānāmi dharmāṁ na ca me pravṛttiḥ.*

Jānāmyadharmaṁ na ca me nivṛttiḥ.

⁴ *Gītā*, III—36.

⁵ *Gītā*, III—37 & 39.

distinction between badness, foolishness and madness? Or contrarily between goodness, wisdom and sanity?

All the above views have been held. For instance, it is believed that there are men who are naturally bad. Satan is a representative example. His motto is "Evil! be thou my good." Such men recognise evil to be evil, they have no intention to be good. They are the most difficult men to deal with. They are a menace to the well-being and happiness of the society. Like Nero they rejoice over human suffering. On the other hand there are men like Buddha, Christ and Gandhi who are prepared unconditionally to return good to evil. Not only that; they are even prepared to believe in the divine spark of original goodness in such apparently bad men. It is their faith that the continuous and spontaneous pouring of goodness on the evil will melt the outward covering and the inner goodness in such men will be made to shine. Just as the whole science of Alchemy was produced out of a search for the philosopher's stone by the simple touch of which everything could be turned into gold, so the whole moral conduct proceeds from the belief in the intrinsic goodness of every person. A philosopher's stone may be a fictitious entity and possibly the same may be true of the faith in the intrinsic goodness of every human being. But both the fictions are efficacious in their results. There is no frustration in this search because even if we do not find the object of our seeking we reap a rich harvest of knowledge which otherwise would not have been possibly gained. The belief in the intrinsic goodness of every person goes far beyond the Kantian recognition of every person as an end and not merely as a means. We may be prepared to respect the personality of every individual without recognising or believing in the intrinsic moral worth of the person. We may be prepared to believe in the "kingdom of ends" without identifying it with the "kingdom of heaven." The saintly beings believe in the latter too.

VII. The Theory that Virtue is Sanity, Vice is Insanity

The other view is that a man's badness is a sort of mental disease. Samuel Butler in his novel *Erewhon* recommends a sympathetic treatment to the criminals as they are not bad people but only mad. Therefore they deserve to be sent to the lunatic asylums rather than to the jails. The jails are meant for those, in his opinion, who suffer from physical diseases which are usually caused by irregularities of behaviour. The suggestion is that the sickness is avoidable and a man is responsible for incurring it. Madness is something which a man cannot help. Badness is not a moral defect but only a psychological one. We don't hold the lunatics responsible for their acts. The so called criminals are therefore only psychological cases. They do not enjoy the normal mental health and hence a necessity of giving a psycho-therapeutic treatment. They should be submitted to the sympathetic care of the doctors rather than to the exacting jailors. The modern improvements in the prisons are owing to this view. Prisons are more of hospitals and technical schools. The change from the retributive or preventive theories of punishment to the reformatory theory is the result of a changed outlook towards the criminals. The disabling cruel physical punishments are given up. The criminals are looked upon as persons, as ends; and they are helped to regain their respectable position in the society. In the legal theory also such finer distinctions between murder and culpable homicide are a recognition of the psychological state of the criminal at the occasion of crime. Whether an act was done under provocation or not makes a whole difference to the act. Similarly other circumstantial situations which might have led the criminal to crime may be taken into consideration while giving punishment. The crime is a resultant of certain social situations over which an individual has no control. The cases of delinquency, for example, are due mostly to the disorder in family life. The children either are

orphans, or the parents are cruel, or neglectful, or are quarreling among themselves. The children cannot help developing abnormal psychological traits. Poverty is another responsible factor of great importance. In order to quench hunger man is goaded on to any sin.⁶ So long as the social order has not been changed, so long as the economic security has not been established it would be wrong to hold the criminals responsible for their actions. Criminology has thus to consider the psychological and the sociological aspects of the problem. The roots of crime are not so much in the morally evil nature of the individual as in the deeper psychological and social make-up of his personality.

Whatever may be the crime, it could be viewed as a psychological case and hence an attitude of forgiveness rather than revenge is called for. The Christian injunctions 'Judge not', 'Resist not evil', 'Return good to evil' are significant in this that we are not competent to judge because we cannot put ourselves into the psychological frame of the culprit's mind, we cannot have the correct perspective of the motives from which the person acts. Neither are we free from bias and prejudice nor are we ourselves free from sin to take upon ourselves the responsibility of sitting in judgment over others. The situation demands an attitude of immense love which is more than the attitude of forgiveness. To forget and forgive we have to assume that a crime has been committed and judged to be so. While we presume that the culprit deserves punishment as a matter of justice, an attitude of pity is taken towards him. Pity assumes that there is a degradation of personality. The culprit is assigned an inferior moral worth. When we say that justice is human, pity divine, what we mean is, it is not given to man to pity other men, it is God's privilege. As men we are equals both in our merit and demerit, none holds a superior or an inferior worth in relation to others. God, as superior to man in every respect may take pity on man's sin, as

⁶ Cf. *Bhubhuksiṭaḥ kiṁ na karoti pāpam ? A subhāṣita.*

He is beyond all sin and also because He knows the human weakness. Man can at best take an attitude of love towards other men. It is a faith in the brotherhood and equality of men. Therefore, for us the gradational valuation is justice, pity and love in increasing order. Christ has shown by example that the attitude of love makes wonders. The woman who was condemned for adultery was brought before Christ. He asked the men: "Let him throw the first stone at her, who had no sin in him." But no one dared stone her. For how can those who live in glass-houses afford to throw stones at others? There was a complete change in the heart of that woman. She no more sinned. Love is a superior substitute for any form of revenge or punishment. We cannot reform others only. True reformation has to begin with ourselves. Each one of us needs a transformation of our being to make it replete with love. A mental defect needs a mental healing.

VIII. The Theory that Virtue is Knowledge, Vice is Ignorance

The third theory associated with the great name of Socrates is that virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. Nobody is involuntarily good or voluntarily bad. This theory denies that men are by nature bad or good, it also denies that vicious men are psychological cases of insanity either temporary or lasting, it rather finds the root of evil in ignorance or folly and of goodness in knowledge or wisdom. The bad man does not know that it is bad on his part to act the way he acts. Had he known better, he would have been a better man. Lack of knowledge, not voluntary sinfulness that issues in a bad conduct. The need is of education. For if virtue is knowledge, it could be taught. We find so much evil in human society only for want of proper education.

On the face of it the theory does not appear plausible. But it could be so explained as to show the truth in this theory. For example, does not man tell a lie knowing full well that it is morally bad to tell lies? Does not a man behave dishonestly or

unfaithfully, in spite of his knowing that it is bad to do so? The answer in defence of Socratic theory would be that these men *really* do not believe in what they profess. There may be ulterior motives in professing goodness without genuinely understanding what goodness is. To pay a lip service to moral virtues is no indication of moral knowledge at all. A man's belief is expressed in his behaviour. Whatever a man may profess, his actual conduct is the true token of the beliefs that he holds. A man's practice is the criterion of the theory that he holds. We are deceived only because we go by what is on a man's lips, we won't be deceived if we have an access to his heart. But there being no direct access to another man's heart, we can judge his beliefs only by his express conduct. So it is no use saying that a man knows that it is good to be truthful and bad to tell a lie and yet he acts contrary to his knowledge. The fact rather is that a man does not believe in truthfulness and hence tells lies. He does not believe in keeping a word and therefore breaks the promises. He does not believe in honesty and faithfulness, and hence acts dishonestly and unfaithfully. Therefore, Socrates is right in saying that these people really do not know what it is to be good and hence behave in that bad manner. What is needed here is that they should be made to see what genuine truthfulness and honesty and justice are and then they would be good. The whole purpose of education is to mould the right kinds of beliefs and once they are formed the right actions follow as a matter of course. There is no gap, for Socrates, between genuine knowledge and doing. To know the good and not to act up to it was, for him, a psychological impossibility. A man's knowledge is not a superficial, verbal, intellectual acquisition, an external decoration, an ornamental show. Knowledge must take possession of a man's heart, hold his will, stir his soul, regenerate his whole being. Then virtue becomes his habit, his second nature. Nay, it flows as spontaneously as sweetness from rose. A flower

cannot cast its fragrance because fragrance is its essence and not an accident. And so too a virtuous man cannot afford to be vicious, because that is not his nature.

IX. The Educational Theory of Goodness

We have expounded above all the three significant theories of moral goodness and evil. Good and evil are looked upon either as innate moral qualities, or as psychologically normal or abnormal states, or as forms of wisdom and folly. If we ask ourselves whether we would be prepared to regard ourselves as bad, mad or foolish, it would be difficult to decide. We would not like to be ascribed any of these epithets. We would like to be recognised as good, sane and wise. There is truth in all these views. Wisdom consists in the practical sense of values. We do not all possess that sense in equal proportion, though knowledge and experience is bound to make an improvement. Goodness could be promoted in proportion as moral instruction is imparted. It is possible to train the sense of values. This may be regarded broadly as an educational theory of goodness. According to it wisdom is the basis of goodness. Wisdom depends upon the right kind of education. And imparting of education is essentially imparting of virtue.

X. The Yogic Psychotherapeutic Theory of Goodness

What is the distinction between sanity and insanity? Can we call all those persons sane who are psychologically recognised as normal? Is mental normality definitively an exhaustive characteristic of goodness? While it is true that abnormal persons are more or less mad in proportion to their degree of abnormality, and hence it is not possible to expect goodness from them, it does not appear to be true that all mentally normal persons are good. For, the distinction of good and bad is particularly

made among these normal persons. Goodness can be expected of them, but somehow people do not come up to this expectation.

Therefore, either mere mental health is not enough for moral goodness, or unless there is moral goodness there is no mental health. On a closer analysis it is possible to see that men whom we may usually recognise as normal also have their fits of abnormality and frenzy. Just as all of us very rarely enjoy perfect physical health, though for all practical purposes we are supposed to be normally healthy, so all of us very rarely enjoy genuine mental health. All of us have our idiosyncrasies and eccentricities. Susceptibility to physical disease with a slight climatic and other disturbances is the normal trait of the persons enjoying normal health, which is not therefore, perfect health. Similarly susceptibility to a loss of mental balance at the slightest provocation of a certain sort is the kind of normal mentality we possess. That is, our conception of mental health allows the play of passions and emotions. But it is very difficult to draw a line of demarcation that would distinguish between normal and abnormal lust, anger, greed, pride, delusion and hate to which we all are susceptible. We are said to be enjoying normal mental health with all these susceptibilities, without deciding their boundaries within the limits of goodness. An ideal mental health is more than psychological normality. It must include a sense of values. Mad men are psychologically deficient in the sense of values and that madness even the psychologically normal men share with them. Therefore, unless men possessed a perfect sense of values they could not be regarded as enjoying real mental health. The yoga psychology is a serious attempt to develop an elaborate discipline for the acquisition of the perfect mental health. Besides the physical postures (*āsana*) and control of breath (*prāṇāyāma*) and control of mind and the senses (*pratyāhāra*) which help soundness of physical health, the yoga has laid down tenfold moral discipline in the form of restraints (*Yama*) and

observances (*niyama*)⁷ as foundational, and a psychological discipline of concentration (*dhāraṇā*), meditation (*dhyāna*) and absorption (*samādhi*) as a superstructure thereon. That is the enjoyment of perfect psychological health. Sound mind has aspects of physical and moral health. This may be regarded as medical or psychotherapeutic theory of goodness. According to it the truly normal is the ideally perfect. Goodness is the ingredient of mental health.

XI. The Metaphysical Theory of Goodness

That goodness or badness is an innate nature of man is a metaphysical theory. A good man has an intrinsically right sense of values while the bad man has intrinsically a perverse sense of values. The *Gitā* classifies three kinds of valuational knowledge that results from the three kinds of human intellect. The intellect that has a natural sense of discrimination between activity and inactivity, the right and the wrong, the dangerous and the non-dangerous, the binding and the liberating is called of the nature of *sattva*. The intellect that naturally misjudges the distinction between the good and the bad, the right and the wrong is under the influence of *rajas*. And the intellect that has a topsyturvy sense of good and bad, an inverse scale of valuation of everything is of the nature of *tamas*.⁸ These are the elemental qualities constitutive of human nature.

XII. Valuational Harmony in All the Theories

In short, whether a man is called bad or mad or stupid, in one way or the other the reference is to his sense of values. Whatever may be the distinctions of aspects in these attributes

⁷ Non-violence (*ahiṃsā*), truth (*satya*), non-stealing (*asteya*), continence (*brahmacharya*) and non-possession (*aparigraha*), are the five restraints. Purity (*śauca*), contentment (*santoṣa*), penance (*tapas*), spiritual learning (*svādhyāya*) and meditation on God (*iśvara-praṇidhāna*) are the five observances.

⁸ *Gitā*, XVIII—30 to 32.

there is no basic difference in their essence because they could be judged in terms of the common denominator of the sense of values. The stupid man is ignorant of values, the mad man has a deficient sense of values and the bad man has a perverse sense of values. No description is exclusively correct and yet everyone of them has a modicum of truth in it. When we commonly use all these terms indiscriminately we are not far from truth. Some men are at once bad, mad and foolish, as some others are good, sane and wise. Harmony, balance, equilibrium characterize wisdom, sanity and goodness. Disharmony, imbalance, inequilibrium characterize folly, insanity and badness. This equilibrium is of the elemental qualities. This view is similar to the medical views of Āyurveda and Bio-chemistry. According to Āyurveda health is an equilibrium of the three humours of the body, namely, wind, bile and phlegm. According to Bio-chemistry health is an equilibrium of the twelve salts that compose the body. Disease is inequilibrium in them. In the same way goodness is an elemental state of equilibrium. The whole purpose of knowledge is to enable the person to gain this initial equilibrium.

XIII. The Vedāntic Reconciliation of the Three Theories

The above three theories of goodness and evil have been beautifully reconciled in the Vedānta. It recognizes that ignorance (*ajñāna*) is responsible for all evil and that knowledge alone liberates the person from evil. As a matter of fact this fundamental fact of knowledge as saviour is the common teaching of all the systems of Indian philosophy. This ignorance is of the form of passions which pollutes the right knowledge. Ignorance, thus, is rather of a psychological nature than merely logical. Hence ignorance or folly is a form of insanity and wisdom alone is sanity. The innateness of goodness and evil is aptly explained on the Vedāntic theory. Man's nature (*prakṛti*) is made of the three *guṇas* and it is the predominance of the *rajas* and the *tamas* that is responsible for his passions. These are

responsible for giving rise to sin. Through the preponderance of *sattva* sin is overcome. But the insistence of the Vedānta is that so long as the moral agent identifies himself with the *guṇas* or *prakṛti* there is an innate tendency to evil. It is only when he transcends *prakṛti* and identifies himself with his true self that he realizes his fundamental being, fundamental knowledge and fundamental goodness (*sat-cit-ānanda*). Not *prakṛti*, but *Brahman* is his real nature.⁹

⁹ 'Svabhāvo' dhyātmamucyate, Gītā, VIII-3.

7.

VALUATIONAL VIEW OF MORAL FREEDOM

I. The Paradoxical Problem of Moral Freedom

IN spite of the determinists' attempts to give meaning to morality on the background of strict causal determination it must be maintained that if freedom is not a fact, then morality has no meaning.

The moral problem could be formulated in the following way: A human being is a part and parcel of the universe in which he is born and brought up, and he leads his life inevitably according to the demands of the nature of the universe as a whole.

As we advance more and more in our knowledge of the universe through the various sciences we are able to formulate laws in the specific fields of our investigation which reveal a necessity with which the facts and events in those fields are uniformly bound. And it appears that in proportion as we remain ignorant about the uniform behaviour of things we are not at least to that extent in possession of the scientific knowledge. In fact scientific knowledge is another name for the revelation of necessity.

To understand man, therefore, is to know how he is an instance of a necessity. So that if we imagine man to be free his freedom is allowed by our ignorance of what he is, and cannot therefore be accounted for in terms of a scientific knowledge of man.

A moral life, to be truly moral, thus depends upon a paradoxical situation. It is to be led in this universe in consonance with the inexorable laws of this universe, and yet in such a way

that these do not come in the way of free life. Moral life requires man at once to be and not to be of this universe. It is a paradox which is apparently insoluble.

II. The Statistical Nature of the Natural Laws

The rule of necessity is true so far as it goes, but it has to be understood with certain reservations.

In the first place, the laws discovered in all the descriptive sciences are only of a statistical nature. They are applicable with significance to masses of facts, but not so applicable to the individual facts. While, therefore, predictability is possible on a large scale, the individual's behaviour, whether that of a physical electron or of a living cell or a conscious human being, is not at all predictable. Thus, for example, the constancy of statistics, which is very remarkable, may enable us to predict as to how many cases of suicides will be in a certain community, but will not enable us to know as to who will commit suicide.

Secondly, statistical laws based on the inductive methods of investigation are only probable in character. Probability is a matter of degrees, and therefore the picture raised of an absolute necessity is an exaggeration. The universe exhibits elements both of necessity and chance,¹ determinacy and indeterminacy, law and accident, universality and particularity, *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. Man's moral life also has both these aspects.

III. Determinism only a Methodological Principle

Thirdly, and this is a very important consideration, the whole argument for absolute necessity is based on a confusion between a methodological procedure of science and the conclusions of science. The causal determination is a postulate of science, a principle of methodology, and not the result of scientific investi-

¹ See Maurice Cornforth, *Dialectical Materialism*, Vol III, Ch. XIII

gation, regarding the final and ultimate nature of reality. It is true that the postulational principle may not distort the nature of reality, but it does not also conclusively reveal the original nature of reality. Necessitarianism is a way of looking at things and there need not be any objection to it. But it must be conceded that our view of looking at things will considerably determine what we find in them. There is no wonder that an initial determination to view things in a determinate way will reveal them as necessarily determined. But to conclude that this is what characterizes reality wholly is to commit the fallacy of Initial Predication.

IV. Physicalism *versus* Idealism

There is a growing tendency among the sciences to reduce all of them to the physical pattern. This procedure may help us to understand things in a certain way. A physical account of the biological, psychological, social and moral facts could be given. But to consider such an account as exhaustive of the nature of things under investigation is to commit the fallacy of exclusive particularity. Reality has multiple aspects, and perhaps a sort of a translation (and not reduction) of one aspect into another is legitimate, but it is certainly illegitimate to consider that the aspects lose their distinctive originality in being so studied.

Again, if in the study of a human being, one may physicalize the biological, the psychological and the moral facts of human nature there is no reason why one may also not biologize, or psychologize or moralize all those facts.² Perhaps it is the latter ways of looking at a human being which give us progressively a better account of him than the former ones. A physical characterization of a physical thing is in the fitness of things and so are the biological characterization of life and the

² Cf. Whitehead's theory of Organic Mechanism in his *Science and the Modern World*, p. 99.

psychological characterization of mind very adequate. In the case of a human being when we are dealing with the facts of his moral or valuational consciousness we must treat them as such. Freedom is the essential characteristic of a moral life. Such an understanding is both legitimate and adequate. As a matter of fact, in the complex being which a man is, if his moral consciousness is looked upon as definitive of his nature, then the physical, the biological, the psychological and the social facts regarding his nature do not remain merely so, but they undergo a transformation to suit the central moral being of man. Man's moral consciousness with the experience of freedom ingrained in it becomes the central key to mysteries of the other aspects of his existence. An action issuing in human volition cannot be simply physical, biological, psychological or social, it is through and through moral, as the sense of values characterizes human action.

When a man looks upon himself as a free moral agent and the world around him as a field for his moral activity, he not only moralizes all aspects of his own being, but the whole world of environment assumes a moral texture. Such an understanding of man is in the fitness of things. Instead of naturalizing man and thus making a caricature of him, true understanding of man would necessitate the idealization of the whole world.

An empirical study of man considering him one object among the others, and following the deterministic methodological procedure required for such a study, must inevitably end in victimizing the true moral nature of man. There are other and better ways of understanding man than rank empiricism dreams of.

V. Necessity Essential for Freedom

But assurance of freedom for man does not necessitate a denial of necessity. As a matter of fact man's truly moral life

would be impossible if there had not been a rule of necessity in the universe which forms the field of human moral activity. If indeterminacy were characteristic of the world it would have been the worst place for anybody to live in. If blind chance were all that prevailed, then no human activity could be meaningful. Since anything could be expected at any time, there would be no sense in expecting anything in particular. Man's willing a certain thing is no better than his not willing. Hence determinacy is not only preferable to indeterminacy, it is also desirable for a significant moral life. Necessity is a boon in disguise, for freedom indeed consists in the progressive recognition and appreciation of necessity, as Marx pointed out.

Just as a man cannot have freedom in an undetermined world, a man ignorant of the laws of necessity which govern this world cannot live freely. He can utilize the knowledge of necessity, for serving his ends. The more he understands the necessities of nature, the more is his freedom. Freedom in this sense, is not initially given to him but is a matter of progressive acquisition. Ignorance is bondage, and knowledge is liberation.

VI. Necessity Compatible with Freedom

Kant could not see this compatibility between the causal necessity revealed by the theoretical reason and freedom required by the practical reason. In an article E. P. Papanoutsos has shown this compatibility.³ When a historian or a magistrate accounts for a past human action, they take a retrospective view of the situation and argue backwards from effect to cause, and they are able to find out what conditions were both necessary and sufficient for the production of that action. But such causal explanation does not amount to fore-knowledge. When we take a prospective view of human action we cannot predict with the

³ "Freedom and Causality" in *Philosophy*, July 1959, p. 193.

same certainty for we have to reckon with the internal process of a human decision which involves a moment of fiat. A post mortem analysis reveals necessity and a prospective view has to allow for freedom. Thus an overt observation of a person may lead us to expect that he may commit either a murder or suicide while actually a religious conversion may take place in him. It is the completion of an act that gives us a new orientation to what preceded. So long as it is not complete we have no surety of its termination in a certain way.

This brings us to the consideration whether the act of decision is to be looked upon as continuous or discontinuous with the moments preceding that decision. It is no use merely saying that in a completed act the moment of decision by the will does appear to be continuous with the previous moments, though it appears to be discontinuous in an incomplete act.

VII. Volition Discontinuous with Material Necessity

If in any sense the will is simply a link in the causal chain, the will cannot be free. It is, therefore, difficult to see how on a materialistic conception of the universe there can be any freedom. The issue does not change whether this materialism is conceived of as in the old gross sense or the modern dialectical sense. If freedom consists in the recognition and appreciation of necessity, the knowledge of necessity itself cannot form an element in that necessity. If the facts of cognition and volition are only material, then freedom is an illusion. If consciousness is the resultant of material processes mere consciousness of necessity is not sufficient for making man truly free. Again the knowledge of ends and values cannot be derived from the knowledge of necessity in the facts.

Knowledge and purposeful volition, therefore, presuppose a spiritual principle. A spiritual self which at once transcends and illumines all the levels of man's non-spiritual being, the *annama-*

yakośa (body), *prāṇamayakośa* (life), *manomayakośa* (mind), *vijñānamayakośa* (intellect) and *ānandamayakośa* (aesthetic intuition) renders meaningful all his activities on these levels. Man thus truly lives a double existence. He is at once both in this universe and outside it. Man's freedom is owing to his spiritual nature. One of the chief misunderstandings of the Vedāntic view, however, is this that the transcendence of the spirit is regarded as its unrelatedness to matter. It is not sufficient to recognize the spiritual freedom of man; what is necessary also to emphasize is that this freedom could be made effective with the realization of the material freedom in the form of social, legal and political freedom. The institutions which bring up a man and condition him are at once the means and ends for man's moral activity. They may at once help or hinder human freedom. To the extent that the institutions are an expression of the spiritual values they help him realize his freedom, and abiding by the regulations of such institutions is a bounden duty of man. And to the extent that these institutions do not represent the spiritual values, they may hinder man's freedom, and he must exercise his spiritual freedom to spiritualize these institutions.

VIII. Freedom is a Fact, neither a Postulate nor an Illusion

Freedom thus is a fact and not merely a postulate of moral life nor an illusory experience as some suppose it to be. It is not a postulate on the plane of causality, because we are not concerned merely with giving a meaning to moral life, but we are interested in the reality of moral life. We can look upon the universe "as if" determined (as Vaihinger puts it) to enable the formulation of science. We cannot in the same sense simply look upon the moral life "as if" it were free.

If freedom has a postulatory character, and if it is not in the nature of reality, then moral life ceases to have any significance. While causality has a status of a postulate or a methodological

principle which enables the formulation of natural science, freedom has a status of reality itself.⁴

Those who are interested in the naturalist account of everything when they come to deal with the actual experience of freedom explain it away as mere illusion. An illusion in the physical sphere has the character of being explicable in terms of the facts. The illusion of a bent stick in water, for example, is explicable in terms of the laws of refraction of light and optics. But no such convincing explanation could be given of the so called illusion of freedom in terms of the known facts. We do not know how and why an illusory experience of freedom arises. When a discrepancy between the absolute necessity required by methodology on the one hand and the immediate experience of freedom, further strengthened by the practical exigencies of life on the other hand is, found, it is wonderful that the determinists exercise their freedom of choice and opt for necessity rather than for freedom, and following the "sour grapes" policy denounce freedom as illusion!

IX.: Axionoetic Argument for Freedom

I here briefly state what I may call an Axionoetic argument for Freedom. According to Axionoetics, we have seen that knowledge has absolute priority over reality and we cannot avoid determination of reality in terms of knowledge. Human knowing and valuing, though distinguishable from each other, are inseparable in human consciousness. There being no verification of knowledge in terms of reality, valuational approach to knowledge becomes more significant as there is an intuitive recognition of values which are at once self-evident and

⁴ Thus Vedānta explains the Vedic propositions regarding injunctions and prohibitions in terms of the real freedom of the Ātman, *Kartā Śāstrārthavatvāt*. (Vedānta Sūtra 2—3—33). Pāṇini, the grammarian-philosopher also refers to the subject as free: *Svatantraḥ Kartā*, Pāṇini Sūtra, 1—4—54.

universal. It is in terms of these values that we evaluate our knowledge. This axionoetic account as applied to the problem of the reality of freedom, asserts that if freedom has an intrinsic value for moral life and again if experience of freedom is a fact, then this knowledge determines the nature of reality too. The only falsification of this position is the denial of value to freedom in moral life. This, however, is impossible.

X. Freedom truly Belongs to Spiritual Self, not to Will

Having thus established the reality of freedom, attention must be drawn to certain distinctive features of the Indian approach to the problem in contrast with the Western. The Indian thinkers do not speak of the freedom of will as the Western moralists do. Freedom belongs only to the spiritual self. Human reason and will belong to the empirical level of Psychology only. The whole sphere of the psychological phenomena is insentient (*jada*) according to the Indian terminology. So when the Western moralists speak of freedom as self-determination, and identify the self with reason and will, they are speaking of the empirical self only. But freedom does not truly belong to this psychological self. The intimations of freedom come to the empirical self from the spiritual self. The spiritual and the mental are two distinct but related categories. Morality does not proceed from the empirical reason which is necessarily conditioned by other psychological factors. Man's reason is an impure reason. It needs purification which consists in spiritualizing reason.

XI. Evaluation of the Ideas of Freedom

This account will enable us to evaluate the meanings which are attached to the term freedom.⁵ Freedom is a certain kind of ability. There are three senses in which this ability is expressed :

⁵ Cf. Discussion on "Ideas of Freedom" by Rojel Hancock in *Ethics*, July 1957, p. 285.

(1) An ability to act as one pleases or desires, termed as self-satisfaction or self-fulfilment. (2) An ability to live as one ought with reference to an ideal, termed as self-perfection. (3) An ability to determine creatively one's own character, termed as self-determination or self-creativity.

It will be seen that freedom in the sense of self-satisfaction is a fulfilment of the non-rational elements in our nature. Such acting on pleasure is limited by the circumstances. Freedom of self-satisfaction is only circumstantially determined. The common run of the people do enjoy this freedom. They are free to do good or evil.

Freedom as self-perfection is living constantly on the rational plane. This could be regarded as acquired freedom. In the initial stages a good deal of effort is required. Though here also there is freedom to do good or evil, the moral agent chooses to exercise his freedom in the direction of the good only. A few men consciously make such an effort. The culmination of this effort consists in the spontaneous moral activity. In the beginning morality appears to be burdensome because of the tremendous efforts it involves, particularly because of the stress and strain of the lower desires. Virtue, therefore, at least for the common man is not contiguous with knowledge as Socrates seems to suppose, though it should be conditioned by knowledge. As Aristotle pointed out, virtue is a habit of will. Such a spontaneity characterizes moral freedom which very few acquire. Socrates and all great saints enjoyed such spontaneous freedom. This is why Socrates could not understand the psychology of the common man. But his teaching was true for himself.

Such a spontaneity of moral life, though very important, is not enough. Because the knowledge of an ideal life may be derived from authority. Such morality must necessarily be static. A virtuous man may live an ideal life according to the

ideals and values accepted by the community in which he is born and brought up. He may not have as yet an ability to create values, which is absolutely necessary for moral progress.

XII. Freedom as Creativity

This brings us to the third meaning of freedom which is natural and real freedom. An insight into the limitations of the prevailing ideals and a vision of new ones is necessary for a dynamic moral life. A knowledge of new values is possible for a man who has an ability to overcome the limitations of his cultural make-up. The psychological and the sociological conditioning of reason has to be transcended by the intimation from the spirit. Self-determination is really a spiritual determination. Creativity does not belong to the psychological rational self, it belongs to the spiritual self. Such a creativity belongs naturally and truly to all persons in so far as they change their characters either in an evolutionary way or in a revolutionary way. All change of character is a transvaluation of values on the individual plane. But the transvaluation of the prevalent values in a given society is possible in the case of very few gifted seers only.

All freedom entails a variety of choice.⁶ Self-satisfaction has a restricted scope of choice as compared to self-perfection. A man of sensuous licence soon finds himself in bondage to his passions. A man of rational self-restraint has freedom of choice to a greater extent. A man of creative freedom of the spirit has an ever-widening range of choice.

This takes us on to one more important aspect of the problem. A creative transvaluation of values results in the recognition of the superiority of the spiritual values to the moral. The continuous dominance of a spiritual outlook makes moral life superficial. The distinctions of good and evil have meaning

⁶ See Reginald Lennard's article "Mill and Others on Liberty", *Hibbert Journal*, July 1959, p. 347.

on the moral plane. On the spiritual plane a man is not bothered by these distinctions,⁷ only because he has passed through that plane and has enjoyed the spontaneity of good life. Freedom *for* morality is finally a means for a freedom *from* morality.

XIII. Theological Meaning of Freedom as Submission to God

A stage comes in the spiritual pilgrimage of man when he is prepared to submit himself to the divinity. This theological sense of freedom consists in the dependence on God. A child is relatively free in comparison to the grown-up man. Man's moral freedom brings on him the inevitable burden of responsibility from which he cannot free himself. But he frees himself totally when he submits his will to the divine determination. Thus a devotee of God enjoys supreme freedom in the child-like innocence.⁸ In the initial stages the divine determination is heteronomous as the dualism between the devotee and the Deity is not overcome. But there is a gradual realization of the identity between the individual and the universal self when the divine determination assumes an autonomous form. In such a Divine life there is the fullest expression of a life of freedom. Enjoyment of this value of freedom is the essence of Divinity. Morals cannot be made self-sufficient. Their deep waters run into metaphysics and religion. The richness of freedom lies in that higher direction. Freedom from morals is possible in this higher sense.

⁷ Cf. *etam ha vāva na tapati kimaham sādhu nākaravaṁ kimaham pāpamakaravamiti. Taittirīya* II-9.

⁸ Cf. "Until ye be like little children," *Bible*. Also, *tasmād brāhmanah nirvidya bālyena tiṣṭhāset, Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, III-5-1.

8.

AXIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

I. Valuational Philosophy of Knowledge

THE Axiological Theory of Knowledge, or Axionoetics proposes to study the problem of knowledge, firstly, by taking advantage of whatever valuable points there may be in the various theories of knowledge; secondly, by avoiding their defects; thirdly, by taking a comprehensive view of the concrete knowledge situation; and fourthly, by a reorientation of the study of knowledge from the point of view of the theory of value.

Knowledge does originate in the individual human mind. But there is a very important element of truth in the view that the so-called individual psychology is essentially a social psychology, which the psychological theory of knowledge has neglected. The human individuals and their minds do not exist, much less grow, in a void. Hence, knowledge neither originates nor flourishes in a social vacuum. It is only such a point of view that will save knowledge from solipsism. The give and take between the individual and the society, action and reaction between the mind and its environment are responsible for the birth, nourishment and growth of knowledge. Knowledge is one of the human institutions of basic importance, and as such, it is intimately related with human life and its values. All human institutions necessarily reflect human values, and just as the various human institutions could be evaluated in terms of human hopes and aspirations, so also we can make a critical evaluation of the institution of knowledge in its concrete achievements.

If we can have the respective philosophies of science, of history, of law, of religion, of art and the like, which deal with them not so much in their formal aspects as their actual

content, we can as well have a true philosophy of knowledge. The theory of knowledge, with which we are familiar, makes a formal study of knowledge, which also serves a valuable purpose in its own way, but it could not rightly be called a philosophy of knowledge. The genuine philosophy of knowledge is conceived in Axionoetics which makes a study of both the formal and the material aspects of knowledge in its intimate relationship with human life and its values. The Sociology of Knowledge being descriptive may supply, at the most, very valuable data for a philosophy of knowledge which is essentially interpretative and normative. The Positivistic Theory of knowledge is far from such a philosophy of knowledge, as it has no sense for values at all. The Dialectical Materialist Theory of knowledge comes nearer to the conception of a philosophy of knowledge in so far as it includes, according to Cornforth, the role of ideas in social life as a part of its subject-matter. The theory of knowledge "helps us to evaluate our ideas, to develop them and use them as instruments of human progress."¹ But, unfortunately, it has a narrow conception of values which is determined by its dire materialism. There is no meaning for human progress if it is measured in terms of material values alone.

II. The Concept of the Concrete Knowledge Situation

The concrete knowledge situation, as Axionoetics considers it, involves reference to the knower as a social being with his physical, mental, intellectual, moral and spiritual make-up which measures the value of the knower as a subject in relation to the object of his knowledge. Deficiency in any of these would mar the prospects of his attaining desirable truth. His social inheritance, his cultural background, or the ethics of which he is a representative, go a long way in making the knowledge situation

¹ *Theory of Knowledge*, Foreword.

very specific. These supply him with a set of values which he consciously or unconsciously makes use of in his investigation of truth. The general level of knowledge attained, the specific interests and the social requirements also determine the choice of the problems of knowledge, as also the means, the methods and the standards of verification pertaining to the field of investigation. Thus, in the knowledge situation, there is not only merely the triad of the knower, the means of knowledge and the object of knowledge, but the whole of this, besides being internally interdependent, moves within the perspectives supplied by the two sets of values, one determined by the scientific spirit and the other determined by the ends or ideals which the society and the individual place before themselves. The knower ordinarily receives a great deal passively from this concrete situation in which he finds himself. For him, most of the knowledge comes through social sanction or authority. But knowledge does not grow so much by passive reception as by active contribution. The action of the knower on the environment, the change that he brings within it with a specific purpose which he values and which he brings with him to bear upon his environment, are vastly operative in the creative activity of knowledge. Knowledge does not grow so much by accidental happenings as by planned activity, at least where there is an appearance of an accidental progress of knowledge, there is an active mind full of knowledge to recognise the worth of the accident for knowledge, and even if there is a wanton accretion of knowledge which goes on accumulating irrespective of its significance for human life and its values; the same may ultimately prove to be harmful or useless, if it is not brought within the control of desirable ends. Robert S. Lynd says, "Research without an actively selective point of view becomes the dirty bag of an idiot, filled with bits of pebbles, straws, feathers and other random hoardings. If nobody goes about endlessly counting throughout a life time the number of particles of sand along infinite miles of seashore over all the

coasts of the world, why is this? Because there is no point to it, no need to complete this particular aspect of the jigsaw puzzle of the unknown."² This convincingly shows how knowledge cannot be merely for the sake of knowledge, it must have a sufficient interest for man.

III. Knowledge and Value

It is such a concrete study of the human institution of knowledge, in the perspective of values, in which it originates, the values in which it sustains itself and the values into which it results, that constitutes the chief point of interest for Axionoetics.

In order to justify this enquiry the various ways in which value seems to be very pertinent to knowledge may be indicated.

(1) The most obvious consideration is that knowledge itself constitutes a value. It is something worthy of human attainment. The more of it the better for the individual and society.

(2) If knowledge has an intrinsic value, does it necessarily mean that all knowledge is of equal value? It will be seen that all knowledge is not uniformly valuable. The value of knowledge depends upon the stage of knowledge and the objects of knowledge. Regarding both of these points there may be a difference of opinion, but the fact remains that all knowledge is not equally valuable. Thus, for instance, as Comte suggests, knowledge grows in value as it passes through the successive stages of mythology, metaphysics and science. According to another point of view, the object of our knowledge gives value to that knowledge, the most valuable object of knowledge being God, or nature, or man respective to the various standpoints

² *Knowledge for What ?* p. 183.

taken. According to a very strong tradition self-knowledge is the highest knowledge. Whatever point of view we may take, it is clear that the value of knowledge has itself to be judged in terms of a certain standard of valuation.

(3) In so far as knowledge itself is submitted to valuation in terms of certain standards of values, these themselves may be consciously or unconsciously entertained by a given society. In this sense, knowledge in the form of a set of beliefs entertained by that society is reflective of the social ethos involving ideas, sentiments and ideals which constitute a system of values. Knowledge comes to be judged in terms of these latent values.

(4) Even though we talk of social ethos or culture which forms a norm for the common men in a given social group, some superior individuals transcend this norm. These individuals who have a greater keenness for values may help the society to see a greater extension and intension of the values, or may even help it towards a transvaluation of values. Such individuals become the reformers of society. Thus progress is made possible by the effective leaders of society, whose knowledge, point of view, or insight could be valued in terms of their worthy or unworthy personalities. In this sense, the value of an individual in the capacity of a knower measures the value of his knowledge. Worthier the cognitive agent, worthier would be his cognitive achievement.

(5) Knowledge is a result of the cognitive activity, and like every human activity it involves a purpose. The activity of knowledge, therefore, is meaningful only in relation to consciousness of a value that constitutes its goal. This cognitive goal is generally recognised as a truth-value. With reference to science, for instance, it is said that "the institutional goal of science is the extension of certified knowledge."³

³ R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, p. 309.

(6) The disinterested pursuit of knowledge to gain such a truth-value itself constitutes a value. This involves the recognition of the methodological procedure of a scientific spirit as a value. R. K. Merton speaks of it as the "ethos of science" or "mores of science" as determined by the goal and method of science. He suggests that an ethical value is in these mores. "The mores of science possess a methodological rationale, but they are binding, not because they are procedurally efficient but because they are believed right and good. They are moral not technical prescriptions."⁴

(7) The nature of this ethos is bound to vary from field to field since all the fields of knowledge are not analogous in their subject-matter. The nature of the methodological rationale that is binding upon the seeker of truth-value is determined by the nature of the subject-matter. Axionoetics should consider how these mores vary in different fields of investigation. To consider that the values involved in the ethos of one science constitute a model for every other science and forms of knowledge to follow is to disregard the truth-value itself.

(8) The theoretical problems that the truth-seeker attempts to solve originate in the practical life. The theoretical activity of man is surrounded by the practical activity. The Dialectical Materialist Theory of knowledge even goes to the length of asserting the unity of theory and practice, of knowing and doing. Hence Lenin wrote, "The standpoint of life, of practice should be first and fundamental in the theory of knowledge."⁵ It is inevitable, therefore, that in the background of the theoretical purpose there is perhaps a more important practical purpose arising out of human life and its values. Whatever be the system of values inherent in the ethos of science, it will have to be quite

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 309.

⁵ *Materialism and Empirico-criticism*, Ch. 2, sec. 6.

in conformity with the fundamental human values. Every human vocation has its specific ethical code or system of values. The mores of science are only one instance amongst other such systems of values, which can only be the specific expressions of the universal system of human values.

(9) Even if knowledge is not directly pursued for the realization of certain ulterior ends, when a certain truth-value is reached, it is bound to affect the research worker and the society in general. The disinterested pursuit of knowledge does not mean that the knowledge remains indifferent to life. Nor can life, from which knowledge springs, remains indifferent to what knowledge has to offer it, whether it wants it or not. The utilitarian motive may not, in some cases, be the spring of knowledge, but when knowledge is somehow made available, human life is bound to take cognisance of it, and thus knowledge comes to be applied. In this way knowledge does affect life. In fact, a knowledge which does not directly or indirectly affect life is meaningless, being devoid of value. The role of knowledge in setting new values and upsetting the cherished ones can hardly be denied. The building of character in the case of an individual or culture in the case of society, consists in the assimilation and revelation of certain values in the life whether of an individual or of a society.

(10) Knowledge thus evidently stands in relation to other values. The values may be independent of one another in the sense of their mutual irreducibility. But this does not mean they are unrelated. Thus, for instance, the basic values of truth, beauty and goodness are irreducible to one another. Nevertheless they enter into intimate interrelationships. This is because the source of all these values is in the unity of human life and experience. So that even under what appears superficially as plurality of values there is a basic unity of their organisation in human experience. It is idle and irresponsible to talk of their mutual ex-

clusiveness or indifference simply because of their irreducible character. In this sense, knowledge and its truth-value are in real relationship with other values. It is not sufficient, therefore, to value knowledge in terms of its truth-value, but it is also necessary to value knowledge in terms of its relation to other values. That is, a truth ultimately must be shown to be a desirable truth, because of its power of truly enriching life by the promotion of other values. Truth-value of knowledge is, therefore, the minimum not the maximum value of knowledge. The maximum value of knowledge lies in its being in organic relationship with the human values in general.

(11) Lastly, the concept of fact or being to be known involves as its essence a reference to value. There is nothing like a fact and a value. Facts are values. Prof. Sorley⁶ for instance considers God as the embodiment of values, and that reality has a moral constitution through and through. According to Hartmann⁷ value is the genuine first mover, the first entelechy, the power behind that which ought to be, in fact, the centre of gravity of existence. Being, knowledge and value, therefore in this sense constitute three aspects of the same reality. To ignore value is to ignore existence as well as knowledge.

IV. Value-Schemes Implied in the Various Epistemological Theories

Every epistemological theory is a recognition and appreciation of a certain scheme of values. Let us analyse each in turn to discover the epistemological values implied in them.

Thus, empiricism finds value in sense experience. It is the concrete, the particular, the present, the actual, the contingent that interests it. It is the existential content of knowledge, its

⁶ *Moral Values and Idea of God*, p. 515.

⁷ *Ethics*, pp. 272, 273.

denotative and synthetic character that attracts it. It values the specific perceptual immediacy and directness of knowledge and is content with description. It is in terms of these fundamental values woven round perceptual verification and the inductive method that empiricism describes knowledge.

Rationalism has discovered value in reason. It is the universal, the innate, the necessary, the self-consistent, the demonstrable, that has epistemological value. It is interested in the autonomous coherence of thought and its *a priori*, axiomatic principles. It values analysis, meaning, connotation and essence. According to it knowledge is systematic explanation by following a deductive and a formal procedure. Abstract commensurable relations of quantity, formation of concepts and classification of categories constitute the chief values of rationalism.

Mysticism has recognised the value of intuition. According to it the real value of knowledge consists in a sort of transparency, clarity, simplicity, distinctness, immediacy, directness and freshness. It has a value for feeling, sympathy, emotion and inspiration. It prizes an inner vision and a conviction of certainty. Mysticism draws our attention to the domain of ultimate and intrinsic values, unanalysable elemental interests, ineffable quality of the supersensuous and the supra-rational unity of the ultimate reality. According to it there cannot be a genuinely cognitive value for the inexhaustible multiplicities of the finite and limited bits of sensory experiences, nor for the insoluble antinomies and paradoxes of reason, nor for its infinite regress. Absence of dubiousness, reached by transcending sense and reason is possible only in the recognition of the value of unity of reality and experience. It is the eternal, the timeless, the perfect, the absolute, the ideal, the infinite that constitutes value for mystical revelation.

Authoritarian method draws our attention to the necessity of faith and belief, especially with reference to the historical

past objects, religious experiences of the adepts, ethical injunctions and efficient education. In the spheres where one has no direct evidence it is an inevitable value to hold on trust the disinterested testimony of those who are in the possession of truth. Knowledge for most of us depends upon a retrospective as well as reverential attitude.

Pragmatic theory of knowledge is interested in the primacy of life and will. Utility, workability, practical expediency, convenience, biological and psychological satisfaction, serviceability, instrumentality, human purpose, ideals and ends are the watchwords of pragmatic understanding of value. Knowledge is essentially concerned with a prospective attitude. Future has a greater claim than the past or the present. Pragmatic method is peculiarly suited to cognise the dynamic, the plural, the discrete, the discontinuous and the novel in reality. The reformative humanitarian outlook necessary for the realization of the desirable ends in the sphere of the individual and social conduct in relation to the political, economic, educational and religious institutions is of great value according to pragmatist epistemology. Since complex movement of concrete life far exceeds the static and abstract reason, the value of feeling, will and faith cannot be stressed too much as complementary instruments of cognition. Where the categorical knowledge ends the hypothetical and postulational knowledge works.

Scepticism stresses the negative value of doubt. It is a check on easy credulity and hasty conviction. It is a recognition of human fallibility, resulting in the awareness of humility. Scepticism compensates for dogmatism by entering into criticism.

Relativism has found value in the individual and social differences of experiences and standpoints as well as uniqueness of objective situations.

Subjectivism and idealism find value in the subject of knowledge. And for objectivism and realism it is the object which has eminent value.

Sociology of knowledge has recognised the value of social factors in knowledge. The social origin, determination and development of human knowledge are of chief value. The mutual impact of society and knowledge is of special significance for sociology of knowledge.

Dialectical materialist theory of knowledge has recognised the value of human labour, individual and cooperative practice in the development of ideas as instruments of human progress.

Transcendentalist metaphysical theory of knowledge emphasizes the value of the spiritual principle in knowledge. The ethical theory of knowledge finds value in the individual discipline as a preparation for knowledge. Its chief interest lies in developing a method of purification of the knower and thus make him qualified for acquisition of knowledge. It finds origination and validation of knowledge only in the disciplined and purified being of the cognitive agent.

In consistency with the epistemological ethos which each theory of knowledge reveals in its scheme of epistemic values there is also found a conception of the truth-value.

Thus, for empiricism truth-value of a piece of knowledge consists in correspondence and verification; for rationalism in coherence, for mysticism in immediacy, for authoritarianism in the testimonial reliability, for pragmatism in workability, for scepticism in indubitability, for relativism in probability, for idealism in uncontradicted experience, for realism in the identification of the fact, for the sociology of knowledge in the community of objectivity, for dialectical materialism in the unity of

theory and practice, for transcendentalism in the ineffable identity with reality and for the ethical theory of knowledge in the experience of the integral personality.

V. Coordination of Epistemic and Non-epistemic Values

Axiology of knowledge or Axionoetics appreciates the intuitions of the various theories of knowledge regarding certain elemental values discoverable in the knowledge situation. Various fields of human experience reveal specific values relevant to those fields. Analysis of the various epistemological theories has led us to the discovery of certain epistemological values. Axionoetics further attempts a systematization of these values in the knowledge situation. It enters into a discussion of finding a hierarchy, if possible, amongst these values and discover the supreme epistemological value in terms of which such gradation of values could be reached. But the task of Axionoetics is not complete here. It wants to reach a possible coordination and mutual relationship between the epistemic values on the one hand and the non-epistemic values on the other. Axionoetics is interested in avoiding the Naturalistic Fallacy in epistemology which would consist in explaining knowledge and particularly the value of truth exclusively in terms of natural phenomena. No value could be explained in natural descriptive terms, and truth as a value also could not be so explained.

The distinctive feature of Axionoetics consists in the axiological point of view it takes in epistemology. The traditional epistemology is descriptive. It does not have the real status of being a philosophy of knowledge. The traditional treatment is more a science of knowledge than a philosophy. The kind of distinction that would prevail between, for instance, political science and political philosophy, sociology and social philosophy would also prevail between epistemological science and epistemological philosophy. While the former studies are interested in

facts the latter are interested in values. It is one thing to reach an analysis of epistemological facts and another to attempt an evaluation of them. It may be difficult to reach a hierarchy in the epistemological values. This largely depends upon the specific epistemological situation. In different kinds of cognitive situations different kinds of epistemological values will get priority.

VI. Concrete Conception of Truth and Error

The recognition of principle of value in knowledge distinguishes human cognitive activity from that of the beasts. It is, therefore, obligatory upon man to view his knowledge as a manifestation of his own worth as a knower, and also to measure the worth of his knowledge in terms of the human values that it promotes. An unworthy knower renders his knowledge erroneous, and whatever knowledge one attains, if it is unworthy, from the point of view of its failing to promote human values, would constitute an error.

In the concrete knowledge situation there is an experiencing subject making use of his past experiences determining the sources and methods of knowledge which are adequate to the nature of his object in the knowledge. It is the subject in the knowledge situation that plays the most important role. In all his experience it is the real that is revealed. In no experience could there be a revelation of that which is altogether unreal. It is true that one experience may sublate the other, and we may have a scale of values of the different levels and kinds of experience, some of which are more true and some less true. An absolutely erroneous experience in the sense of a revelation of an absolute unreality is not possible. In the so-called illusory experience of a piece of silver where there "really" is a shell, there is, from the subject's point of view, a true revelation of a piece of silver under the prevailing conditions. It is another

experience of the shell, under other conditions, which sublates the earlier experience. No experience is self-contradictory. It is a comparison of two different experiences that reveals logically their mutual contradiction. But actually, it is the sublating experience that constitutes truth from which point of view alone the sublated experience is an error.

VII. Theories of Error in Indian Epistemology

The theories of error in the Indian systems or those in the Western Epistemology are only a post mortem analysis of an experience of error when it is recognised by a subsequent experience of truth. The post mortem analysis catches no doubt one or the other important aspect of the truth about error, but it could not be regarded as complete because it is done in an abstract way. In every case one who commits an error and recognises it by a subsequent knowledge of truth is competent to explain in terms of the knowledge of truth what defect his previous erroneous experience had. But instead of this concrete procedure the *Khyātis* follow an abstract procedure.

Thus the *asatkhyāti* of the Śūnyavādins contains this element of truth that the non-existent silver is somehow perceived. But its further explanation is unacceptable. Thus the non-existence of silver is not absolute and that non-existence is not known when error is actually committed, but is known only when subsequent knowledge of truth is attained. Its metaphysical position that the shell also is *asat* is an absurd position, for it is actually experienced without the possibility of its sublation like that of the silver.

The *ātmakhyāti* of the Vijñānavādins contains this element of truth that error mainly depends upon the subject of experience but the non-recognition of an objective basis for error and saying that idea ideates an idea, removes the possibility of a distinction between truth and error which is a matter of our

experience. For, when actually one knowledge sublates the other, both of them cannot be equally true or equally erroneous.

The other *Khyātis* are unanimous regarding the objective basis for an error and in maintaining that the absolutely non-existent could never be perceived even though the *Mādhya-mikas* hold such a queer view. The *Akhyāti* of *Sāṅkhya* and Prabhākara and *Satkhyāti* of Rāmānuja, to speak generally, regard error as incomplete knowledge. Error consists in omission of some aspects of truth given in two knowledges of objects which are not discriminated. But the defect of this theory is that the unitary character of the knowledge in which the error occurs is not recognised. The *anyathākhyāti* of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* and the *Viparītakhyāti* of Kumārila recognise this fact of commission of a unitary blend which they later on analyse into two knowledges resulting in error. The *anirvacanīyakhyāti* or *adhyāsa* of *Vedānta* describes error as arising when different orders of existences are related in unitary experience. But it will be seen that the analysis of error into two knowledges or two orders of objects is possible only after its sublation by a subsequently known truth. And hence, I call it only a post mortem examination. When an error does occur it is a unitary experience where there is neither omission nor commission, neither discrimination nor blending. Śaṅkara's accounting error as a blend of two orders of existence, one of which is illusory, is begging the whole question. And when this difficulty is attempted to be solved in an abstract speculative manner it has to take recourse to an abstruse logic, according to which the relation between the two terms involved in error is neither of identity nor of difference, nor of an identity-in-difference.

But unlike other theories, *Vedānta* attempts to explain the origin of error with reference to the defects in the object (*prameyadoṣa*), in the instruments (*pramāṇadoṣa*) and in the subject (*pramātrdoṣa*) of knowledge, thus taking the concrete

knowledge situation into account. All the defects are ultimately reduced to ignorance (*avidyā*) which characterise an imperfect personality of the knower. The only escape from this is a rigorous attempt at the perfection of personality in whose experience truth is spontaneously revealed.

VIII. The Cognitive Worth of the Knower

Whatever other differences there may be between an illusory experience, waking experience, experience of a layman, of a scientist, of a philosopher, of an artist and a mystic the one fundamental difference worth noting is a difference of worth in the subjects of experience. To reach a higher level of experience, which is more revelatory of truth of reality, is essentially to reach a worthier state of subjecthood. Truth consists in reaching perfection or idealization of an experiencing agent by purification of the physical, mental, intellectual, moral and spiritual elements in his personality. Error in its ultimate analysis consists in the defective subjecthood. In the scale of gradations amongst human beings one would find that the better level of subjecthood is capable of sitting in judgement upon the lower level of subjecthood, though the reverse of this is not possible, as the higher is comprehensive of the lower, but not vice versa. The degree of the perfection of personality of the knower determines the degree of truth that he attains in his knowledge. But it must be remembered that at a given stage and the moment of the actual experience that forms the basis of knowledge, there is but one truth, and that is the final one, which has sublated all other earlier truths of the lower stages, and which now become so many errors in the light of the present knowledge. The present truth would continue to be the final and only truth till it is sublated by a more comprehensive experience depending upon a further perfection of the knower's subjecthood. The possibility of a sublation of the present truth is only hypothetical, and therefore, truth does not cease to be truth, until it is actually so sublated. Only a thoroughly critical

attitude towards oneself which measures one's worth as a knower, would possibly ensure the finality of the truth that is gained.

IX. Ethical Analysis of Perception

This could be illustrated with reference to the most elementary form of knowledge like that of a perceptual judgement. On an analysis we will find that a perceptual judgement, to be free from error, depends upon certain qualifications which measure the worth of the percipient.

For, when is a perceptual judgement true? The perceptions of every perceiver at every time are not true. We will have to take note of the physical and mental conditions of the percipient. The phenomena of illusions, hallucinations, dream, delirium, delusion and the like indicate that we will have to make selection of the percipients if we are to rely upon their perceptions. All such perceptual judgements are true for the individual, but we do not accept them because the percipient has not fulfilled certain subjective conditions of his being regarded as a normal percipient. The colour-blind persons, and others who are otherwise deficient in their senses, do not have true perceptions. Similarly the sick, the drunkard, the excited and the insane are unreliable as percipients. The qualifications necessary to be a good percipient of objective fact are soundness of sense organs, mental poise, attentiveness, cautiousness and even some amount of self-consciousness. Though, ordinarily we do not question our perceptual judgements, that does not mean that in our true perceptions these conditions are absent. Usually we are cock-sure of our possessing these qualifications, but if we claim truth for our perceptions we ought to sit in judgement upon ourselves, and dispassionately take a cognisance of our own perceptual abilities. A person who clearly knows his own defects will not insist upon a certain perception that he

has, but, he will ask a more reliable percipient to make the perception and tell him the truth. He will not say, for instance, the star Arundhati is not there. Because, however, he may strain his eyes he may not be able to perceive it, and knowing this inability he will rely upon the perception of another who has a better sight. This open-mindedness is, therefore, essential for the possibility of right perception. Dr. I. H. Godlove, colour scientist of the General Aniline and Film Corporation says "you can't hope to see eye-to-eye with your wife, business associates, or anyone else unless you and they have the same visual response to different colour mixtures in the light of which you observe a coloured object.... Moreover, blue-eyed and brown-eyed persons match colours differently, the blue-eyed persons match colours at one end of the colour spectrum, and the brown-eyed at the other end. The match made by the blue-eyed looks terrible to the brown-eyed and vice versa."⁸ Those who are ignorant of these psychological facts would, indeed, fight phantoms. What is true of one sense is true of others also. What is required of the percipient is that he should openly admit differences in perception and should not claim a true perception for himself alone.

If that is the amount of self-criticism necessary for the ensurement of the truth of a mere perceptual judgement, how much more the subject has to be on his guard before he claims a finality of truth where knowledge deals with a more complex phenomenon, where interpretation and speculation are involved. Prejudice, self-interest, partiality, oblivion, affectation and such other psychological factors are at the basis of error. A thorough knowledge of the field of investigation and the methods adequate for that field, coupled with intellectual imagination is necessary for the impartial evaluation of evidence and suggestion of a

⁸ *Science Digest*, September, 1946.

possible truth. Faith⁹ is the possibility of realization of truth and love of truth, even a devotion to truth constitute the basic moral and spiritual conditions of knowledge. Truth originates in the *sattva*¹⁰ error originates in the *rajas* and *tamas*.¹¹

The object of knowledge that interests us is no less connected with values. Truth is no truth if it is not in organic relationship with good. Its desirability (*priyatva*) because of its promotion of happiness (*ānanda*) makes it a worthy object of knowledge. To know that which is worth knowing is more than truth; and a worthless knowledge is an error. Knowledge that leads to peace and progress, love and understanding is truth; knowledge that engenders fear, war, insecurity, hatred and misunderstanding constitutes error. This is the concrete view of knowledge in relation to human life and experience taken as an integral whole. Knowledge abstracted from these is neither true nor false, it is meaningless. The principle of knowledge for the sake of knowledge is as dangerous as the principle of art for art's sake. Both knowledge and art are primarily human affairs and apart from the promotion of humanity and its values these activities are beset with error. Error is at once an epistemic and axiological diminution, as much as truth is their mutual fulfilment.

⁹ Cf. *Śraddhāvān labhate jñānam, Gītā*, IV-39.

¹⁰ Cf. *Sattvāt sañjāyate jñānam, Gītā*, XIV-17.

¹¹ Cf. *Pramāda* is regarded in the *Gītā* as originating in *tamas* (*Gītā*, XIV-13-17).

9.

FOUR-FOLD VALUE ATTITUDES IN VEDĀNTA AND BUDDHISM

I. The Concept of *Catuṣkoṭi*

IN this chapter an attempt is made to study metaphysics in terms of the logical value concept. The representative metaphysics considered here refers to Vedānta and Buddhism. These two respectively uphold the contradictory categories of Being (*sat*) and Nothing (*asat*). The other varieties of metaphysical positions are modifications of these original positions. The three-fold object here is to show that there is a possibility of constructing a concept of *Catuṣkoṭi* (four-fold value attitudes) already implied in the literature of Advaita Vedānta; to maintain that this conception is more comprehensive in value than the corresponding prevalent conception in Buddhism; and to assert that the nature of ultimate reality though in a certain sense ineffable, is not beyond logic.

The concept of *Catuṣkoṭi* as formulated in the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism refers to the nature of phenomenal (*Saṃvṛti* or *Vyavahāra satya*) and noumenal (*pariniṣpanna* or *paramārtha satya*) reality. The question is whether either of them could be described as either *sat* or *asat*, or both *sat* and *asat* or neither *sat* nor *asat*. The answer is that none of these cognitive stand-points, which are the only four possible value standpoints, be taken regarding either the noumenal or the phenomenal reality. Becoming or change which is the very essence of mundane existence cannot be explained in terms of the values of absolute eternalism or absolute negativism or by an unintelligible jargon of their simultaneous combination or rejection. The four stand-points are denied in regard to the absolute reality *paramārtha*

or *Śunya*, because it is *niṣprapañca* or transcending all characteristics. They are denied because they are, according to Buddhism, simply irrelevant in this connection.¹

But while the Buddhist attitude towards *Catuṣkoṭi* is that of denial, the Vedānta *Catuṣkoṭi* primarily consists in the affirmation of these four positions regarding Brahman or the Absolute Reality.

Thus Brahman has been variously referred to as *Sat*² (real) and *Asat*³ (unreal) both *Sat* and *Asat*⁴ and neither *Sat* nor *Asat*.⁵ Such characterisations, however, are not to be found in one context, but are diffused in the Vedāntic literature. Taken together they constitute the original Vedāntic *Catuṣkoṭi*. But in addition to this affirmation, and without proving false to its metaphysical standpoint, the Vedānta is prepared to accept the denial of these positions regarding Brahman. This is what I call the double-edged *Catuṣkoṭi* of the Vedānta.

The Vedānta attitude towards *māyā* or *vyāvahārika sattā* however, is comparable to the Buddhistic attitude towards the world of *padārthās*. *Māyā*, for example, is neither *sat*, nor *asat*, nor both nor neither.⁶

¹ *Asti nāsti ubhaya anubhaya iti catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṁ Śūnyatvam, Sarva darśanasāṅgraha.*

² *Sadeva somyedamagra āsit, Chāndogya, VI, 2-1.*

³ *Asadeva idamagra āsit, Taittirīya, II-7.*

⁴ *Sadasaccāhamarjuna, Gītā, IX-19.*

Sadasattatparaṁ yat, Gītā, XI-37.

Sacca tyaccābhavat, Taittirīya, II-6.

⁵ *Nāsadāsīno sadāsittadānīm, R̥gveda, X-129-1.*

Na sattannāsaducyate, Gītā, XIII-1.

⁶ *Sannāpyasannāpyubhayātmikā no, Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, III.* The fourth *Koṭi* is not mentioned here.

II. Ineffabilism regarding Brahman and Māyā

It is usual to regard māyā as ineffable (*anirvacanīya*). Similarly the *padārthas* and the *śūnya* are recognised as ineffable in Buddhism.

It is not so usual to regard Brahman as ineffable, though if we read between the lines the general trend of Vedānta is towards ineffabilism regarding Brahman⁷ also. The disinclination towards a straight acceptance of the ineffabilist position regarding Brahman is owing to the absolutely opposite nature of Brahman and Māyā. While there is undecidability regarding the nature of Māyā owing to its apparently double character of being real and unreal, Brahman is decidedly real. Hence it is deemed proper to restrict the term ineffabilism to māyā alone.

But there is no harm in regarding Brahman as ineffable with a different meaning. The ineffabilism of Brahman is the most logical outcome of a definite logic depending upon the metaphysical position of non-dual absolutism.

The Advaita position is that Brahman or self alone is one without a second. And consistently to this position the meaning of the *Catuṣkoṭi* in its double aspect of being true and false of reality, could be understood. This appears to violate the logical laws of thought, but as a matter of fact, there is no violation of logic at all. *Sat* and *asat* appear to be contradictory of each other and hence it appears a height of absurdity that both these characterisations could be affirmed or denied both disjunctively and conjunctively of Brahman. Nevertheless such is the case regarding reality, according to the traditional Vedānta. The

⁷ *Yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha, Taittirīya, II, 4. anirdeśyam acintyam. Gītā, XII-3.*

avyapadeśyam, acintyam, Māṇḍūkya 7. aniruktam, Taittirīya, II-44. The trend of Śrīharṣa's work '*Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāṇḍya*' is towards *anirvacanīya-tāvāda*.

inaffability of Brahman consists in its essentially transcending logic or reason.⁸ But this, as I propose to show, is a misconception of Vedānta since without thought philosophy, as distinguished from mysticism, would be impossible. Śaṅkara does favour thought.⁹

III. The Laws of Thought in Relation to Absolute Reality

Thus the Law of Identity requires that the meaning of the term should remain the same in the given context. Therefore, when a word is used in two or more different senses, it is in fact more than one term. The apparent identity of a word must not be mistaken for an identity of a term.

The Law of Non-contradiction requires that the contradictory terms should not be affirmed together, and the Law of Excluded Middle requires that they should not be denied together. We should therefore, be on our guard when understanding the connotations of the words. For, it is quite possible that two words which have apparently contradictory forms may not be actually contradictory in their meanings, that is, they may not be contradictory as terms.

The contradictory terms, again, depend for their meaning upon each other. Being thus correlative none of them is significant in the absence and exclusion of another.

Hence the following paradoxical statements, apparently blowing hot and cold in the same breath, could be made about Brahman. In these statements the two words *sat* and *asat* are

⁸ *Tarko' pratisthānāt* etc. *Brahma Sūtra* II. 1, '2 *acintyāḥ khalu ye bhāvāḥ na tūnstarkeṇa sādhayet*. *Mahābhārata*, *Bhīṣma*, V — 12.

⁹ *Notpadyate vinā jñānaṁ vicāreṇānyasādhanaṁ*. *Āparokṣānubhūti*, II. *medhāvi puruṣo vidvān ūhāpohavicaṣanaḥ adhikāryāt mavidyūyāmuktalakṣaṇalakṣitaḥ*. *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* — 16.

not only two terms, for, as presently will be shown, their significance does not remain the same.

- (1) Brahman is *sat*, but is not *sat*.
- (2) Brahman is *asat*, but is not *asat*.
- (3) Brahman is both *sat* and *asat*, but is not both *sat* and *asat*.
- (4) Brahman is neither *sat* nor *asat*, but is not neither *sat* nor *asat*.

Th. Stcherbatsky in his very profound book *Buddhist Logic* has imagined an Indo-European symposium on various metaphysical topics, where he has shown four different Vedāntins representing four different positions as following :

1st Vedāntin : Real at the beginning was the Nought.

2nd Vedāntin : Real at the beginning was neither Existence nor the Nought.

3rd Vedāntin : Real at the beginning was only Existence.
The One without a Second. It was Brahman.

4th Vedāntin : The Brahman is identical with our own self.
The "This" and "Thou."¹⁰

Here only the first half of each of my proposed statements is taken, but not the negations of them which form the second parts of my corresponding statements. Further, my third statement is not recognised by him. Instead his fourth Vedāntin identifying reality with the self is recognised.

IV. Explanation of the Paradoxes

But the most important consideration in my opinion is that the same Vedāntin can consistently maintain the four statements as I have put above. Their explanation is as follows :

¹⁰ *Buddhist Logic*, Vol I, pp. 536-7.

(1) Brahman is *sat*, but in the absolute absence of its contradictory, *sat* could not be logically called *sat*. For example, the husband who has given a divorce to his wife has taken from himself a divorce of his husbandhood also.

The other meaning is that Brahman has a transcendental existence, but not an empirical existence.

(2) Brahman is *asat* in the sense that it is not experienced in the manifest form or as an object of knowledge. But the non-cognition of a certain kind does not prove the absolute non-existence of a thing. That which has not assumed a name and a form is as good as non-existent from the point of view of knowledge, but this consideration should not lead us to think, from the point of view of ontology, that it is genuinely non-existent. It is also a mistake to suppose that, that which is not amenable to knowledge as an object is therefore, non-existent. The self, not being an object of knowledge is mistaken for *asat*.

(3) Brahman is both *sat* and *asat*. This statement means that whatever experience of the empirical world (which is ultimately *asat*) we have has its foundation in Brahman which alone truly is. Darkness depends upon light but not vice versa. Sun, though all light, has made both light and darkness possible. Brahman is the ground of the duality of subject and object.

In another sense, the statement refers to the manifest (*sat*) and the unmanifest (*asat*) forms of *Prakṛti* which are founded ultimately in Brahman. This refers to the immanent nature of Brahman. Everything is essentially Brahman.

The denial of this statement means that Brahman cannot simultaneously in the same sense be both *sat* and *asat*. The existence of Brahman is transcendental. To say that it is non-existent in the same transcendental sense is a contradiction. Therefore, Brahman is only *sat* and not *asat*. Again, Brahman

is empirically non-existent being without form and name. And, therefore, in the same sense it cannot be existent also. Hence Brahman is *asat* only and not *sat*.

(4) Brahman is neither *sat* nor *asat*. Brahman is such a foundational reality that the distinction between *sat* and *asat* is made possible by it. *Sat* and *asat* constitute a duality of terms which get their significance from the transcendental reality which does not constitute one of the terms of this duality. Sun makes both day and night but sun is neither day nor night. Brahman transcends the manifest and the unmanifest forms of *Prakṛti*.¹¹

But it is false to say that Brahman is neither *sat* nor *asat*. It has to be either *sat* or *asat*, these being contradictory terms. We have seen above the sense in which Brahman is *sat* but not *asat*, and the sense in which Brahman is *asat* but not *sat*. The difference between the third denial and the fourth denial is that the third proceeds on the basis of the law of Non-Contradiction which asserts that the contradictories cannot be true together, hence one of them must be false, and the fourth proceeds on the basis of the Law of Excluded Middle which asserts that the contradictories cannot be false together, hence one of them must be true. It cannot be said that Brahman has neither the empirical nor the transcendental reality, that it is accessible neither to logical nor to supralogical ways of knowledge.

V. The Relative Values of the Vedāntic and the Buddhist Positions

Thus the mystical position of the ineffable nature of Brahman is arrived at by a logical procedure of gradational valuation depending upon the absolute reality of Brahmin. There is a dualistic logic that takes us gradually from pluralism to

¹¹ *Parastasmāttubhāvo 'nyo'vyakto' vyaktātsanātanaḥ*, *Gitā*, VIII-2.

dualism and from dualism to absolutism ; and the non-dualistic logic from absolutism to ineffabilism and mysticism. This is rational mysticism. The passage from pluralism to dualism is to reach metaphysically a higher value. Still higher is the metaphysical value of absolutism.

The Vedāntic ineffabilism is not with respect to the characterization *sat* alone. It could be extended to other characterizations of Brahman like *nitya*, *śuddha*, *buddha*, *mukta*, *ānanda* ; and also to such categories as quantity, quality, relation etc.

There is a sense of course, in the traditional Vedānta when it declared Brahman to be beyond logic or reason, and that sense simply is that the highest and purest knowledge of Brahman is a matter of intuitive experience and not of ratiocination. As a matter of fact intuition directs and substantiates reason, and logic fulfils itself in an experience. Reason is not to be discarded, it is to be fulfilled. It is not to commit suicide but to be reborn in a new purified form. The supremacy of any experience is characterized by inclusiveness of the lower values by fulfilment or their lacunae in the higher.

Buddhism, on the other hand, has taken only and entirely a negative attitude towards the reality of experience, and therefore, has only denied the values of *Catuṣkoṭi* to reality without affirming them also. Its pessimistic outlook on life has ended in a pessimistic epistemology which regards all knowledge as false or doubtful and which has paved the way towards a *Mahāśūnya*, A Big Void. If the *paramārtha* of *Mahāśūnya*, is such that all discursive thought is simply irrelevant, then the denial of *Catuṣkoṭi* has no more relevance than its affirmation. If the *śūnya* is absolutely nothing, then the application of *Catuṣkoṭi* is not only irrelevant but simply nonsensical. And yet the basic pessimism and scepticism is emphatic regarding the denial. The Vedānta, on the other hand, depends upon the

wholesome epistemological position of the self-validity of all knowledge. If values of life and experience are richer than logic that logic must not, after all prove false to experience of the indubitable reality of the self. Therefore, ultimate reality, though ineffable, is not *śūnya* but our very self which essentially is *sat*, in the very denial of *Catuṣkoṭi* of reality, the real asserts itself through the denying self.¹²

The pessimist complains that the cup is half empty and the optimist is glad that it is half full. Objectively there appears to be no difference in what they assert, but subjectively there is a world of difference of valuation. The valuational attitude makes the whole philosophy. Our psychology and ethics mould both our logic and metaphysics.

But the opposition between the *Sūnyavāda* and the *Brahmavāda* is more apparent than real. According to both, *paramārtha* is not so much a matter of logic-chopping as of ineffable immediate experience. The two terms *Śūnya* and *Brahman* may as well be exchanged. As a matter of fact, Nāgārjuna declares that the absolute reality cannot be called "Void or not void, or both or neither, but in order to indicate it is called the void."¹³

According to the *Mahopaniṣad*, Brahman is *Śūnya* (void) *tuccha* (trivial) or *abhāva* (nothing). *Yogasvaroday*, also refers to *sacchidānanda* Brahman as *śūnya*.¹⁴ The *Gītā* usage of the term *Brahma-nirvāṇa* significantly combines the two notions in one. According to Bergson absolute void is absolute fullness. "Nothing is, at bottom, the idea of everything."¹⁵

¹² *Ya eva hi nirākartā tadeva tasya svarūpam* (*Śāṅkhya Bhāṣya*).

¹³ *Śūnyam iti na vaktavyam aśūnyam iti vā bhavet, ubhayaṁ nobhayaṁ ceti prajñaptiyartham tu kathyate.*

¹⁴ *Śūnyam tu sacchidānandam niḥśabdabrahmaśabdītam.*

¹⁵ *Creative Evolution*, p. 312.

The only question is whether our attitude towards reality should be that of emptiness or fullness. And if the latter is to be preferred in value the Vedānta has to be commended for its integral or comprehensive approach.

VI. Supermonism

Ineffabilism is an inevitable logical position into which absolutism culminates. Logic consists in the pursuit of precision. But it is this very demand for precision that ends in mysticism. Inconsistent as it may appear, ineffabilism is the highest precise category of knowledge of the absolute reality.

Unity of reality is the ultimate quantitative category that reason approves of. For if there are two absolute reals, they cannot be brought within one unit of knowledge. But nor can there be a unity of reality different from the unity of knowledge, thus constituting an absurd duality between knowledge and reality. For, in such a position knowledge ceases to be a knowledge of reality as the latter absolutely transcends the former, and reality refuses as it were to come within knowledge. Thus there has to be a unity of knowledge and reality. But the category of unity though apparently an ultimate quantitative category is not genuinely so. For, unity, to have a logical meaning, must be taken in relation to duality or multiplicity. Thus the category of unity being a relative category, ceases to be ultimate. The one is one because of the many, and because ultimately many is not, the one ceases to be one. Hence, though reality has to be a unity it could not be described as unity. Unity therefore, is only a penultimate category. What ultimate quantitative category could be applied to describe reality, one cannot say. The Vedānta category of nonduality is supposed to approach the idea of that ultimate category, yet it suffers from the same defect, as it has to depend upon the idea of two which is not, and not upon the one which is. Further, it is a negative

description of a positive reality, which constitutes a grave misunderstanding. I propose to call the non-dualistic position as Supermonism. Plotinus calls the absolute one as Superone.

The statement of the quantitative problem of the nature of reality from four stand points, taken as true and as false, will be as follows:

(1) Reality is one :	True.
(2) Reality is not-one :	True.
(3) Reality is both one and not-one :	True.
(4) Reality is neither one nor not-one :	True.
(5) Reality is one :	False.
(6) Reality is not-one :	False.
(7) Reality is both one and not-one :	False.
(8) Reality is neither one nor not-one :	False.

It may be objected that the question about number presupposes that the thing to be numbered (i.e. reality) belongs to some one class (since, number, as Russell points out, is a class characteristic, a 'class of classes'). This empiricist logic if not altogether false, applies only to the empirical sphere of practical life. If the absolutist standpoint is allowed the Absolute unity ceases to be a class of classes, since the Absolute is devoid of generic, specific and internal differences (*Sajātiya-vijātiya-svagatabheda-śūnya*). Therefore, the Absolute though essentially a unity, ceases to be meaningful as a unity which is significant only in relation to multiplicity.

VII. Ineffabilism in relation to Reality

Absolutism or Supermonism thus culminates in mysticism because of ineffabilism. The questions is: Is the real ineffable because it is ontologically indeterminate in its nature or epistemologically undecidable?

It appears that there is some confusion here between the ontological and the epistemological standpoints. It is conceiv-

able as to how all our characterisations of the absolute reality are inadequate to describe the essence of reality. *Determinatio- nest negatio*, to determine is to negate, said Spinoza. *Neti neti*, not this, not this, declared the Upaniṣads. The meaning of this position is only to admit the human inability to comprehend the essence of reality by the limited means of the concepts and categories at the finite man's disposal. Ineffabilism, therefore, describes the state of human knowledge in relation to reality. Ineffabilism does not mean that reality in itself is indeterminate. Ineffabilism, therefore, is the ultimate epistemological standpoint. To infer from this the ontological indeterminateness of reality is not justified, unless epistemological determination of reality is claimed to be the final one, and thus there is an absolute reduction of the ontology of the infinite to epistemology of the finite. But it is possible to maintain that what is ultimate for epistemology is not necessarily ultimate for ontology, just as God is the ultimate category for theology but not for metaphysics. The correlation between ontology and epistemology would be complete if both are oriented from the infinite point of view.

The real cannot be ontologically indeterminate though epistemologically ineffable. Nor is the problem of the nature of reality such that we cannot decide whether reality is, for example one or not-one or *sat* or *asat*. There may be problems regarding which no conclusive decision is possible. But at least the problem of the quantity of the real, or of its being, is such that our concluding reality to be ineffable is a definite decision. Ineffabilism is, therefore, not undecidability. Even Buddhism *decides* that the four alternatives are false as applied to things.

VIII. Ineffabilism is not Scepticism

Ineffabilism, again, does not mean scepticism. In scepticism the doubt is maintained for the sake of doubt, its alpha and omega are doubt. Such a theory, according to its own logic, is

doubtful and therefore something other than doubtful must be asserted. But in spite of this suicidal position, the sceptic entertains doubt and shows no real desire for any serious effort towards knowledge but only a retiring spirit. The absolutely sceptical outlook, as is taken up by Gorgias and Pyrrho, however inconsistent to its position it might be to do so, puts forth its findings in the following propositions: (1) Nothing exists (2) If anything exists it cannot be known (3) If anything exists, and if it can be known, its knowledge is incommunicable. (4) Therefore, the best way for the sceptic is to keep silent, that is, he should suspend all judgement.

Now, between this sceptical position and ineffabilism there is altogether a wide difference. The ineffabilist believes in the one ultimate reality and has not any doubt of its existence at all. And again, though he conceives the knowledge of such reality as unattainable by the commonly recognized means of knowledge, he believes that reality is realizable in a mystical experience. Such experience, being altogether individual in its nature is incommunicable to others as all experience as such is. Nevertheless, such a mystical experience may be attempted to be expressed in some sort of symbolism and language, which though far from adequate, may give to the inept but interested person, hints of the direction in which he may exert himself and make that experience his own. The description of the mystical experience of reality though inadequate to the core, may yet be significant enough for the *sādhaka*, the spiritual aspirant, who may get inspired in his spiritual pilgrimage. Here, therefore, there is no total distrust of the possibility of communication, but whatever best could be done of the available means of communication is done wholeheartedly.

Finally, the ineffabilist may choose to keep silent as was done in the story of the Vedānta teacher who kept himself silent before his students; but the result was that the teacher's silence

was as good as a discourse and the disciples had all their doubts solved.¹⁶ The ineffabilist and the sceptic both may advocate and indulge in silence and hold their judgement in suspense. But the ineffabilist holds his judgement in suspense as he finds no use for the judgement when there is a direct experience of reality, or as he sees the inadequacy of any conceivable judgment regarding the nature of what he has seen in a vision, or as he does not want to come down from the heights and serenity of the immediacy of his realization to the round about mediacy of the dichotomous judgements. The sceptic, on the other hand, suspends his judgement because he has not had any opportunity to hold any judgement at all; for the simple reason that not only does he not have any experience of reality but he doubts that there could be any reality to be experienced, much less does he believe in any possibility of knowing it, and still less in the possibility of communicating it. While the silence of the ineffabilist is full of significance, the silence of the sceptic means there is no significance in whatsoever; while, in short, the ineffabilist is silent because he is full with illumination, the sceptic is in utter darkness. The one keeps silent because he is wise the other because he is still in doubt.

Exhortation of the Linguistic philosophy that whereof we cannot speak thereof we must keep silence is correct only to a certain extent in the interest of definiteness and clarity of our expressions. But if it suggests that reality is exhaustible in linguistic expressions, this claim is doubtful. There are more realities than our language can catch adequately. To keep silence with regards to inexpressible experiences is not to deny their reality. All superb experiences are inaccessible to words. Linguistic philosophy should not end in Linguistic Solipsism.

¹⁶ *Gurostu maunaṁ vyākhyānaṁ, śisyastu chinnaśayaḥ.*

Though this story is current regarding Śaṅkara's Advaita position, similar account is famous regarding Buddha's keeping silent. His silence with regards to metaphysical questions was equally eloquent or meaningful.

Ineffabilism is born of negation of any dualism whatsoever, and this position is held not about any special department of reality, namely, matter, life, mind, God etc., but of the whole reality, because there are not any such compartmental differences in the non-dual experience. And though there is no knowledge of such a non-dual reality in the ordinary sense of the term, there is yet a realization of it in one's own being. That reality is asserted to be existent because there is a direct realization of it. And there is no inconsistency in such an assertion as there would be in the agnostic or nihilist position.¹⁷ Again, in ineffabilistic position there is no dogmatic assertion that the ultimate Reality is of the nature of Matter, or Life or Mind or even Spirit. Such an assertion only reveals a prejudice for some of these categories, and therefore, the truth ceases to be impartial. In such a refusal to assert definitely any anthropomorphic category originating in finite human experience lies the essence of ineffabilism. Characterizing the Absolute as Spirit is the highest possible approach to its understanding.

Of course when self is regarded as the highest category by the ineffabilist he does not want to assert it as the highest from the point of view of ultimate reality, but he regards that as the nearest to the real essence of reality as compared with any other category that human mind can conceive of, but that category is not necessarily the best from the absolute point of view. A consistent ineffabilist must hold that even the highest human category, though it is the best anthropomorphic description of ultimate Reality, is not necessarily the best from the Absolute's point of view. His partiality to the category of self, is, therefore, understandable but it does not mean that, that is the absolutely adequate category.

¹⁷ *Catuskoti* could be applied with full logical significance only to the real or to the illusory, but to apply it to Nothing has no logical significance. For, what is the significance of attributing or not attributing a name to a son of barren woman?

It may be seen that nihilism, scepticism, agnosticism, relativism, absolutism and ineffabilism constitute the ascending value scale of epistemological positions regarding reality.

VALUATIONAL PHILOSOPHY
OF SCIENCE**I. The Present Conception of the Philosophy of Science**

PHILOSOPHY of Science has been so far restricted to the systematic study of the nature of science, especially of the methods the conception and the presuppositions that it involves. It has a general bias for the scientific empiricism according to which the chief object of philosophy is the development of the logic and methodology of science. It believes that most of the problems of the traditional philosophy, in so far as they have significant meaning dependent upon the possibility of empirical verification, could be interpreted in terms of science. It is also interested in the nature of scientific symbols, and their logical structure, the logical analysis of language known as semiotics developed further into pragmatics, semantics and syntactics. Particularly is this study devoted to bring about a Unity of Science postulating the physicalist thesis that every descriptive term in any science is connected with terms designating observable phenomena. Its emphasis is on the scientific attitude, cooperation and the use of inter-subjective language. It believes in bringing out or demonstrating the homogeneity in the concepts of different sciences which make a coherent system. Naturally an attempt is made to come to a better mutual adaptation of terminologies in the different sciences. The future ideal of the philosophy of science is to work out a unity of the laws of science so that from a simple set of interconnected and fundamental laws the special laws of the specific sciences including the social sciences can be deduced.

II. Empirical Verification *versus* Experiential Verification

The most commendable part of this study is the idea of the unification of scientific knowledge. It is a supreme task and indeed very valuable. To a certain extent this has been worked out in the "Encyclopaedia of Unified Science". The significant idea is that our knowledge forms a unity and that unity could be actually worked out. But there are different ways of reaching this unity. The physicalist thesis and its restriction to the empirical method would result in the shrinking of the boundaries of "certified knowledge". That which lies beyond these boundaries is looked upon with suspicion and all metaphysical and valuational knowledge has come to be discredited as meaningless.

The only antidote to this is the extension of the connotative content of verification so as to include all kinds of experiences. We must substitute the "empirical" theory of verification by a more comprehensive "experiential" theory. The human experience is not restricted to sensuous experience. It includes intellectual and intuitive experience. It has all the aspects of cognition, affection and conation. Experience is more than consciousness and includes the subconscious and the unconscious. Experience is not restricted to the scientist. We must take into account the experience of the scientist, we must take into account experiences of the laymen, the poets, the artists, the philosophers, the mystics, the moralists and the saints. There are experiences of the extroverts as well as of the introverts, of the tender-minded and of the tough-minded. The philosopher cannot be oblivious also of the parapsychological phenomena.

Therefore admitting that the content of meaningful truth must be traced to experience, the meaning of the term experience itself should fall back upon what men do experience. The empiricist conception has reduced man to a dwarf, while the experientialist conception elevates human being to unlimited heights.

There need not be mere imaginary speculation unrooted in the firm ground of experience. But let not speculation clinch for want of a proper comprehension of what constitutes experience. Scientific knowledge is only one form of knowledge, important indeed, but not the only one. It must make room for other varieties of knowledge.

III. The Principle of Autonomy of Values in Different Sciences

Scientific attitude must not end in a scientific dogmatism and intolerance. In order to reach a unity of science the qualitative distinction among the spheres of the various sciences must not be overlooked. The present unification of science has ironed out the qualitative differences of the various kinds of sciences into the physical level. Each science has its autonomous sphere of values; therefore, trespassing other spheres with an intention to violate the sacred values in them is an unsound method of unification. It is at once illogical and unaxiological. The reduction of the sociological to the socio-psychological, then to the psychological, then to the biological, then to the chemical and physical is an ingenious method, but nonetheless a perverse method. Each science has its own norm, its own ethos, its own *gestalt*, its own conception of value in its sphere. It ought to be a postulatory principle to allow perfect freedom to every science in its own field of enquiry. Each science should have its own concepts, own categories and own methods of enquiry. [Simply because verification by appeal to sensuous experience is possible to its utmost in the physical science, owing to the adequacy of the describable subject-matter in relation to the adopted procedure, it must not be superimposed upon other spheres. That is committing the fallacy of the vicarious substitution of methods.¹ As Professor

¹ See author's *Approach to Reality*, pp. 61, 62.

Hayek has phrased it, it is an 'abuse of reason'²

The natural sciences, the social sciences and the axiological or philosophical sciences are the broadest classification of sciences. The descriptive and the normative sciences are irreducible to each other. The abstract and the concrete sciences fall apart. Each science has its adequate methodology determined objectively with reference to the nature of the subject-matter. They are related, but not amenable to reduction to a uniform pattern.

IV. Valuational Unification of Human Knowledge

Hence if a unification of scientific knowledge is to be reached it must not be based on an arbitrary principle which does injustice to the genuine variety of sciences. The principle that I suggest is that of the comprehensive unification of all knowledges, inclusive of a variety of values. Each science has its own value-scheme, and many such schemes of all the sciences have to be arranged in a grand federal, and, if possible, hierarchical system of knowledge. Ordering, coordinating and integrating all knowledge is the supreme task of the axionoetic philosophy of knowledge without prejudice for or against any methodology of a single science. As a matter of fact the task of the philosophy of science is not complete unless it shows a way to philosophy of knowledge as a whole wherein not only the different sciences will be accounted for but also such other aspects of the institution of human knowledge as are represented in literature, philosophy, religion, art and history.

V. Logical Empiricism in the Context of Indian Epistemology

Next we must consider the epistemological foundations of the scientific philosophy. This I propose to do by considering

² See *The Counter Revolution of Science : Studies in the Abuse of Reason*.

logical empiricism, as allied to philosophy of science, in the context of the Indian Epistemology. On a superficial observation it appears that the two approaches are so very different that they could not be compared. Nevertheless I propose to show in brief how the implications of logical empiricist epistemology compare favourably with the *pramāṇās* as sources or methods of knowledge. Logical empiricism recognises only sensuous perception as the source of all knowledge. It does, of course, recognise inference, but that is wholly perceptually conditioned. Cārvāka does not recognise perceptually conditioned inference as an independent method. The Sāṅkhya view is that inference is a source of the knowledge of the supersensible.³ This kind of inference is not recognised by logical empiricism. The importance of perception as an ultimate source of knowledge could not be questioned. It appears that while other sources such as testimony (*śabda*), postulation (*arthāpatti*) and analogy (*upamāna*) are ultimately dependent upon perception, perception is not so dependent on the rest. Therefore, while perception, in a sense, is an absolute and a self-sufficient method of knowledge, the other methods are only relative to and conditioned by perception.

Nevertheless it can be shown that logical empiricism has to recognise some of the other methods of knowledge recognised in the Indian Epistemology.

Verification is either actual or only in principle, either direct or indirect, either conclusive or probable. These modifications make room for the non-empirical methods.

VI. Word as a Source of Knowledge in Linguistic Analysis

Logical empiricism in its aspect of the analysis of language, believes in word as a source of knowledge, though, of course,

³ *Aṅdriyāṇām pratītiramunānāt, Sāṅkhya Kārikā, 6.*

it attempts to understand the meaning of the word with reference to the describable perceptual situation. There are, of course, some positivists who emphasize the study of the linguistic forms to the exclusion of the subject matter. That is why they make a distinction between the formal and the material modes of expression and put premium upon the former. Word thus assumes the chief importance in this view.

VII. Analogy as the Basis of Inference in Logical Empiricism

Analogy (*upamāna*) comes also to be recognised. When for instance, logical empiricism recognises verifiability in principle that which is not practically or actually verifiable is believed to be analogous to that which could be actually verifiable. The nature of reality in question is ultimately believed to be identical in nature whether it is actually verified or believed to be verifiable in principle. That which is verifiable in principle, is of necessity, a reality which is analogous to perceptual reality. It believes in the homogeneous nature of reality determined by the only criterion of perceptual verifiability. There are not two kinds or orders of reality, perceptual and transcendent, or different in nature.

In other cases where no direct verification is possible, but only an indirect one from the effects to their causes, analogical argument is applied. Atoms are not directly perceived, nor is ether directly perceived. These are regarded as "representative fictions" by Bain. They are fictions because they are not directly perceivable, but they are representative of reality which is believed to be essentially analogous to that which is directly perceived. Atoms have, for instance, physical properties like weight and motion and they exist in space. Ether is in space and has waves. There is thus a homogeneity of nature between the cause and the effect. Therefore, we infer the

essentially perceptible character of these causes from their directly perceivable effects. The suprasensuous (*atindriya*) reality which is amenable to inference, according to Sāṅkhya and other systems, is not homogeneous with the perceptible reality. Therefore, it does not lend itself even to indirect perception. Hence it is wholly transcendent to perception. The inference that is recognised by logical empiricism is, therefore, within perceptual reality. Inference thus has its foot and fulcrum in perception.

VIII. Are Brahman and Prakṛti Inferrible?

A distinction therefore must be made between the legitimate and illegitimate use of inference. The inferred reality must have a basis in the perceptible reality. From that which is directly perceived we can infer that which is not so directly perceived. From the actual perception we can infer about a possible perception. Such a use of inference is legitimate, because it moves within the gamut of reality which is essentially perceptible in its character. Hence, when we attempt to infer a transcendent reality on the basis of perceptual reality, we are making an illegitimate use of inference. Any inference whatsoever in which a transcendent reality is inferred on the basis of perceptual reality is only a semblance of inference, a pseudo-inference. Therefore the claim that the *atindriya* reality is amenable to the method of inference appears to be unjustifiable. Prakṛti or Brahman, therefore, if they are the objects of inference, must have a homogeneity of nature with that which is actually perceived. In this case they cease to be transcendent, and are amenable to the principle of verification. On the other hand, if they are regarded as wholly transcendent, and not amenable to the principle of verification, they do not also constitute legitimate objects of the method of inference, since the stuff of which inference is made is perception.

Whatever may be said about the nature of Brahman, at

least Prakṛti of Sāṅkhya and atoms of Nyāya are not transcendent realities. They have a character which is analogous to the character of that which is actually perceived. Prakṛti e.g. is not amenable to direct perception, hence it is inferred. In one of the verses in the *Sāṅkhya-Kārikā* certain reasons for the non-perception of certain realities are given, such as excessive distance or proximity, defect in sense organs, inattentiveness, admixture of similars, preponderance of one object over the other and extreme bigness or smallness. The reason given for the imperceptibility of Prakṛti is subtleness (*saukṣmya*). Atoms also are not perceived because of their subtlety. Can we, therefore, conclude that Sāṅkhya Prakṛti and Vaiśeṣika atoms are not transcendental realities, that they are indirectly perceptible? They possess characteristics which are homogeneous with the perceived world. The examples which are given to illustrate the causes of imperceptibility are taken from the perceptual reality. Non-perception of water in milk, of stars in daylight, of drops in ocean, collyrium in the eyes and so on. Prakṛti which is not perceived also must have a similar character. It is inferrible from its effects because of the analogous character that it possesses with them. The reference to *alīndriya*, therefore is to be taken within the limits of perceptibility. *Alīndriya* nature of Prakṛti only means that it is indirectly or in principle, perceptible.

IX. Non-perception as a Method of Refutation of Metaphysical Reality

Non-perception (*Anupalabdhi*) as a method of knowledge, thus comes to be recognised in logical empiricism, that which is not perceived is non-existent. Brahman is not existent because it is not perceived. The refutation of metaphysics is based upon this method of *anupalabdhi* of the metaphysical subject-matter.

X. The Minor *Pramāṇas*: Postulation, History and Gesture

Postulation (*arthāpatti*) is also recognised. The other side of the moon or the centre of the earth is postulated to exist to make our actual experience consistent.

Empiricism recognises the possibility of historical knowledge though without verification. Therefore *Aitiḥya* or the legendary method of history also is recognised. Probability (*sambhava*) is recognised as a method of knowledge. There are three kinds of probability — (1) Statistical (2) Situational or Circumstantial (3) Relational (between two propositions). All these are interpretative rather than verificatory and hence lead to probabilism. Empiricism is saved from the sceptical conclusions drawn by Hume, but as following the inductive procedure the best of generalisations are only probable.

Gesture (*ceṣṭā*) as a source of knowledge is recognised in Pragmatics as a branch of Semeotics. In some cases the meaning is determined with reference to practical behaviour.

In brief, it may be said that with modifications to suit its scientific bias logical empiricism fits in with the general scheme of *pramāṇas* recognised in Indian Philosophy. If further empiricism could be made as broad-based as the Nyāya theory of perception, inclusive of the various kinds of supra-sensuous perceptions (*alaukika pratyakṣa*), suggests, then only room could be made for metaphysics. The whole distinction is between a narrow and a broad view of experience.

XI. Sociology of Science

One of the recent interests associated rather hesitatingly with the Philosophy of Science is the specific branch of the Sociology of Knowledge, namely, the Sociology of Science. This branch studies the mutual impact of science and society.

Regarding the social relations of science it examines the place of science in a given cultural pattern, and in relation to such social institutions as government, business, education, art, religion and morals. Under different forms of the social and political organisation as for example, the capitalist and the communist social order, the democratic and the dictatorial form of government the relationships of science will undergo change. The sociology of science has brought out certain general characteristics of the scientific knowledge which form what is known as the ethos or the mores of science. "Four sets of institutional imperatives—universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism—comprise the ethos of modern science."⁴ Actually this ethos has to work in the prevalent social structure. The society has its own ethos or a set of values. Science cannot afford to break away from these values. The goodness or badness of the social ethos will determine to a certain extent the goodness or badness of science. Science itself may be instrumental in bringing a change in the cultural outlook of the society. Mostly this influence and counter-influence take place not in a planned and a conscious way but in an unconscious way. The common individual is only swayed hither and thither in the currents over which he has very little control inspite of his boasting of his freedom. It looks as if there is a hand of Providence or Destiny controlling the march of civilizations in the specific directions in a mysterious and an incomprehensible way. Many a time the mild conformist attitude towards the existent structure proves helpful to the solidarity and peace of the society even though the rationality of the given order is not very clear. Some amount of dogmatism is necessary, even though an excess of it may lead to the stagnation of social progress. But to be sceptical about the given cultural pattern

⁴ R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, p. 30

without hoping to substitute some other superior pattern leads to chaos and decay. For, the general attitude of scepticism only spreads anarchy regarding all the values of human existence, which state is not at all desirable. Even a false or a bad set of beliefs is tolerably preferable to an absence of belief.

If on the other hand, a conscious planning is done taking the help of scientific and technological knowledge, there is a possibility of giving direction to the onward movement of society, but the more elaborate the planning the more totalitarian it tends to become leaving little scope for the individual freedom. It becomes a problem of steering clearly between the individual liberty and social planning. The problem has become more and more important because of the advance of technology which depends upon the society's sacrificing a large amount of their income for extremely costly research. No nations small or great can afford to preserve themselves independently of the proper military power that science alone can help to build. The modern predicament is that preservation is impossible without science, and yet the growth of knowledge on military lines also has endangered human life. Hence no philosophy of science would be complete without considering the values for which the institute of science exists and the efficiency of its implementing those values.

XII. The Scientific Attitude is a Moral Attitude

The scientific research worker must faithfully follow the methodology adequate for his field of research. This faith itself is an uncommon moral quality. But the following group of virtues are expected to be present in the scientist: keen curiosity, rationality, freedom from bias, impartiality, subtle and wide observation, attentiveness, one-pointed concentration, imaginative genius, resourcefulness, initial scepticism, faith in the discovery of truth, courage, perseverance, effort, endurance, sincerity, self criticism, disinterestedness and above all, love of truth. In pro-

portion as these virtues are possessed by the scientist, he is likely to get an authoritative position in his field. In the Indian epistemology such a person is known as *āpta* (authority). He is one who sincerely observes the methodological procedure (*prāmāṇika*). He is a seer of the truth and a spokesman of the truth (*yathārthadraṣṭā, yathārthavaktā*). His word is regarded as testimony. He must possess both the intellectual and moral qualities in virtue of which his testimony becomes reliable.

The foundation of science is in such a cultured mental make-up. This shows how a scientific frame of mind is essentially an expression of a high moral worth of the person. All those who have contributed to the promotion of scientific knowledge could not have done so but for the above mentioned virtues in them. The kind of absorption which a great devotee of God experiences in his mysticism, is also experienced by the great scientist in his devoted search of truth. The difference between them is a difference in the objects of their interest, but not in the quality of the mental attitude. No one can ever aspire to be a great scientist, or a great mystic, or a great artist, or a great philosopher, if such an absorbing quality of the mind is not present in him. All these are verily *yogīs* in their fields.

XIII. Scientific Dogmatism and Philosophical Criticism

But the unfortunate thing about the scientist is that the limitations of his subject-matter inevitably result in putting a limit to his virtue. His objectivity is defined by the limits of sensuous experience. His rationalism ends in narrow intellectualism. His love of truth becomes a partisanship of his own subject of interest, with the result that the problems in the other fields also are usurped by having developed an excessive attachment to his own sphere. He insists upon the application of

his methods, concepts and categories beyond his legitimate field. He conveniently thinks that what is true in his particular field must be true universally in all the other fields. He thus misunderstands the universality of truth. Truth has many aspects and each is qualitatively a distinct universal, yet the universality of an aspect of truth is extended illegitimately to other aspects of truth. Exuberant faith in his own findings results in suspecting the findings of others in their fields. The quarrels among the scientists belonging to the different categories of science, for example, the physical and the social, the descriptive and the appreciative, are a result of the sticky and intolerant attitude.

Thus science, inspite of its avowed love for truth, becomes an expression of dogmatism. Philosophy cannot feed itself on such a dogmatic attitude. Criticism is its soul, and it begins with self-criticism. It is a comprehensive search and its virtue is in its liberal attitude. It springs in a wide outlook and generosity for others' points of view. It was not without reason that an elaborate *yogic* discipline was recommended to the philosopher. Such a discipline is the most significant aspect of epistemology itself.

XIV. Purity of Means in the Scientific Procedure

Inspite of the high moral discipline that the scientist shows in his search of truth, he has not always been morally discriminative regarding the means that he adopts in the scientific procedure. Mahatma Gandhi had always insisted upon the virtue of purity in the employment of the right means for the right ends. Even though the ends are good they do not always justify the goodness of the means. The means have to be good independently of the good ends sought. A correlation between the worth of means and ends has to be established. This Gandhi did in the sphere of social and political activities. He was the father of the modern idea of moralizing the politics by the employment

of the technique of non-violence. But the same must be done in the sphere of scientific research. Dissection and vivisection in the field of biological and medical research have taken an extensive scale in order to study the organic processes. Thousands of monkeys and pigs, rats and dogs, hares and frogs are subjected to utter cruelty. They are put in torturous conditions to study the effects of those conditions on their physiological and psychological processes. All kinds of dangerous drugs are administered to them. The conscience of the scientist becomes dulled after repeated experiments. They are ingenious but very cruel experiments. Many of these experiments are only a prelude to man's journey in space.

Can we regard knowledge as possessing intrinsic worth irrespective of the inhuman as well as immoral means employed for the acquisition of that knowledge? The *Gītā* proclaims : there is nothing so pure indeed as knowledge.⁵

XV. Preventive Knowledge Preferable to Curative Knowledge

We must also make a distinction between genuine and substantial knowledge on the one hand, and an unwholesome accretion of knowledge on the other. A preventive knowledge, for example in the medical science, is preferable in value to the curative sort of knowledge. But proportionately more attention is paid to the curative value of knowledge than its preventive value. Research more often comes to be concentrated on cure rather than prevention.

Here we meet with a vicious circle. Unless there is evil the remedial knowledge also cannot increase. For the increase of such knowledge a state of evil must prevail. And if we have knowledge enough to prevent evil, we would have to remain ignorant of the remedial knowledge.

⁵ *Na hi jñānena sadṛśam pavitramiha vidyate*, *Gītā*, IV, 38.

Further, many a time the remedies prove indirectly to be more dangerous than the evils themselves. The growth of the medical science does not merely lie in the discovery of the causes and remedies of the prevalent diseases, it also grows by inadvertently giving rise to new diseases. The knowledge of impending danger in the form of contracting such diseases as cancer, blood pressure etc. results in a psychological breakdown and a constant worry of the future. In spite of the growth in the psychological therapy, there are more such mental patients than ever before. The impending dangerous potentialities of the modern science have taken possession of the unconscious, and a general attitude of frustration has been caused. The existentialist philosophy has fed itself upon this frustration caused by science as well as the urban civilization based upon technology and engineering. The machine age has a psychologically perverse effect on man. The complexity of life weighs upon human mind.

The size of the preventive knowledge may be smaller in comparison with the size of the curative knowledge, nevertheless the former is far more valuable. There is a great difference between the natural health free from disease and artificial health susceptible to disease that is medically checked. Therefore just as it is important to have planning in the various institutions of society making use of the available scientific knowledge, there is a need for planning the activity of the knowledge itself. Mere abundance of knowledge may not serve any useful purpose and may even prove harmful in certain ways. Besides the need for an internal organization of the institution of knowledge itself, the kind of planning that is required is that it is brought into such relationships with the general interests of the society as would prove to be both harmless and progressive. It is necessary to see as to what kind of knowledge is growing, in what way it is growing, as well as the direction in which it is growing. It may happen that while the wealth of knowledge is increasing, man-

kind is on the path of decay, simply for want of planning in that growth of knowledge.

XVI. Need for Organising Society on the Foundation of Values

Knowledge is only one of the many human values. It must be brought in coordination with those other values. An integral view of the individual personality and human life must be taken, so that the scientists will realize their responsibility in helping to promote other values of human existence. They cannot afford to shut themselves into their narrow scientific ethos, but they must help the growth of all other values which are as sacred as their own scientific values. The scientists not only make available theoretical knowledge, but they themselves also are responsible for the knowledge of the applications of knowledge. Moreover, a scientist does not cease to be a man. His humanity commonly shared with others must have a priority over his being a man of science. He is a man first and foremost and scientist only afterwards.

The scientists are responsible for both the kinds of knowledge—knowledge for peace and for war, good knowledge as well as bad knowledge. The scientists shelve their responsibility and throw it on the politicians. As a matter of fact both of them are responsible for the evil application of knowledge. It is therefore, a question of the basic relationship between the two institutions, of politics and of science. And their relations are to be determined in the context of the society as a whole. The challenge is really to human intelligence, to reorganize society which automatically will lead to the preservation and progress of the good and elimination of the evil. The very kind of effort that is made for the increase of the scientific knowledge, must be seriously concentrated upon this knowledge which will enable preservation and growth of man and his higher values. The attention

that is paid to the military science and the sciences that help military science is far more than the attention to human and social sciences. The growing neglect of the humanities and the social sciences is proving very harmful. There are of course economical, political, and social philosophies which claim to solve the problem of the ideal social organization, yet their mutual opposition regarding the viewpoints itself results in the cold war of ideologies. The cold war is only a prelude to the hot war. Many a time suspense itself becomes an intolerable situation and men may be led to take the desperate action of effacing the rival ideology for the sake of establishing one ideology for social reconstruction. Only a genius, greater than that of a scientist or a statesman, who combines within him at once the physical and the spiritual strength may have a power to lead mankind out of the prevailing conflict of ideologies. It requires a warm heart, a deep vision, and a magnetic personality to go beyond the narrow ideologies or to integrate them in a manner which may become acceptable to mankind as a whole.

XVII. Conjunction of Good Will and Knowledge

The heights of material and moral progress depend upon the extension of available knowledge. It is sinful to remain ignorant where knowledge enriches life. Therefore, acquisition of knowledge is itself a moral obligation, and a fundamental obligation at that. It is not enough to have good will, which could not be substantiated by good knowledge. Knowledge enables realization of the greater good. Hence a conjunction of good will with the relevant wholesome knowledge is the need of the day. The Socratic conception that virtue is knowledge has this truth in it that a man, who both knows and wills good, is likely to be a better man than a man who does not know, but has only a will to be and to do good. Good will is blind without the right knowledge for effecting the good results, and the right

knowledge is lame without the strength of the good will. Good will is a jewel that shines by its own light, but its light must be first directed upon the acquisition of the right knowledge which alone will help the actualization of the ideal. Thus the Socratic and the Kantian concepts ought to be integrated into the unity of knowledge and good will. Virtue is only a disposition to excellence, its manifestation is through the substantial knowledge of both the means and the ends.

XVIII. Conjunction of the Knowledge of Ends and of Means

The moralists and the saints have emphasized the good will but they have neglected the efficacy of knowledge for the effective implementation and realization of that will. The scientists and the speculative philosophers have put an emphasis upon knowledge and more knowledge, but they have been neglecting the desirability of possessing the good will. Knowledge may be of the ends or of the means. The moralists and the saints have made available the knowledge of the ends but not of the means; the scientists have made available knowledge of the means but they know of no ends. For an integral view of life, both must be proportionately made available so that man can prosper both materially as well as spiritually.

11.

A COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPTION OF DHARMA

I. Dharma is the Principle of Dynamic Existence

THE human mind has conceived nothing more comprehensive as well as subtle in its connotation than what this monosyllabic word dharma stands for. It is the object of this Chapter briefly to elucidate the conception of dharma.

Dharma is derived from *dhr* which variously means to hold, to sustain, to exist, to preserve, to support, to restrain, to assign and to owe. All these meanings are germane for the conception of dharma. Dharma is that which helps to hold or preserve the whole creation, including humanity. It is that which makes the very existence possible. It is that which sustains, supports and restrains by assigning some laws. All that is, owes its existence and nature to it. And in order to be, everything is under the obligation of dharma.

But what it is to be or to exist? What constitutes existence? There is no meaning in mere being as such. To be is to become, to be is to be active. That really is which does ; and it does what it is capable of and is meant for. That truly exists which is capable of growth, and does actually grow. To be, then, is to do, to grow, to evolve, to create according to the law of one's own nature. Dharma, construed in this light, means so to exist as would bring forth creatively the latent potentialities of anything, according to the law of its own nature. Any thing or any action that inhibits this process of creative evolution is contrary to dharma.

But what is the nature of any thing? The nature of a thing

is revealed in what a thing is capable of becoming. A thing cannot become anything if it was not in its nature to become that. It cannot evolve nor create in the absence of that quality in its constitution. There is not a single thing in this manifest universe which is too poor to change, grow, or create even in a meagre manner.

Whatever view we may accept of the evolution of the astronomical universe, there is no doubt that it has its own laws of development. An absolutely static existence is surely inconceivable. Mountains appear to be static. But evidently the whole physical nature apart from its imperceptible yet certain changes, grows at least in time. It becomes aged, with the consequence that a present moment is a resume of the infinite past. Every moment is recorded in its history. None can question the growth of the vegetable kingdom whether in the individual growth of the seed or evolution of the species. So, too, the evolution of animal species has become an old story.

II. Man is a Miniature Universe

When we come to the nature of human existence, the idea of evolution is far more significant. Being on the highest rung of the ladder of evolution, his nature has become very complex. On the plane of body he is identical with the whole of physical existence. On the plane of life, he is identical with the whole of biological existence. On the plane of mind, he is identical with the whole of humanity. On the plane of spirit, he is truly himself and is at the same time identical with the whole of Reality. These planes at once existential and valuational are such that the higher includes the lower. The lower plane is also a means to the higher. The biological existence is not possible without the physical, the mental without the biological, and the spiritual without the mental. For man, then, to be truly himself is to be spiritually creative. But over and above this, an active expression

of the values of the other lower levels is also to be seen, though it should be in a decreasing order from the mental to the bodily being.

Such an existence is the privilege of man, not only because he stands highest, but specially because he is conscious of what he is. And "man partly is and wholly hopes to be." That is, he is what he is capable of becoming and realizing. What he hopes to be, looks after and pines for is an index to his real nature. With consciousness comes an obligation to realize the best values of human existence, the conception of which is not possible on the lower levels. He may be the resume of the past, but unlike the animal and the merely corporeal existence, he is conscious of this present as well as the future that infinitely stretches before him and is rooted within him. The historical past is gathered in the present through memory and the making of the future history is anticipated through aspiration.

III. Dharma is Wisdom Put into Action

Being conscious of himself as replete with infinitely creative potentialities, the man is to act in such a manner as befits his total self including the four-fold aspects. So to act is to follow dharma, not otherwise. He must make a study of this four-fold self with a view to employ his knowledge for the sake of his spiritual development in which consists the significance of his true self. He must understand the laws sustaining the physical nature which is the lowest aspect of his total self. These laws are revealed in Physics, Chemistry, Mineralogy, Agriculture, Meteorology, Engineering, Medicine, etc. He must understand the laws sustaining the biological existence which is the second aspect of his total self. These laws are revealed in Physiology, Hygiene, Genetics, Embryology, Eugenics, Neurology, Botany, Zoology, Anthropology, Dietetics, etc. He must understand the laws sustaining the mental existence which

forms the third aspect of his total self. The mental existence includes the rational, the social, the moral and the aesthetic aspects. These laws are revealed in Psychology, Sociology, Politics, Economics, History, Education, Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics, etc. Finally he must understand the laws of spiritual existence which forms the highest aspect of his total self, and with which he is truly identical. These laws are revealed in Theology, Mysticism, Yogic Psychology, Parapsychology, etc.

It is obvious that every individual cannot become conversant with the details of all these branches of knowledge. But it is incumbent upon man's nature that he must so live as to make a conscious progress in the direction of the realization of his spiritual self through the knowledge of his total self. For this he may not know the details of these sciences. He is directly concerned with the final results of these sciences at a given time. These enter into the disciplining of his whole life. The Sanskrit word *śāstra* (science) literally means that which governs and brings discipline in life (*śāsana* and *anuśāsana*). It is for philosophy to systematize the final findings of these sciences with a view that these may be put to use by each individual for the sake of the individual and social progress. Philosophy, in short, is wisdom of the world. Dharma is, then, a comprehensive wisdom put into action. Man should so act as to be consistent with the injunctions of such comprehensive philosophy. In line with the physical injunctions one should endeavour to become physically perfect. But mere physical perfection or efficiency makes man a machine, a robot. And yet one who is not even physically efficient, one who lingers and idles, is as good as a stone. A stone, no doubt, grows, but only in time; and likewise a man grows temporally aged, remains temporarily so and at last, unlike the stone, dies. In line with the biological injunctions one should endeavour to become biologically perfect that is, full of life, vigour, vitality and strength. He should take scientific exercise, scientific food and

guard himself against diseases. One who does not take exercise, control his palate, abstain from keeping late hours and degenerating habits is acting disobediently to the injunctions of Dharma. But here too mere physiological and hygienic perfection would make man an animal like a lion or an elephant at the best. One, who is not even physiologically perfect, is not better than an amoeba, or a pig or a sheep. In line with the psychological injunctions one should endeavour along with the whole humanity to become humanly, that is, socially and morally perfect. He should try to achieve economic and political order which would enable him and the whole society to progress peacefully in the direction of higher values of rational existence, namely, Truth, Beauty and Good. That social life of man which hinders all such progress is inconsistent with Dharma. But even here mere intellectual, aesthetic or social or moral perfection would produce at the best a Socrates, a Newton or a Milton. One who is not even humanly perfect is at the best an economic or a political animal, but an animal after all. He is a human biped with one foot balanced in the animal pan, and does not totally fall down only because his other foot is in the rational pan compensating that fall. Man is what he is capable of becoming. He can become more than man, superman, God. Man is not truly himself so long as he does not aspire to become superman. This is the province of what is ordinarily called religion. Here man attempts to take an immediate and immense leap into the infinite and spiritual ocean of peace and bliss, and so to become identical with the Ultimate Reality or Brahman. A Buddha or a Christ is the ideal manhood. We have fortunately a series of them in the history of mankind.

IV. Dharma Comprehends All Values of Human Life

In brief, to act up to Dharma is to act up to the laws of physical efficiency which is a means to biological perfection, which, on its part, is made a means to mental and moral

perfection, which again, in its turn, is but a means to spiritual perfection. Dharma is thus far more comprehensive than religion. Dharma is at once an individual and universal matter, religion is a part of Dharma in its individual and spiritual aspect. Dharma, again, is wider than morality, in that the former is universal and individual while the latter is essentially social. Dharma is more comprehensive than even the metaphysics of Brahman or the Ultimate Reality; for while the latter deals with the absolute reality only, the former wants it as an ideal to be spiritually realized by means of the actual laws of the phenomenal existence. In such a comprehensiveness is the index of its subtlety: No human action, bodily, verbal or mental, is free from the implication of Dharma. In fact, man would be preserved if he preserves Dharma.¹ Dharma has the merit of satisfying both the traditional account as well as the modern scientific spirit.

Whatever is conducive to preservation is Dharma.² It is the progressive realization of the total nature of human personality. According to the Vaiśeṣika definition, Dharma is that by which material prosperity (*puṣṭi*) and spiritual beatitude (*tuṣṭi*) is realized.³ Dharma comprehends within its scope the material pleasure (*bhukti*) and the spiritual good (*mukti*) of the whole nature of man. Material secular well-being (*laukika* and *aihika*) is instrumental to spiritual and religious well-being (*pāramārthika* and *pāralaukika*) in the case of the individual as well as the society. If material well-being is not conducive to spiritual well-being then the former is suicidal to human life as a whole. Over-emphasis on either of the notions is self-destructive, as for example the Westerners' over-emphasis on the material and worldly well-being, and the Indians' over-emphasis on the spiritual and other worldly well-being.

¹ *Dharmoraṅgaśati rakṣitaḥ, Mahābhārata.*

² *Dhāraṇāddharmamityūhuḥ, Mahābhārata.*

³ *Yato' bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmah.*

The Vedic culture which is based on knowledge (*veda*) is the harmonization of both these notions. Negligence of either of the aspects of Dharma is detrimental in the long run to the integral well-being.⁴ We become a '*dhārmika*' by becoming irreligious or ultra-religious.

V. The Characteristics of Dharma

Dharma must be rooted in the eternal and the transient aspects of truth (*ṛta* and *satya*). Truth is that which stands the experiential test. Hence no true Dharma can afford to be dogmatic. Dharma should not be in conflict with science and popular experience. The final sanction for Dharma is not a blind faith in the authority of Scriptures, but the rational systematization of values as depicted in them. The doctrine of the five sheaths (*pañcakośa*) stands for the gradational valuation of the human experiences. If Vedas are termed as '*Śāstras*', then our Dharma is founded upon sciences meant to discipline our life.

Truth, however, not being initially realized by every one, faith or belief is an inevitable ingredient of Dharma. To the layman Dharma comes in the form of a dogma. He must accept the injunctions and prohibitions on faith. That is the *Imāmsa* concept of Dharma.⁵ But this faith should not be blind. As every one cannot and need not understand all the details, faith only means economy of effort. It is to profit by the experience of the experts. Experts (*āpta*) are those who know the truth and who speak the truth. The intellectual and moral honesty is combined in them.

Unity and universality is the third feature of Dharma. It follows directly from the unity and universality of truth and

⁴ See the whole of the *Īśopaniṣad*.

⁵ *Codanūlakṣaṇārtho dharmah*.

knowledge on which Dharma is based. Of course, Dharma may have diverse applications and expressions in concrete life, yet in principle, it is one.

The fourth feature of Dharma is its progressive nature. This dynamic conception is very important. Whatever may be the importance of stability and solidarity of the traditional nature of religion both for the individual and social life, it must not be forgotten that cynicism makes life truly lively. When the proper time comes, society must not hesitate to overthrow the older traditions for the newer ones. But this process should be evolutionary in its application of the revolutionary ideas. The absolute values are unchangeable and eternal (*sanātana dharma*) but their expressions are conditioned by the spatial and temporal (*deśa kāla paristhiti*) context. The over-worn dress has to be thrown out. A gradual evolution combines the values of the old and the new, while a revolution upsets the values of the old, resulting in chaos.

This total point of view is lost sight of both by the present advance of sciences and the conservative nature of the existent religions. It is the lack of synoptic, synthetic and coherent point of view in our activities, that is the cause of the present discontent and a feeling of frustration all over the world.

HARMONY THEORY OF VALUES

I. The Origin of Science, Art and Morals

ACCORDING to Vedānta the ultimate reality, whether in the individual self or the world outside, is of the nature of being-knowledge-bliss. Self-expression is the manifestation of the spiritual principle in and through the human intellect. When knowledge is directed upon being it gives rise to truth. Truth is reality known. In this process arise the sciences and philosophies. This knowledge, when it directs itself towards bliss or joy, gives birth to literature and art. It is a mistaken notion that the creativity of human intellect is found in literature and art only. The discovery of a truth or invention of a new idea or an ideal, which are the main functions of science and philosophy, are also the culmination of a creative intellect. When knowledge, touched with emotion, becomes an activity, and when the ideal truth manifests itself in that human activity or conduct, then there is the origin of morality. And the same knowledge, full of emotion turns into an activity expressing joy or beauty, becomes the genesis of arts such as drawing, painting, sculpture, architecture, dance, dramatics and music. Knowledge culminating into a reverential vision of unity of being and bliss is mysticism as the best form of personal religion.

There is a unity of knowledge, feeling and action in human life. Similarly there is a unity of reality, knowledge and bliss. Hence there ought to be a harmonious unity among science, philosophy, religion, morality and art. They are aspects of one and the same unity of human existence, and as such in an ideal human life these must be mutually complementary. All these must evolve simultaneously and in a unison in the perfect indivi-

dual or social life. An over-emphasis on any one of these aspects, or a development of that aspect neglecting the other rightful aspects also will naturally result in a lopsided development, a sort of an imperfection and a lameness in human life. Many a time not understanding this unison in all values the scientists and the artists as well as the moralists, most dogmatically and obstinately, insist upon their own set of values dear only to them and thus they give rise to a condition that hinders the harmonious and integral enrichment of life.

The slogans of the nature of 'Art for the sake of art', 'Knowledge for the sake of knowledge' and 'Virtue for the sake of virtue' (more popularly, 'Duty for the sake of duty') have an origin in such a parochial mentality.

II. Knowledge for the Sake of Knowledge

There is no doubt that the extensive search of truth that the modern sciences have made is beyond comparison to anything that has been done in the past recorded history. The boundaries of human knowledge are very quickly expanding. Science has literally pierced through the microcosmic and the macrocosmic space. But in the egotism of human capacities and possession of knowledge, there is no conscious realization of the fact that the life of mankind is itself at stake. The pursuit of knowledge for the sake of knowledge has turned its back against life itself. While we expect that knowledge should make for salvation, it has actually resulted in a state of fear.

III. Art for Art's Sake

Those who indulge in the pursuit of art for the sake of art pay no attention to what harm they do to a wholesome growth of life as they upset the very values of character and virtue, both in the individual's and society's life. The artists show very little consciousness of the integrity of life. They look askance at the

criticism ensuing from the moralist and the social reformer. Art which has mainly an appeal to human imagination and emotion, takes a quicker possession of the man's mind, and this influence is the more, the more sensuous and coarse the form of art. Music is comparatively finer than dance, dance finer than dramatics, dramatics finer than sculpture and architecture, sculpture finer than painting. This is but a passing suggestion, there is no genuine comparison possible in the distinctive arts with their specialities. Each one of them has its coarse and finer aspects. But the visual arts are certainly more impressive than the others. The modern cinema has outstripped all arts in its yoking other arts into its service. But because of this power that it wields, the direction in which it is put to use may help or hinder the real cultural life of society. Actually, to speak only generally, it has debased human values.

IV. Virtue for Virtue's Sake

The moralists on the other hand have shown very little concern for the variety of human interests. All these interests and especially the aesthetic attitude towards life has its important part to play in bringing a higher kind of happiness to man. But for the fear of the unwholesome trail of associations which the love of the beautiful brings with itself, a puritan and an ascetic attitude is recommended and insisted upon. There may not be any virtue in pleasure itself, neither is any happiness ensured in the ascetic life also. The absolute insistence on what *prima facie* do appear to be negative virtues like continence, non-possession, non-violence and the like, is neither within the capacity of the common man nor is it universally practicable. A conscious virtue is better than a blind virtue. Life cannot afford to be vertically straight without being horizontally in harmony with other aspects of human life and social demands. Bernard Shaw's remark after Gandhiji's assassination is epigrammatic: "It is dangerous to be too good!" It suggests that a comprehensive

good life needs taking note of the variety of the context of circumstances in which a good life is to be lived. There are simultaneously more demands than one which an ideally good life will have to fulfil, and because of their diversity, it is most difficult to live smoothly. The perfect life is much more than ethically virtuous.

Man is not made for the sake of law, the Categorical Imperative, but the law is made for the sake of man. The excess of goodness cannot be good. It means the equilibrium, the harmony of goodness has broken. A good man should be prepared to face the danger for leading a good life, but that does not mean that he should live a dangerously good life by following one virtue, absolutely at the cost of other demands of the complex circumstances of life. 'Virtue is a mean' as Aristotle rightly pointed out, but there is no mathematical calculation at hand to decide this mean. It depends upon the knowledge of the individual. Hence the question of casuistry becomes very important. It is for the worldly wise man to strike at the correct mean. The Gītā also defines virtue as equilibrium (*samatva*). But it requires intelligence to decide it. A man may observe silence (*maun*) for twenty-five years or more as some have actually done. That does not speak of his virtue, for that is the virtue which even a fool can practise. He should be obstinate enough. The observance of the virtue of a measured speech (*mita bhāṣaṇa*) is a wise man's virtue difficult to practise. One can comparatively easily be good in a single direction to be too good, but to harmonize the various aspects of goodness is not a small thing. The real good must be a harmony, it can never be an excess. The dangerous nature of the excess of goodness does not lie in its invitation of danger to the life of the person, its real danger lies in its violating the harmony of a composite nature of goodness. For to be too good is to cross the limits of goodness, it is to be bad. It is a loss of the sense of harmony in values. Hence an excessive growth in any direction to the exclusion, and perhaps at the cost of, other dimensions

of human life is dangerous to the integral view of life. Neither the scientists, nor the artists, nor the moralists use their sense of proportion when they insist upon their own values only.

V. Truth in These Slogans

Lest there may be a misunderstanding of the above discussion, it ought to be pointed out that there is an element of truth in the above slogans, if they are understood in a certain sense. And the sense is that truth, beauty and goodness are ultimate, independent and intrinsic values. Their criteria are internal to them, they have an autonomy of their own. Truth must be tested in terms of the intrinsic logical criterion. Beauty must be tested in terms of the intrinsic aesthetical criterion. Goodness must be tested by the intrinsic ethical criterion. Criteria external to the respective fields are not to be applied to them. They are simply irrelevant. Truth is not decided to be true in terms of the criterion of beauty or goodness, and *vice-versa*. The truth-seeker is primarily a truth-seeker not an aesthetician or a moralist. And an artist is essentially a searcher of beauty, not a seeker of truth, a meliorist or a moralist. Just as there is his own methodology for the scientist, there is his own methodology for the artist. As the Indian Aestheticians have elaborately pointed out, proportion, appropriateness, novelty, coherence, style, suggestiveness, variety, homogeneity, uniformity, symmetry, simplicity, clarity and the central quality of harmony—these values are what the artist seeks, finds, appreciates and creates. To express these qualities in an impressive way in his own work is the autonomous moral policy of the artist. He does not tolerate any external moral criticism. He refuses to be bound by such external controls. His artistic freedom consists in his own aesthetic expression. It is contended by him that the artist lives his own life. His art is the expanse of his consciousness (*cetovistāra*). Art is a motiveless play of the artist for his own enjoyment (*svāntah sukhāya*). There is no doubt

that this is a faithful description of any great artist's psychology of the creative process. All this is very significant and the non-artists should take a note of it, if they are not to do an injustice to him.

There cannot be any insistence on the reduction of one value to the other. Truth cannot be reduced to beauty, nor beauty to goodness. But even accepting this much, the lacuna in this view must be shown. And it is the obligation of the scientist and especially the artist to appreciate the point that will presently be made.

VI. Error in These Slogans

The question is : Are beauty and goodness related or not ? It is very difficult to deny any relation between them. For whatever objective relation there may or may not be between the two, they must at least be related as belonging to and springing from the same unity of life or experience of man. The very life that is the source of the experience of beauty also gives the experience of goodness and truth. And if life does not afford of compartmental divisions, these experiences must have inter-relationships which give significance and value to any and all of these. To tear one kind of experience from the rest is to impoverish it of its full significance. It is necessary, therefore, for an integral life that it must seek all the values which it affords and seek them in such a manner that it does justice to all without impairing the just demands that each value claims for itself. Not to pay attention to such a harmonious experience of all values is to undervalue the values of life itself. In this sense, therefore, all values are in relation with one another.

We cannot seek beauty, therefore, in such a manner as if it were the only value which life offers. Nor can we exclude the claims of beauty on life. The same may be said of every other value. In order, therefore, to reach a harmony amongst

these values we must have a clear idea of a valuation of all the values. In reaching such an estimation of values they must necessarily be brought in relation with one another. For the concept of valuation of values is impossible if the values are mutually exclusive or independent of one another.

We must learn to see truth in beauty, and beauty in truth and goodness. So must we learn to see goodness in beauty and truth, and truth in goodness. It is quite possible that one and the same reality has all these aspects of value. And even though each of these values has an intrinsic claim none of the claim is really exclusive of the others.

When an artist seeks beauty he must not neglect the claim of the other values of truth and goodness. There is of course a possibility of the acquisition of the value of beauty which is not in a special way either conducive to truth and goodness or harmful to these values. There is, perhaps, a creation of a beautiful form which is harmless from the point of view of truth or goodness. To the extent that it is possible for beauty to be indifferent to the cognitive and conative values, without harming them, it may legitimately be pursued for its own sake. But whenever there is even the least chance of a harm being done to these other values of life, the seeking of the beauty-value must be stopped.

An artist may recognise the interrelationship amongst these values and act up to this knowledge. He may seek values of human life, and may make a positive attempt to enrich these other values through the medium of the value which is dear to him, in this case he is an ideal artist. Or even recognising this interrelationship he may be indifferent to this knowledge, and thus seek beauty which may positively prove harmful to the other values of life, in which case, even if he is good as an artist he is not good as a man and therefore his search of beauty must be regarded as immoral. There, of course, may be an artist who has no knowledge of this interrelationship, or possibly he is of

opinion that there is no such relationship, and he may express beauty in a harmful manner without knowing that it is harmful. In this case he is ignorant and a fool. We do not want artists who are either foolish or immoral. An artist should be both wise and good besides being a true lover of beauty. As a matter of fact the fullest beauty consists in its harmony with truth and goodness. Lesser than that is beauty which is harmless to these values. The worst is the beauty which is positively harmful to other values. The question is whether beauty which harms other values remains beauty at all. Possibly the least thing that beauty requires is that it is not harmful to the other values of life, even though it has nothing positively to contribute to these other values.

The whole question boils down to this. Does the artist cease to be a man? Does the scientist or the seeker after truth cease to be a human being? If any of them does not cease to be a man he cannot shelve the duties of being a man. The artist has his duties to perform as an artist, but these duties cannot supersede the duties of being a human being. Everybody ought to be first a man and then anything else in specific.

The scientist, the artist and the moralist—are all of them so overwhelmed by the love of their own objects that they have become altogether blind to the unity and richness of life in other respects. When society is replete with such blind zealots, there is an apparent richness of values, and yet nothing but chaos would result in such a society. In spite of the prolific growth of the individual values there will be a poverty of their mutual harmony. The values which spring from the unity of life must be mutually in the relationship of harmony. And this harmony would result only if each value is followed in such a way that it remains faithful to the main spring of human life.

VII. Harmony Theory of Truth

A little more consideration will show that there is not

merely an external relation of harmony amongst them but there is a genuine internal harmony in them. This internal harmony is also the natural result of the unity of life which manifests itself in the multifarious values.

There is at least one important criterion which is uniformly applicable to all the three values though all of them have their respective internal tests. And this common criterion is of harmony itself.

That knowledge which is internally harmonious, that is self-consistent or coherent, is likely to be true. But that likelihood increases, if in addition to the internal harmony, that knowledge is somehow seen to be or believed to be in harmony with the actual reality external to it. Correspondence or agreement theory of truth is really the test of harmony between the order of knowledge and the order of being. The realization of this mutual harmony of knowledge and reality is made possible by the further harmony of knowledge with practice. The pragmatic test of utility of knowledge or its workability is in essence a harmony of theory and practice. The three criteria of truth, thus are not different from one another but three aspects of harmony. Idealism, realism and pragmatism together help to make the complete truth. Where these three ways of harmony are not realized, there is a suspicion about the truthfulness of a piece of knowledge.

VIII. Harmony Theory of Beauty

Harmony is the principal criterion of beauty. The various constituents and the determinants of beauty mentioned above in Section V help to promote harmony. The richer the harmony, the richer is the beauty, whether in poetry, dance, or music, though the character of harmony will be specifically different according to the qualitative differences of the arts. This is not always a quantitatively measurable harmony, but a qualitative

harmony. And this is realized only by one who experiences a harmony between himself and the object of beauty. The beauty of an object is not revealed so long as it is not brought into a harmonious feeling with oneself. This beauty is not an object of sensuous experience alone, but also of reason and emotion. It is especially the affective aspect of experience that brings the aesthetic subject in harmony with the beautiful object. For the appreciation of the artist's work also a harm—only between the hearts of the artist and the critic is necessary. This is spoken of as *hṛdayasaṁvāda*.

IX. Harmony Theory of Goodness

The principle of harmony also works in the moral sphere. That conduct which is internally coherent or harmonious is good. The rationalist ethics suggests this criterion of the internal harmony. Similarly a man is said to be good in whose thought, speech and action there is a harmony. It is the rationally determined principle that is harmoniously manifested in speech as well as conduct. But this is the minimum of moral goodness. The really good man is one who seeks harmony in thought, sentiment and will in himself and also with those of others. That conduct is good which brings the greatest number of men in harmonious relationships with one another. That is the universalist and the altruist criterion. This altruism begins with the blood-relationship of the family, and is extended to the tribe, the community, the nation and the mankind. The intensity of harmony is in the internal aspects of human personality—the physical (*annamaya*), the vital (*prāṇamaya*), the mental (*manomaya*), the intellectual (*vijñānamaya*), the aesthetic or the intuitive (*ānandamaya*), and the spiritual (*ātman*)—with a valuational gradation in them, making the spiritual aspect of personality the central principle of organization of the other aspects. This is the perfectionist theory of morals, also known by the name of self-realization. The self to be integrally realized is such a complex one. Eudaemonia or

well-being of the individual consists in the harmonious integration of these various elements in the total personality. That is the true hedonist theory also, according to which happiness somehow has an intrinsic value. The extensity of harmony to other human beings is the social aspect of the theory of goodness. The intensity of the internal harmony is harmonious with the extensity of the external harmony in the society. There is a natural and an increasing adjustment and readjustment between the internal and the external. That is the central conception of the evolutionary ethics emphasising the progressive mutual readjustments of new values and new situations. Facts and values must be harmonized.

In the opinion of the Indian thinkers the sphere of morality does not confine itself to mankind. But it reaches beyond men to the animate and the inanimate spheres. The whole universe is to be brought into harmony. Thus even if within the human society there are the individual rights and the complementary duties, the essence of morality consists in the disinterested emphasis on one's own dutiful attitude towards the others, rather than an insistence upon one's rights. The individual can command an internal adjustment of duty to others, but cannot command the adjustment of others towards himself. As a matter of fact, in an ideal personality the only right one possesses is that of doing one's duty.¹ Further, with reference to the animate and the inanimate spheres too, a human being has duties towards them without the possibility of claiming any rights from them. The humanity has to harmonize its relations to the vegetable, the animal and the inanimate kingdoms, by observing certain duties towards them without claiming anything from them. The animals and the inanimate objects have their rights though they have no consciousness of rights. Men alone can recognise these and make their rights

¹ Cf. *Karmaṇyevādhikāraste*, *Gitā*, II, 47.

The only right (*adhikāra*) that you have is to do your duty (*karma*).

his own unilateral obligations. In the Indian scheme of things the principle of harmonious relationship is extended even to the invisible existence in the form of spirits, the departed souls and deities behind such objects as rivers, hills, trees etc. The visible and the invisible together form one harmonious whole and it is obligatory on man, for the well being of himself and all others concerned, to help keep this harmony by the performance of certain sacrifices and rituals. This is the great idealist ethics. The belief in the eternal order of this value-scheme of harmonious existence makes men more responsible as well as reverential to the whole universe.

X. Internal Harmony among Values

Thus we have seen that the one criterion of harmony is uniformly and most adequately applicable to truth, beauty and goodness. That is the test of their intrinsic unity. Their harmony is natural to them, not an artificial superimposition. Therefore, the insistence upon a conscious realization of harmony in them is an obligatory principle upon which every thinking man should plan his activity.

The realization of truth pacifies the intellect, the realization of beauty pacifies the emotion, the realization of goodness pacifies the will. Then naturally the three kinds of evils—the physical (*ādhibhautika*), the mental or the supernatural (*ādhidai-vik*) and the spiritual (*ādhyātmika*) come to an end.

Hence it was a practice with the old Upaniṣadic sages to repeat thrice the invocation of Peace—(*Śāntiḥ, śāntiḥ, śāntiḥ*). Peace for them constituted the highest value. The Spirit or Ātman is described as *Śānta*.²

² *Śanto'yamātmā*.

13.

NATURE AND FORMS OF CREATIVITY

I. Axionoetics and Creativity

WE have traced the significance of the concept of value in all the spheres of human knowledge such as science, philosophy, religion, history, ethics and art. By employing the criterion of value we have attempted to organize human knowledge into one system expressive of a variety of human values. Thus Axionoetics is a comprehensive theory of knowledge which could also be identified with the whole of philosophical investigation. The essential nature of philosophy is axionoetic, that is, evaluation of human knowledge in all its concrete forms. Philosophy is love of wisdom. There is no wisdom without valuational discrimination. And no enquiry which is apathetic of valuational view-point can legitimately be called philosophy in the original sense of the term.

We have mentioned valuational discrimination as an essential nature of human intelligence. At the back of philosophy is this discriminative and evaluative intelligence. But we have also mentioned creativity as an essence of intelligence. That notion of creativity which is at the back of all human intelligent effort is attempted to be analysed in this last chapter.

II. Spontaneity

Creativity is an important term which has been used in the different universes of discourse, but often without much clarity of connotation.

Creativity is such an activity which is essentially characterised by spontaneity. Spontaneity is absence of external compulsion. Wherever there is determination from without, there cannot be any creativity in the activity. The source of the

activity has to be purely from within the agent. It is wholly an internal or self-springing activity.

There is a certain sort of all-of-a-suddenness, an uncontrolled fluidity in the spontaneous activity. Preplanning, deliberation, elaborate ratiocination are foreign to creativity as such. Of course a certain human activity which is very complex may have these, but they are not the determinants of that aspect of creativity which the act involves. The spontaneity of the creative activity is independent of these extra, if not external factors. These factors are called extra in the sense that they do not directly influence the element of creativity. They may be irrelevant or accidental conditions like the scaffolding of a structure. Perspiration is only an invocation of inspiration, it does not constitute, nor explain inspiration.

III. Freedom and Openness

Creativity thus has to be an absolutely free activity. Freedom of the creative act consists in the absence of determination whether mechanical or teleological. There is neither a push from behind nor a pull from before. Bergson has rightly pointed out that teleology is only inverted mechanism. Freedom, therefore, abhors finalism as much as causal necessity. Though, on the whole the creative act has a futuristic tendency, it is not fore-conditioned by future in the same way as it is not pre-conditioned by the past. Creativity refers eternally to the present wherein alone its significant meaning becomes eloquent. The references either to the past or to the future are out of question, being wholly arbitrary or incidental and hence meaningless in this connection. It is in this sense that spontaneity could be described as instantaneous activity.

In many creative acts as those of composing a poem or painting a picture, there could be shown such elements as preplanning, thoughtful deliberation, an expression of a purpose, a realization

of an end, but all these elements are comparatively vague and unimportant. They only indicate the complexity of the human act, but none of these factors is definitive of the creative element in the act. For example, whatever end may be involved in the act, the artist may also experience the constant shifting of the end. The ends continuously come to an end, not because they are continuously being realized, but more frequently because they are not specifically entertained, as they may be found to be altogether inadequate for the freedom of expression. But the more essential fact is that creativity as much applies to the end as to the process of the realization of the end. The artist's or the poet's reshuffling of the efforts is nothing but the waiting upon the creative instant to fall from heaven as it were. There may be a period of long dissatisfaction, before the actual happiness of freedom may dawn. And till that moment dawns, there is a constant reformation of the form, a continuous reconstruction of the ideal, a ceaseless revaluation of the values. In this sense a free activity is an open activity. It is not bound to any set of circumstances or any routine traditions and rules of procedure. It is not closed to this or that mode of thinking, or to a code of values, or to a barricade of regulations and principles of methodology or technique. The openness of an activity consists in beginning from the beginning. It is rethinking, refeeling, rewillling. The creative agent is open even to refuse to think, feel and will. He is open to accept or to reject or to cut a line unknown before. It is owing to this freedom that unheard of voices could be heard and voiced, unseen shapes and colours could be visualised, unthought of ideas could be thought about, in short, it is freedom which has the richest possibilities of experiencing things not experienced before. Herein lies the secret of the psychology of an inventive genius.

IV. Originality

In this openness of freedom lies the originality of the crea-

tive act. Originality means irreducibility to anything more fundamental, for the simple reason that the original is itself the fundamental. There is nothing more primal, nothing more ultimate in terms of which the originality could be explained. The creative act is its own law, it constitutes an autonomous value, it forms a class by itself. Originality is absolute individuality, a uniqueness, a *viśeṣa*. The original could not be therefore, assimilated to anything else, because there is nothing similar to it. It could not be brought under a wider class or genus, and hence the originality of the creative act is indefinable and inexplicable. The original neither could be compared with anything nor significantly contrasted with anything, nor could it be analysed into simpler and more elemental. Originality, is thus opposed to imitation, copying, repetition and reproduction.

V. Novelty

This originality leads to novelty as an important feature of creativity. The novelty is not merely in degree but in kind, not only in quantity but in quality. It is a passage from confusion to configuration, from chaos to order, from nonsense to sense. The creativity leads to something 'more', something 'different' which is not merely a resultant, like the parallelogram of forces, or a derivative, like the conclusion from the premises, but an emergent like the lotus from the mud. In short, creativity leads to a sort of new value. In fact, bringing out new values into existence is perhaps the most distinctive and striking criterion of the creative process. That which is reducible to the already existent, that which could in some sense be assimilated to the past, has no novelty or creativity in it. It is freshness of being that determines creativity. It is newness that marks the genuineness of creativity. It is the element of happy surprise that surpasses the past, and in which surprise the present as it were breaks away from the past. Novelty is discontinuity, variation, mutation, reconstruction, redistribution, revolution, reorientation.

VI. Unpredictability

In this novelty, again, we get another characteristic of creativity, and that is unpredictability. There is a very interesting and a thought-provoking controversy in Indian Philosophy regarding the question: Is the effect contained in the cause? The Vaiśeṣikas say, "No, the effect is new, it has got its own *viśeṣa*. This is aptly called *ārambhavāda*, because the effect is to them a new beginning. The Sāṅkhyas answer the question by saying, 'Yes, the effect is already there in the cause. This is known as '*pariṇāmavāda*' where the effect is looked upon as an evolute or an unfoldment of the cause. The latent becomes patent, the unmanifest becomes manifest. Very strong arguments, which have become classical since then, have been given on both the sides. And there has been a general tendency to side with the Sāṅkhyas as expressing theoretically the stronger position. But a slightly critical as well as a sympathetic understanding of the two positions will show that both are right, only from their respective points of view.

The Vaiśeṣikas take the pragmatic, or the prospective view and then the effect is practically unpredictable, because it could not be foreseen. This could be extensively illustrated from the fields of chemistry and biology. Whereas the Sāṅkhyas take the theoretical and retrospective view of the situation, and declare that the fact of the effect being contained in the cause is logically unassailable.

Given only the cause, we don't know always in advance what the effect will necessarily be. The past does not throw light on the future. There is no guaranty that the present expectations will be fulfilled in the future. There is no unmistakable clue in the 'now' as to what would be 'then'. The prospective attitude is an attitude to the unknown future and there is always an element of chance and a genuine ignorance about what may happen. Here the interest is not so much in the

theoretical knowledge of an abstract law of causation which throws no light upon the concrete facts. The abstract conception of the universal does not enable us to know the particular. The categorical statement that the future resembles the past, as a student of logic well knows, does not clarify the meaning of the law of Uniformity of Nature. The future may not resemble the past, it may be wholly unlike the past, and hence there is an element of chance and unpredictability. The law of uniformity is hypothetical, which means that if a certain thing happens then a certain other thing will happen, and it is a big 'if'. For who can, with all the definiteness, say that a certain thing in all its uniqueness is ever repeated so that its effect too in all its uniqueness can be repeated? The connection between the two unique events as cause and effect, is itself unique not likely to be often repeated. The Vaiśeṣikas are interested in this specificness, the actual, the particular, the *viśeṣa* in everything. They have recognised two categories of *asmānya* and *viśeṣa* as independent of each other. The universal does not enlighten us about the particular. The particular is inexplicable in terms of the universal. Both the categories of the universal and the particular have their practical advantages and therefore they may be entertained as of equal value. And hence any expectation of the particularity of the effect to lie in the particular cause is out of question.

VII. The Sāṅkhya view .

The Sāṅkhya position need only broadly be considered here in detail. The cause must be in some sense regarded as the repository of the effect. If the whole cause is taken into account there cannot be any element in the effect which is exterior to the whole. The given effect could be explained wholly in terms of the preceding cause. This is the strength of the retrospective view. Logically too, the cause must be all-inclusive of the effect, and thus the novelty of the effect altogether disappears. Yet this

position is not opposed to the unpredictable nature of the future effect. Thus if we allow for the differences of the points of view between the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhya positions we must agree that both of them are right without prejudicing unpredictability. Whether the effect is or is not new, before it actually takes place, it is not always foreknown. This unpredictability goes on increasing as we pass from the physical to the chemical, biological, mental, social, artistic and spiritual spheres.

VIII. The Paradox of Creativity

This, in fact, is the paradox of creativity. That it must hold together the old and the new. The present must somehow unite the past and the future. It has to be simultaneously continuous and discontinuous. Creativity is a mysterious phenomenon in which the logically invariable practically manifests itself in variations, the ideally immutable actually expresses itself in mutations. It must be at once identical and different, one and many, homogeneous and heterogeneous, universal and particular, being and nothing.

IX. The Jain and the Vedānta views

It is with reference to the possible differences in the attitudes that could be taken towards a certain problem that the Jain position of *syādvāda* could be justified here. To the question, 'Is the effect contained in the cause?' the meaningful answers are: (1) Possibly it is (2) Possibly it is not (3) Possibly it is and is not (4) Possibly it is undescribable (5) Possibly it is and yet undescribable (6) Possibly it is not and yet undescribable and (7) Possibly it is and is not and yet undescribable. Whether we accept all these attitudes to the question or not, these attitudes reveal the mysterious character of the relation between the cause and the effect. The Vedānta system also joins in accentuating the mysterious character of the relation. What the Jain calls *avak tavya*, the Vedānta calls *anirvacanīya*.

All the six systems accept that every event has a cause. This is what is known as *satkāraṇavāda*. Only they have held different positions regarding the relation between the cause and the effect. Excepting the Vedānta they accept the reality of both the cause and the effect. Both are *sat*. But while for the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika the effect is new for the Sāṅkhya it is not new. While for the Vedānta the cause is *sat* but the effect is ultimately *asat* and provisionally *anirvacanīya*.

As opposed to these positions the Buddhist position is that the cause also is *asat*. And this is very significant.

X. Creativity *ex nihilo* : The Nyāya and the Bauddha views

In spite of the apparent absurdity of the Buddhistic position there is a modicum of truth in it. The question is: Has the concept of 'nothing' to play any important part in creativity? It will be observed that all those who have accepted the possibility of creativity have either directly or indirectly accepted the role of nothing in creation.

Either the being alone is and there is no possibility of the experience of variety. But variety and plurality are actually experienced. This is not possible unless there is a reference to a principle which alone could explain change, mutation, plurality, variety and novelty. That principle is not other than nothing. Being alone cannot explain becoming.

In so far as the Vaiśeṣikas have accepted the novelty of the effect, they have recognised the part that the idea of nothing plays in creativity. There is a posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṁ-sābhāva*) of the cause and a prior non-existence of the effect in between the cause and the effect. It means that there is a moment of gap, a vacuum, as it were in between the cause and the effect. Logic does not allow any such gap, it insists upon the immediacy between the cause and the effect. The Nyāya

definition of cause recognises it as immediate antecedent (*niyata-pūrvavartī*) in relation to the effect. Immediacy means that there is 'nothing' in between the cause and the effect. But how to understand this nothingness? If there is really nothing in between these two then what separates them and makes them different? Nothing is a principle in virtue of which the one becomes two. It is a principle that is responsible for newness of the effect. Either the effect is absolutely identical with the cause and then the effect is no more there as an effect. Or it is different from the cause and then the being of the cause cannot account for this difference in the effect. Whence this novelty of the effect which the being of the cause cannot explain? The novelty must be regarded as having sprung into existence from nothing. That which was not has somehow come to be. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position is regarded as (*ardha-vaināśika*,) half-nihilist in so far as the reality of the cause also is recognised. But once the principle of the creation of novelty of being out of nothing is accepted, the Buddhists cannot see why there should be such a half-hearted recognition of this principle. All this world of novelty and variety could be regarded as springing epigenetically from nothing. This position of the Buddhists is known as perfect nihilism or (*pūrṇavaināśika*.) It is remarkable that Plato had accepted this category of nothing to explain the world of matter. Aristotle too had identified matter with nothing. Hegel had to resort to the idea of nothing to explain becoming. Bergson has shown the significant richness of the idea of nothing, which according to him stands for the fulness of being. Creativity thus cannot be explained unless the original being of the cause or the subsequent being of the effect is somehow made to pass through nothing. All creativity is in essence *ex nihilo*. The idea of nothing is so very important that it alone supplies the clue for the understanding of the several characteristics of creativity.

Thus creativity is spontaneous only because that which originally is nothing comes into being. Creativity is free on account of nothing not being bound by anything. Creativity owes its originality to nothing. Its novelty too is because of nothing passing into being. Hence, too the unpredictable nature of creativity. The principle of nothing thus appears to deserve a recognition as an independent category. So have the Vaiśeṣikas given *abhāva* a place among the *padārthas*. The mystery of it all is that though ontologically its status is nothing, epistemologically it has to be recognised as serving a positive function. In this respect nothing is adequately identifiable with *māyā*, which though nothing, appears to be. Though negative in essence *māyā* is positive in form (*bhāvarāpa*).

XI. Sportivity

The next characteristic of creativity is sportivity (*līlā*). Sportivity implies three things: playfulness, motivelessness, and joyfulness. Playfulness is opposite to laboriousness and drudgery. The playfulness of the creative act consists in its naturalness, simplicity and ease. There is no experience of hardship, no feeling of difficulty or obstruction. Creativity is opposed to studiedness, artificiality and sophistication.

Creative activity is without any ulterior motive. It is an end in itself. It constitutes an intrinsic value. The poet composes, the singer sings, the painter paints, because they cannot help it. These activities may serve some purpose, but they do not originate in purpose. The utilitarian value of the creative act is only a by-product. Utility is not the motive power behind creation. It is essentially self-centred, self-complete and autonomous activity of self-fulfilment.

Creativity springs in an overflowing joy, is attended with joy, is replete with joy and ends in joy. Joyfulness is probably the hall-mark of the experience of creativity. In fact, joyfulness is

the very life and substance of creativity. The joy of creativity is its own reward.

XII. Progressiveness

But all true creativity is, in spite of itself, an onward march an upward process. In this lies progressive character. The creative act is not merely a change, it is of necessity a change for the better in some respects. Creation thus is opposed to destruction, though destruction may sometimes form a moment in creation. Creativity is not a regress, but a progress; not a suppression; but an expression; not a decrease; but an increase; not an impoverishment, but an enrichment; not a diminution, but a fulfilment. Creativity is an excellence, a perfection, an integration. It is an upliftment, an elevation, an appreciation. It is generation, growth, evolvment. Creativity is, in short, a transvaluation of values to a higher level.

To summarise, creativity is a mysterious activity conjugating being and nothing and characterised by spontaneity, freedom, originality, novelty, unpredictability, sportivity and progressiveness.

XIII. Forms of Creativity

This creativity is not found at its best in all spheres of existence. The above characteristics of creativity take on different forms at the different levels of reality. Here is a brief but a very suggestive indication only.

Thus at the level of matter, the mechanical activity is mostly repetitive as in a machine, and redistributive as in a kaleidoscope. Even in a mechanical jerk there is an emergence of a new design. But nowadays even mechanical brains are coming very near to human intelligent activity. Thus creativity of a sort begins even with matter as the lowest form of existence.

The chemical activity is constitutive in its nature. It is constitutive of the elements into a variety of compounds, each one of which has new properties irreducible to those of the elements.

At the level of life, the creative activity becomes assimilative of food, adaptive to circumstances, regenerative of its own form, and evolutionary growth of the individual and the species.

At the level of mind the creativity is in all the aspects: cognitive affective and conative. Under cognitive activity come (i) Instinctive activity, which is directive of animal and human activity, (ii) Perceptive activity which is formative of sensations, (iii) Intellectual activity which is constructive upon the perceptions, and (iv) Intuitive activity which is semi-creative of axioms, postulates, hypotheses and values.

The intellectual constructions take on different aspects in the different sciences. In the exact mathematical sciences, the intellect is analytic and deductive. In the empirical sciences the intellect is synthetic and inductive. In the positive sciences the activity is descriptive of facts, in the normative sciences it is appreciative of values and ideals. In the speculative science or philosophy the intellectual activity consists in the construction of a comprehensive world-view.

At the affective level we have (1) Literature, where the activity is mainly imaginative, (2) Fine Arts which are recreative and (3) mysticism or religion which is meditative or devotional.

At the conative level the crafts are productive, the applied sciences and technology are inventive, and morals are progressive. It must be remembered that all these terms are to be taken as distinctive and not exclusive of the various forms.

XIV. The Nature of the Creative Urge

This is all a fine description of creativity. But what is its explanation? What is the creative urge, the impetus, behind

the creative process? Is the ultimate urge in matter, life, reason, will, nous, entelechy etc. as the various philosophers have suggested? The Vedāntic answer is, it is spirit or Brahman, the Sāṅkhyas call it Puruṣa, the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas call it God. God has the creative power of Māyā through which he can become anything and everything (*Sarva-bhavana-Sāmarthya*). Māyā is a mysterious power of concealing (*āvaraṇa*) and spreading (*Vikṣepa*) through which God can do, undo, or do otherwise than what is (*Kartumakartumanyathākartum Śakti*). As a matter of fact he has undone himself, by covering himself and putting forth this world. That is the supreme creative act. Art lies in concealing art. God is the greatest artist who has concealed himself behind the whole show of creation. But we must understand this creation as a mode of God's self-expression. Man, being identical in spirit with God, participates in this creative self-expression through all forms of knowledge.

CONCLUSION

THE philosophical approach may in the first place be ontological, metaphysical, existential, objective, impersonal, factual, in which case it begins and ends with some concept of 'Being'. In the second place the approach may be epistemological, cognitive, subjective, personal, experiential, — in which case it begins and ends with some concept of 'spirit or consciousness'. In the third place the approach may be valuational, appreciative, normative ethical, æsthetic, axiological — in which case it begins and ends with some concept of 'bliss, joy, beatitude' as the criterion of value. It is one and the same Reality which is characterised as either '*sat*' or '*cit*' or '*ānanda*' commensurate with the characteristic nature of the method of approach. The proper understanding of philosophy is that these approaches are complementary rather than alternative and exclusive.

All these approaches originate in the consciousness of man. He comes to see that in order to be objective he cannot totally transcend himself. However he may value the necessity of having an impersonal view of Reality, he cannot escape his personality. He, therefore, finds a way out of this difficulty not by the impossible as well as undesirable elimination of subjectivity but, on the one hand, by the elimination of the idiosyncracies, and on the other, by the enrichment of his personality. The value of Knowledge of Reality increases in proportion as there is an integration of the subjects personality. Self-realization is essentially self-perfection or self-idealization. This method is the best equipment for the Knowledge of Reality.

But in what does this integration or idealization of the personality consist? It consists essentially in the expression and fulfilment of the values of truly human existence. There is in

man an innate sense of values. His experience of values is personal, nonetheless, the meaning and significance of this experience is transpersonal and universal. Thus the compensation for subjectivity is made by a valuational approach. There is an increasing value from the objective to the subjective approach, and thence to the valuational. The objectivity which appears to be lost in the inevitable subjectivity is made good by the valuational fulfilment. The evaluation of personality is in terms of the values for which a person stands and which he expresses in thought, speech and action. And the understanding of Reality is to be evaluated in terms of such valued personality. Thus value determines validity and validity determines Reality. This is in brief the standpoint of Axionoetics.

The human personality is complex. It is the embodiment of physical, biological, psychological, intellectual, social, moral, aesthetic and spiritual values. These are interrelated in a hierarchical harmony in an ideal personality. All these are studied in the various sciences and philosophies. They are at once autonomous and complementarily interrelated. Organisation of these various forms of knowledge—scientific, literary, philosophical, historical, religious, moral and artistic in terms of the values which are most naturally revealed and expressed in the human life and experience is the aim and end of all true philosophy. The fundamental unity and continuity of human existence is the running thread through all forms of his knowledge. Whenever there is an apparent conflict between the scientific and the philosophical, the moral and the æsthetic, the material and the spiritual, and so on, the verification of truth is to be made by making an appeal to the basic unity of the human life, and especially to the integrated personality in which values come to be coordinated and organised.

Such valuational orientation of the most comprehensive and concrete human institution of all kinds of knowledge is in con-

sistency with the essentially creative nature of man's consciousness. The man must be taken at his best to understand his best achievements. He is the creator of values, and through their realization, the maker of his destiny.

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should not start with the elementary principle of value rather than that of fact, as the experience of value is at once immediate and fundamental in the human experience, and universal as well as meaningful in its appeal.

Axionoetics or valuational theory of knowledge is an initiation of a distinctive discipline which is bound to have a far-reaching influence upon the contemporary and future thought in all the departments of human knowledge.

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